1) metaphysical -- ultimately, physical for scientific problems -- problem exists, scientist seeks solution to problem in form of a universal truth.
2) even if probable solution is found, epistemological issues cast doubt on validity of solution claim to universal truth.
3) in order to account for epistemological discrepancies, scientist must consult with other scientists who attempt to verify the validity of the solution by attempting to recreate the experiment and critique any possible methodological or other flaws.
4) other scientists, because they are needed to verify the validity of the solution, introduce their own unique epistemological issues. as such, the collective group of scientists haven't solved epistemological issues, but rather have only come to an epistemologically subjective common agreement on their conclusion about the solution.
5) this epistemologically subjective common agreement is a form of "currency"
6) since the validity of the solution is dependent on this "currency", the "currency" itself becomes the focus of study
here is where science and social science diverge with their claims regarding what constitutes science.
science: "currency" studies metaphysics -- ultimately, physics for scientific problems. if "currency" is deemed problematic, then claim to universal metaphysical truth is either doubted or dismissed. if "currency's" problems are deemed negligible or irrelevant, then claim to universal metaphysical truth is accepted.
social science: "currency" studies epistemology as it is manifested through metaphysical means. "currency" is deemed problematic, so claims to universal metaphysical truths are doubted or dismissed. however, by studying epistemology, social science believes it is coming closer to understanding a truth (not a universal truth, but something approaching it so as to still be considered scientific) in not only the field of epistemology, but also in the realm of metaphysics since understanding the epistemology helps increase the accuracy of metaphysical solution (although once again, the accuracy never is a universal truth, but something approaching it).
the dilemma: ultimately, it boils down to opportunity cost. science only possesses epistemological issues with its "currency", whereas social science possesses additional epistemological issues with its subjects (subjects as in individual people, not subjects as in disciplines) of study. however, social science offers the potential, by studying epistemology manifested through metaphysical means, to improve epistemological problems, and as a result, improve the accuracy of solutions to metaphysical problems.
now, to bring things full circle. at the outset, i made the following statement, "before i proceed, i must declare that the debate over what constitutes the discipline of science is not metaphysical, but epistemological." a common misperception about social science is that the greater amount of experimental error than in hard science and a lack of achieving solutions approaching universal truths is indicative of social science being inferior to hard science as far as what constitutes true science. epistemologically, when using "correct" methodologies, social science is as much a science as any hard science. however, social science can never have "correct" methodologies because it never establishes its problem space correctly. while this is commonly misconstrued as simply being sloppy work on the part of social scientists, the real underlying problem lies with an overlooked methodological flaw in social science. social science studies, via metaphysical manifestations, epistemological issues of its subjects (subjects as in individual people). however, by studying people, social science is unable to define what metaphysical behavior of their subjects is metaphysical at its root and what is epistemological at its root. as such, social science not only is inherently by definition unable to achieve universal truths, but it is also unable to determine how much experimental error is due to pure metaphysics and how much is due to unresolved epistemological issues manifested through metaphysical means. this latter issue is what ultimately makes social science inferior not just to hard science, but soft non-human science (nutrition, etc. -- fields that do not lay claim to universal truths but ultimately can attribute all experimental error to a metaphysical problem and not an epistemological one).
knowing this, i want to revisit the "dilemma" and address a dilemma within the dilemma. initially, social science appeared to resist claims to universal truths because of epistemological concerns, but believes progress can be made regarding these epistemological concerns if we study epistemology itself. however, social science also believes that it can never solve these epistemological issues to the point where they no longer interfere with our ability to lay claims to universal truths in metaphysics. to account for this flaw -- but not necessarily properly define it -- social science invented the idea of culture; what i termed "currency" can be translated into the fundamental issue social science studies: culture -- amongst a group of people, it amounts to the universally, commonly held epistemological issues manifested through metaphysical means, their transmission with each other, and their interactions with both commonly shared pure metaphysics and the rest of metaphysics (commonly shared pure metaphysics constituting things that people have control over, such as rituals and ceremonies, while the rest of metaphysics constitutes things that cultures do not have control over, such as droughts, but still have cultural explanations for, as well as things not conceived by people in a culture before being introduced to them by people in another culture or by an environmental event never documented before by a culture). while the interactions with commonly shared pure metaphysics constitutes a static culture with the only cultural evolution occurring due to the outside impact of non-universally held epistemological issues manifested through metaphysical means (i.e., what makes individual people unique within each culture -- internal cultural evolution), interactions with the rest of metaphysics constitutes external cultural evolution as the framework of the commonly held epistemological issues manifested through metaphysical means interacts with and is impacted by a changing external landscape and environment.
