the study of culture and ramifications for philosophy

in a previous blog entry, i described how culture is "the summation and totality of epistemological issues manifested through metaphysical means and their interactions with pure metaphysics." i then proceeded to explain why culture cannot be investigated scientifically -- due to "social science's major fundamental flaw". so, if the root of culture is ultimately epistemological, then what does the study of culture amount to? the study of culture is ultimately philosophical, as much as social scientists might want to claim it as their own; social scientists merely describe in detail the manifestations of culture, they do not investigate the nature of culture at its root source. so, if culture is in philosophy's domain, then why hasn't any apparent progress been made? well, first of all, philosophy has yet to solve numerous outstanding epistemological problems. however, a more fundamental issue doesn't lie with the existence of problems in the discipline -- every discipline has problems that have yet to be solved -- but with the underlying approach in attempting to solve these problems (sometimes one must wonder if some philosophers are actually attempting to solve these problems but are instead just dancing around them and making things more complicated in the process). richard rorty once commented something along the lines of how philosophy's ultimate failure was its inability to escape its own cultural limitations. i'm not sure exactly what he meant by this statement, but i'm sure it's either one of two possibilities: 1) culture makes philosophy subjective, or 2) philosophy's goal at the outset of the 20th century to fulfill its expected potential was investigate its own problems with language. if rorty's criticism is for the first possibility, then i would consider it irrelevant as one could argue that culture "taints" any discipline, from math to history. also, i would use searle's argument that "ontological subjectivity does not preclude epistemic objectivity" to render this idea of cultural interference as moot. it seems to me that people accusing science as being untruthful are doing so because it is not a complete and independent whole, a perfect ontology; they don't understand the history of epistemology and how science -- physics -- eventually became a branch independent of metaphysics due to epistemological foundations, not metaphysical incongruities. as a result, their criticisms of science result from ontological misunderstandings, mistaking a perfect external realm of the existence of objects of study with a perfect internal interpretation and method of inquiry into an external realm. the epistemological foundations they attack to undermine science's authority are also part of the same epistemological foundations that allowed science to separate itself from metaphysics, and as a result, abdicate some of its universal claims. if rorty's criticism is for the second possibility, then he is correct: philosophy has failed to overcome its internal issues with language, and it is the conflict over how to address this core problem that has resulted in the analytic/continental divide. however, i would like to revisit searle's quote that "ontological subjectivity does not preclude epistemic objectivity". the argument that language is embedded in culture is commonly used to dismiss analytic attempts at philosophizing about language -- "philosophy of language" is the name of this area of specialization. however, i believe that people making this argument fallaciously mistake culture for being solely its metaphysical manifestations, hence being ontologically subjective. when one realizes that culture is ultimately epistemological and not metaphysical, then the possibility for language as being culturally-embedded being an objective notion instead of a subjective one makes the case for an objective inquiry into the study of language and culture much more compelling. ultimately, artificial intelligence will empirically help resolve the dispute one way or another, with computational linguistics embracing the paradigm of traditional linguistics, while postmodernist philosophers, with their insistence of language and culturally being inextricably linked together in a subjective fashion, and an accompanying approach in linguistic anthropology have not been applied to artificial intelligence and have remained exclusively in the realms of the social sciences and humanities.

