philosophy and social science -- a complementary or antagonistic relationship?

to recapitulate the end of the last blog entry, i demonstrated that social science studies epistemology manifested through metaphysical means. i also explained why social science, with its major fundamental flaw, is unable to be scientific in its study of epistemology manifested through metaphysical means. as such, social science simply *studies* epistemology manifested through metaphysical means. however, social science does not ever attempt to really study epistemology exclusively -- that domain is left to philosophy alone. so what does social science study if it fails to adequately investigate underlying epistemological issues? social science studies metaphysics, albeit in an applied form of sorts by having to make epistemological assumptions and by using scientific methods to assist research that, although partly or even mostly scientific in nature, is still not science per se. so one could argue that social science is simply a branch of metaphysics. perhaps the reason social science has been compared to science instead of metaphysics is because it employed the scientific method that yielded results that seemed somewhat scientific; if seemingly scientific results had not been attained via the scientific method, then social science never would have evolved out of philosophy. the problem with assuming social science to resemble science is that scientific results being somewhat scientific in appearance -- metaphysically, that is -- does not make social science a science because the definition of science is epistemological.

now, consider the theoretical frameworks in which social science operates, frameworks that are usually an adaptation of some form of philosophy. the great philosophical divide between analytic and continental/postmodern presents a great dilemma for how social science ought to proceed. after much pontificating, i've arrived at the following conclusion: analytic philosophy is ultimately useful but not truthful (useful at establishing viable philosophical positions, but doing so based on flawed assumptions) whereas continental/postmodern philosophy is truthful, but not useful (truthful as in unable to be critically attacked or overturned, but does not succeed in proactively setting forth philosophical foundations, hence why i haven't heard about how semiotics has any pertinence to fields like artificial intelligence). the assumption made by ancient philosophers was that what is truthful would also be assumed to be at least somewhat useful. philosophy eventually evolved to the point wherein the ancient philosophers' assumptions have been proven to be unattainable, hence bringing the very purpose of philosophy into question. in the case of analytics vs continental/postmodernists, both sides have accused the other of being unreasonable in their assumptions; analytic is based on assumptions that it knows it cannot prove or can't yet prove but are necessary for overall "progress", whereas continental/postmodernist is based on assumptions that it knows cannot be disproven but leaves one to wonder whether, within those set of assumptions, any forms of "progress" can be made. what's funny is that superficially, one would be inclined to believe the opposite for the two branches of philosophy; analytic philosophy is typically viewed as being overly-pedantic and solving "pseudo-problems", thus not being useful but being truthful as it closely attempts to follow the enlightenment path still mostly retained by contemporary science. on the other hand, continental/postmodernist philosophy is often viewed as untruthful -- being purposely evasive and confusing -- but being widely applicable and useful for social science and the humanities.

so, why does psychology typically rely on a default analytic approach, whereas anthropology and sociology rely on postmodernist approaches? quite simply, it has to do with the underlying ambitions and purposes of the disciplines; psychology's end goal is to explain the individual in the context of interactions with other people, whereas anthropology and sociology attempt to explain human behavior on a mass-scale, societal level, with individual behavior assumed to be a product of larger forces instead of starting with individual behavior and building up to broader levels. does psychology's implicit dependence on a framework that follows the path of science make psychology more scientific than anthropology and sociology, which explicitly depend on frameworks that reject the enlightenment approach? the simple answer is no due to the existence of the major fundamental flaw for all disciplines in social science. however, if this flaw were to be solved, then yes, psychology would be considered a science, whereas anthropology and sociology would still be considered branches of metaphysics.

the best example of why social science ultimately fails on macro levels can be illustrated with economics, a discipline that is the worst form of social science in that it completely ignores the major fundamental flaw, but also is the most pertinent to the ultimate societal goal: survival. while survival is also addressed by other social sciences, it is economics that defines the contemporary standard for human survival; if economics could actually predict the future of our economy, it would have almost infinitely more worth than all of the other social sciences, since ultimately survival is what social sciences can be reduced to. now, has any economic theory ever come close to achieving this ideal goal? of course not -- achieving this goal would appear to contradict the very sentiment espoused by postmodernism, which is supposed to be a reflection of contemporary society, and thus macroeconomics on an underlying level. in fact, the opposite has occurred -- macroeconomics is mostly an applied discipline. as such, all social science is rooted in theory that is not useful on a macro level, with "successful" experiments in social science always being conducted on a micro level; even theories that are not completely economic are still predominantly economic in nature and ultimately can be reduced to this. by not being rooted in a viable theoretical framework, how can social science function as a science? how can its problem space be defined? the answer is that social science -- anthropology and sociology, specifically -- even if it were to overcome its major fundamental flaw could not be considered a science, as its problem space on a macro level still not being scientifically defined prevents it from attaining status as a science. as such, on a macro level, disregarding its major fundamental flaw, social science is not a science, but a branch of metaphysics.

in conclusion, i want to redefine what social science is. social science that employs the scientific method on some level should be termed "operational social studies", including anthropology, sociology, and psychology, as well as political science and economics. humanities that study the same domain as social science but without employing the scientific method -- namely history and branches of politics, such as government -- should be termed "informative social studies". and all social scientists are not scientists, but rather specialized, applied metaphysicians. in this sense, the relationship between philosophy and social science is complementary since both are metaphysical. however, if social scientists actually were scientists, then the relationship would in fact be antagonistic (except for psychology if it were to overcome its major fundamental flaw, in which case it would be complementary and scientific, not metaphysical).