the idea of culture can ultimately be reduced to social science's overlooked major methodological flaw: the ambiguity of causality in accounting for experimental error, existing not just as metaphysical as in science, but also being epistemological manifested through metaphysical means. in turn, this forces the discipline to make two horrendous, deterministically subjective -- resulting in automatic indeterministic beliefs about the operation of the universe -- assumptions: 1) claims to universal truths are automatically dismissed and even are claimed to have been "disproven", and 2) culture is this ambiguous wastebasket term encompassing collective epistemological issues manifested through metaphysical means that social science claims can be studied scientifically. point 1 can be addressed as erroneous in two ways. first of all, social science unjustifiably disregards the existence of universal truths from a "meta" perspective; that is to say, without epistemological issues from the perspective of the observer, social science still believes itself to be on equal footing with science. however, this is false, as experimental error from the subject in science is only attributed to metaphysical reasons, whereas in social science experimental error from the subject stems from both metaphysical reasons and epistemological reasons manifested through metaphysical means. second, social science is rather fatalistic, for lack of a better term, when it comes to defining its scope; its own inherent major methodological flaw compels social science to delineate the domain of possible solutions to problems in the universe as not including universal truths for both social science and science. thus, before we can even begin to address whether science can obtain universal truths from alternative points of view, social science intercedes, and with its glaring methodological flaw, still declares that it can confidently assure us that science cannot lay claim to universal truths. whether or not science actually can obtain universal truths is a topic for another time, but certainly social science, with its major methodological flaw, is compromised in its ability to determine any sorts of truths and thus is not in a position to hold power over determining what does and does not constitute science, including its possible ability to obtain universal truths. as detrimental as point 1 was to social science, point 2 might be even more egregious. culture is the fundamental foundation upon which social science, particularly anthropology, is predicated. while culture is advertised throughout academia as an interesting area of investigation with many possible and relevant ramifications for the human condition, it is in fact a specious term, an illusory construct of the highest order, on par with the idea of free will (although the verdict is still out on whether or not we have free will) as polluting our society on every level with misconceptions, and most importantly, *claiming authority without justification*. just as free will is unjustly engrained in our legal system, government, and the very notions by which we lead our lives, including freedom, culture is espoused by academics to be this alluring pseudo-metaphysical mystery by which its understanding can unlock the secrets of life in all humanities and social science disciplines. unfortunately, culture is the diametric opposite of what it claims to be; culture claims to be a possible explanation for social behavior, when in fact it is the biggest thorn in the side of "ideal social science". "ideal social science" is a term i'm going to use to include aspects of, but not limited to, neuroscience and cognitive science, but i will save that explanation for another day. returning to normal social science, why is the idea of culture counterproductive to social science instead of being its shining beacon? let's revisit social science's major fundamental flaw: it is unable to define what metaphysical behavior of its subjects is metaphysical at its root and what is epistemological at its root. so while it is informative to examine some of the enjoyable metaphysical outputs of culture -- art, music, film, etc. -- and some of the not so enjoyable ones -- traditions of irrationality, taboo topics, intercultural interactions that have led to wars, etc. -- doing so does not in any way, shape, or form attempt to address social science's major fundamental flaw. as stated earlier, social science cannot be on equal footing with science until its major fundamental flaw is somehow rectified, if that is possible -- it doesn't appear very likely at the moment. what methods of inquiry could be used to solve the fundamental flaw? well, for one, a good starting point would be what i've deemed "ideal social science". however, at present, it is still dependent on overly reductionist methods without the necessary compatible integration with technology, which is still in very rudimentary stage, and even with progress in the coming years will most likely never propose a plausible solution to social science's major fundamental flaw. furthermore, social science's fundamental flaw aside, "ideal social science's" paradigm even in theory does not possess much relevance to most of social science's purposes, as it is not really applicable to the more holistic ideas and levels of culture -- culture in this context being treated as a subject of study, not a method of inquiry -- and probably won't ever be in many respects. still, it is the only proper way for attempting to make social science on par with science, both in theory and in practice. until then, it is fine to evaluate culture, but just let it be known that these inquiries are *studies*, not *experiments*; they do not fulfill the criteria established by non-human science. speaking of studies, perhaps it should be let known that i don't have much against social science as a discipline, that i do believe it has many useful applications, and that it can be quite scientific in its approach. however, i simply believe that it is not a true science based on the reasons i have given. perhaps *social studies* is a more fitting description for the discipline. ultimately, while the definition of science deals with its epistemological issues, the objects of its study are not in and of themselves epistemological issues. so ultimately, the lesson learned is that it is better to make reasonable assumptions about epistemological issues in science than it is to turn science into a study of epistemological issues, the latter of which social science attempts to do. thus, social science does not meet the standard definition of science, and should instead be termed "social studies". as i have demonstrated, the opportunity cost of altering the definition of science to include that of social science is not a worthwhile endeavor and is not a proper method of inquiry for obtaining universal truths, if indeed such things do exist.
No comments:
Post a Comment