answer to an age old question

here's an interesting observation i recently made about the correspondence theory of truth. for those needing a little refresher, here's what wikipedia says: "The correspondence theory of truth states that the truth or falsity of a statement is determined only by how it relates to the world, and whether it accurately describes (i.e., corresponds with) that world." this a point of much contention in philosophy, as ancient philosophers and most analytics believe in this theory, whereas continental and postmodernist philosophers reject it (heidegger being the most prominent since he focused much of his work on the nature of being stemming from the ancients' interpretation of it, ultimately rejecting their viewpoint on this theory). after some ruminating, it appears to me that both sides are wrong. by believing in the correspondence theory of truth, you have to make a leap of faith regarding epistemological issues and disregarding them as irrelevant to our ability to understand metaphysics. however, not believing in the correspondence theory of truth only is compatible with the belief system of a single person. why is this so and what is its relevance? when more than one person does not believe in the correspondence theory of truth, they are coming to a common agreement both metaphysically and epistemologically. now, if both metaphysical and epistemological compatibility to an agreement on any sort of topic other than the correspondence theory of truth occurred between two people or among n people, one could argue that such an agreement was either a particular agreement to a particular set of people, or a universal agreement, rendering the need for a common agreement among a group of people irrelevant. but in coming to a common agreement regarding the correspondence theory of truth, a group of people has established a universal precedent, albeit in a particular setting, for the need of the existence of the correspondence theory of truth in order to fully and completely reject it. before i return to this point to reexamine the fine print, let me clearly recapitulate the apparent contradiction: one can only reject the correspondence theory of truth by collectively conceiving it first. now, in reexamining the fine print, one notices my use of the terms "universal" and "particular"; universal is attached to the correspondence theory of truth, and particular is attached to the common agreement. what this entails is that the correspondence theory of truth can only be rejected under particular circumstances -- the correspondence theory of truth can never be completely and universally dismissed. on the other hand, believing in the correspondence theory of truth as a common agreement among a group of people is still, due to being a common agreement, a particular circumstance. so, in short, the correspondence theory of truth can never be universally denied, but only affirmed under particular circumstances.

philosophy and social science -- a complementary or antagonistic relationship?

to recapitulate the end of the last blog entry, i demonstrated that social science studies epistemology manifested through metaphysical means. i also explained why social science, with its major fundamental flaw, is unable to be scientific in its study of epistemology manifested through metaphysical means. as such, social science simply *studies* epistemology manifested through metaphysical means. however, social science does not ever attempt to really study epistemology exclusively -- that domain is left to philosophy alone. so what does social science study if it fails to adequately investigate underlying epistemological issues? social science studies metaphysics, albeit in an applied form of sorts by having to make epistemological assumptions and by using scientific methods to assist research that, although partly or even mostly scientific in nature, is still not science per se. so one could argue that social science is simply a branch of metaphysics. perhaps the reason social science has been compared to science instead of metaphysics is because it employed the scientific method that yielded results that seemed somewhat scientific; if seemingly scientific results had not been attained via the scientific method, then social science never would have evolved out of philosophy. the problem with assuming social science to resemble science is that scientific results being somewhat scientific in appearance -- metaphysically, that is -- does not make social science a science because the definition of science is epistemological.

now, consider the theoretical frameworks in which social science operates, frameworks that are usually an adaptation of some form of philosophy. the great philosophical divide between analytic and continental/postmodern presents a great dilemma for how social science ought to proceed. after much pontificating, i've arrived at the following conclusion: analytic philosophy is ultimately useful but not truthful (useful at establishing viable philosophical positions, but doing so based on flawed assumptions) whereas continental/postmodern philosophy is truthful, but not useful (truthful as in unable to be critically attacked or overturned, but does not succeed in proactively setting forth philosophical foundations, hence why i haven't heard about how semiotics has any pertinence to fields like artificial intelligence). the assumption made by ancient philosophers was that what is truthful would also be assumed to be at least somewhat useful. philosophy eventually evolved to the point wherein the ancient philosophers' assumptions have been proven to be unattainable, hence bringing the very purpose of philosophy into question. in the case of analytics vs continental/postmodernists, both sides have accused the other of being unreasonable in their assumptions; analytic is based on assumptions that it knows it cannot prove or can't yet prove but are necessary for overall "progress", whereas continental/postmodernist is based on assumptions that it knows cannot be disproven but leaves one to wonder whether, within those set of assumptions, any forms of "progress" can be made. what's funny is that superficially, one would be inclined to believe the opposite for the two branches of philosophy; analytic philosophy is typically viewed as being overly-pedantic and solving "pseudo-problems", thus not being useful but being truthful as it closely attempts to follow the enlightenment path still mostly retained by contemporary science. on the other hand, continental/postmodernist philosophy is often viewed as untruthful -- being purposely evasive and confusing -- but being widely applicable and useful for social science and the humanities.

so, why does psychology typically rely on a default analytic approach, whereas anthropology and sociology rely on postmodernist approaches? quite simply, it has to do with the underlying ambitions and purposes of the disciplines; psychology's end goal is to explain the individual in the context of interactions with other people, whereas anthropology and sociology attempt to explain human behavior on a mass-scale, societal level, with individual behavior assumed to be a product of larger forces instead of starting with individual behavior and building up to broader levels. does psychology's implicit dependence on a framework that follows the path of science make psychology more scientific than anthropology and sociology, which explicitly depend on frameworks that reject the enlightenment approach? the simple answer is no due to the existence of the major fundamental flaw for all disciplines in social science. however, if this flaw were to be solved, then yes, psychology would be considered a science, whereas anthropology and sociology would still be considered branches of metaphysics.

the best example of why social science ultimately fails on macro levels can be illustrated with economics, a discipline that is the worst form of social science in that it completely ignores the major fundamental flaw, but also is the most pertinent to the ultimate societal goal: survival. while survival is also addressed by other social sciences, it is economics that defines the contemporary standard for human survival; if economics could actually predict the future of our economy, it would have almost infinitely more worth than all of the other social sciences, since ultimately survival is what social sciences can be reduced to. now, has any economic theory ever come close to achieving this ideal goal? of course not -- achieving this goal would appear to contradict the very sentiment espoused by postmodernism, which is supposed to be a reflection of contemporary society, and thus macroeconomics on an underlying level. in fact, the opposite has occurred -- macroeconomics is mostly an applied discipline. as such, all social science is rooted in theory that is not useful on a macro level, with "successful" experiments in social science always being conducted on a micro level; even theories that are not completely economic are still predominantly economic in nature and ultimately can be reduced to this. by not being rooted in a viable theoretical framework, how can social science function as a science? how can its problem space be defined? the answer is that social science -- anthropology and sociology, specifically -- even if it were to overcome its major fundamental flaw could not be considered a science, as its problem space on a macro level still not being scientifically defined prevents it from attaining status as a science. as such, on a macro level, disregarding its major fundamental flaw, social science is not a science, but a branch of metaphysics.

in conclusion, i want to redefine what social science is. social science that employs the scientific method on some level should be termed "operational social studies", including anthropology, sociology, and psychology, as well as political science and economics. humanities that study the same domain as social science but without employing the scientific method -- namely history and branches of politics, such as government -- should be termed "informative social studies". and all social scientists are not scientists, but rather specialized, applied metaphysicians. in this sense, the relationship between philosophy and social science is complementary since both are metaphysical. however, if social scientists actually were scientists, then the relationship would in fact be antagonistic (except for psychology if it were to overcome its major fundamental flaw, in which case it would be complementary and scientific, not metaphysical).

social science's fundamental flaw

the great debate about whether social science is science still appears to be unsettled, and my introduction of qualia into matters does not seem to have firmly persuaded anyone. before i proceed, i must declare that the debate over what constitutes the discipline of science is not metaphysical, but epistemological; if you do not understand this, then you need to do some background reading before returning to this writing. the classic problem is as follows:

1) metaphysical -- ultimately, physical for scientific problems -- problem exists, scientist seeks solution to problem in form of a universal truth.

2) even if probable solution is found, epistemological issues cast doubt on validity of solution claim to universal truth.

3) in order to account for epistemological discrepancies, scientist must consult with other scientists who attempt to verify the validity of the solution by attempting to recreate the experiment and critique any possible methodological or other flaws.

4) other scientists, because they are needed to verify the validity of the solution, introduce their own unique epistemological issues. as such, the collective group of scientists haven't solved epistemological issues, but rather have only come to an epistemologically subjective common agreement on their conclusion about the solution.

5) this epistemologically subjective common agreement is a form of "currency"

6) since the validity of the solution is dependent on this "currency", the "currency" itself becomes the focus of study

here is where science and social science diverge with their claims regarding what constitutes science.

science: "currency" studies metaphysics -- ultimately, physics for scientific problems. if "currency" is deemed problematic, then claim to universal metaphysical truth is either doubted or dismissed. if "currency's" problems are deemed negligible or irrelevant, then claim to universal metaphysical truth is accepted.

social science: "currency" studies epistemology as it is manifested through metaphysical means. "currency" is deemed problematic, so claims to universal metaphysical truths are doubted or dismissed. however, by studying epistemology, social science believes it is coming closer to understanding a truth (not a universal truth, but something approaching it so as to still be considered scientific) in not only the field of epistemology, but also in the realm of metaphysics since understanding the epistemology helps increase the accuracy of metaphysical solution (although once again, the accuracy never is a universal truth, but something approaching it).

the dilemma: ultimately, it boils down to opportunity cost. science only possesses epistemological issues with its "currency", whereas social science possesses additional epistemological issues with its subjects (subjects as in individual people, not subjects as in disciplines) of study. however, social science offers the potential, by studying epistemology manifested through metaphysical means, to improve epistemological problems, and as a result, improve the accuracy of solutions to metaphysical problems.

now, to bring things full circle. at the outset, i made the following statement, "before i proceed, i must declare that the debate over what constitutes the discipline of science is not metaphysical, but epistemological." a common misperception about social science is that the greater amount of experimental error than in hard science and a lack of achieving solutions approaching universal truths is indicative of social science being inferior to hard science as far as what constitutes true science. epistemologically, when using "correct" methodologies, social science is as much a science as any hard science. however, social science can never have "correct" methodologies because it never establishes its problem space correctly. while this is commonly misconstrued as simply being sloppy work on the part of social scientists, the real underlying problem lies with an overlooked methodological flaw in social science. social science studies, via metaphysical manifestations, epistemological issues of its subjects (subjects as in individual people). however, by studying people, social science is unable to define what metaphysical behavior of their subjects is metaphysical at its root and what is epistemological at its root. as such, social science not only is inherently by definition unable to achieve universal truths, but it is also unable to determine how much experimental error is due to pure metaphysics and how much is due to unresolved epistemological issues manifested through metaphysical means. this latter issue is what ultimately makes social science inferior not just to hard science, but soft non-human science (nutrition, etc. -- fields that do not lay claim to universal truths but ultimately can attribute all experimental error to a metaphysical problem and not an epistemological one).

knowing this, i want to revisit the "dilemma" and address a dilemma within the dilemma. initially, social science appeared to resist claims to universal truths because of epistemological concerns, but believes progress can be made regarding these epistemological concerns if we study epistemology itself. however, social science also believes that it can never solve these epistemological issues to the point where they no longer interfere with our ability to lay claims to universal truths in metaphysics. to account for this flaw -- but not necessarily properly define it -- social science invented the idea of culture; what i termed "currency" can be translated into the fundamental issue social science studies: culture -- amongst a group of people, it amounts to the universally, commonly held epistemological issues manifested through metaphysical means, their transmission with each other, and their interactions with both commonly shared pure metaphysics and the rest of metaphysics (commonly shared pure metaphysics constituting things that people have control over, such as rituals and ceremonies, while the rest of metaphysics constitutes things that cultures do not have control over, such as droughts, but still have cultural explanations for, as well as things not conceived by people in a culture before being introduced to them by people in another culture or by an environmental event never documented before by a culture). while the interactions with commonly shared pure metaphysics constitutes a static culture with the only cultural evolution occurring due to the outside impact of non-universally held epistemological issues manifested through metaphysical means (i.e., what makes individual people unique within each culture -- internal cultural evolution), interactions with the rest of metaphysics constitutes external cultural evolution as the framework of the commonly held epistemological issues manifested through metaphysical means interacts with and is impacted by a changing external landscape and environment.

the idea of culture can ultimately be reduced to social science's overlooked major methodological flaw: the ambiguity of causality in accounting for experimental error, existing not just as metaphysical as in science, but also being epistemological manifested through metaphysical means. in turn, this forces the discipline to make two horrendous, deterministically subjective -- resulting in automatic indeterministic beliefs about the operation of the universe -- assumptions: 1) claims to universal truths are automatically dismissed and even are claimed to have been "disproven", and 2) culture is this ambiguous wastebasket term encompassing collective epistemological issues manifested through metaphysical means that social science claims can be studied scientifically. point 1 can be addressed as erroneous in two ways. first of all, social science unjustifiably disregards the existence of universal truths from a "meta" perspective; that is to say, without epistemological issues from the perspective of the observer, social science still believes itself to be on equal footing with science. however, this is false, as experimental error from the subject in science is only attributed to metaphysical reasons, whereas in social science experimental error from the subject stems from both metaphysical reasons and epistemological reasons manifested through metaphysical means. second, social science is rather fatalistic, for lack of a better term, when it comes to defining its scope; its own inherent major methodological flaw compels social science to delineate the domain of possible solutions to problems in the universe as not including universal truths for both social science and science. thus, before we can even begin to address whether science can obtain universal truths from alternative points of view, social science intercedes, and with its glaring methodological flaw, still declares that it can confidently assure us that science cannot lay claim to universal truths. whether or not science actually can obtain universal truths is a topic for another time, but certainly social science, with its major methodological flaw, is compromised in its ability to determine any sorts of truths and thus is not in a position to hold power over determining what does and does not constitute science, including its possible ability to obtain universal truths. as detrimental as point 1 was to social science, point 2 might be even more egregious. culture is the fundamental foundation upon which social science, particularly anthropology, is predicated. while culture is advertised throughout academia as an interesting area of investigation with many possible and relevant ramifications for the human condition, it is in fact a specious term, an illusory construct of the highest order, on par with the idea of free will (although the verdict is still out on whether or not we have free will) as polluting our society on every level with misconceptions, and most importantly, *claiming authority without justification*. just as free will is unjustly engrained in our legal system, government, and the very notions by which we lead our lives, including freedom, culture is espoused by academics to be this alluring pseudo-metaphysical mystery by which its understanding can unlock the secrets of life in all humanities and social science disciplines. unfortunately, culture is the diametric opposite of what it claims to be; culture claims to be a possible explanation for social behavior, when in fact it is the biggest thorn in the side of "ideal social science". "ideal social science" is a term i'm going to use to include aspects of, but not limited to, neuroscience and cognitive science, but i will save that explanation for another day. returning to normal social science, why is the idea of culture counterproductive to social science instead of being its shining beacon? let's revisit social science's major fundamental flaw: it is unable to define what metaphysical behavior of its subjects is metaphysical at its root and what is epistemological at its root. so while it is informative to examine some of the enjoyable metaphysical outputs of culture -- art, music, film, etc. -- and some of the not so enjoyable ones -- traditions of irrationality, taboo topics, intercultural interactions that have led to wars, etc. -- doing so does not in any way, shape, or form attempt to address social science's major fundamental flaw. as stated earlier, social science cannot be on equal footing with science until its major fundamental flaw is somehow rectified, if that is possible -- it doesn't appear very likely at the moment. what methods of inquiry could be used to solve the fundamental flaw? well, for one, a good starting point would be what i've deemed "ideal social science". however, at present, it is still dependent on overly reductionist methods without the necessary compatible integration with technology, which is still in very rudimentary stage, and even with progress in the coming years will most likely never propose a plausible solution to social science's major fundamental flaw. furthermore, social science's fundamental flaw aside, "ideal social science's" paradigm even in theory does not possess much relevance to most of social science's purposes, as it is not really applicable to the more holistic ideas and levels of culture -- culture in this context being treated as a subject of study, not a method of inquiry -- and probably won't ever be in many respects. still, it is the only proper way for attempting to make social science on par with science, both in theory and in practice. until then, it is fine to evaluate culture, but just let it be known that these inquiries are *studies*, not *experiments*; they do not fulfill the criteria established by non-human science. speaking of studies, perhaps it should be let known that i don't have much against social science as a discipline, that i do believe it has many useful applications, and that it can be quite scientific in its approach. however, i simply believe that it is not a true science based on the reasons i have given. perhaps *social studies* is a more fitting description for the discipline. ultimately, while the definition of science deals with its epistemological issues, the objects of its study are not in and of themselves epistemological issues. so ultimately, the lesson learned is that it is better to make reasonable assumptions about epistemological issues in science than it is to turn science into a study of epistemological issues, the latter of which social science attempts to do. thus, social science does not meet the standard definition of science, and should instead be termed "social studies". as i have demonstrated, the opportunity cost of altering the definition of science to include that of social science is not a worthwhile endeavor and is not a proper method of inquiry for obtaining universal truths, if indeed such things do exist.