updated: social science's fundamental flaw

the original post proposed the following as a thesis of sorts: "while this is commonly misconstrued as simply being sloppy work on the part of social scientists, the real underlying problem lies with an overlooked methodological flaw in social science. social science studies, via metaphysical manifestations, epistemological issues of its subjects (subjects as in individual people). however, by studying people, social science is unable to define what metaphysical behavior of their subjects is metaphysical at its root and what is epistemological at its root. as such, social science not only is inherently by definition unable to achieve universal truths, but it is also unable to determine how much experimental error is due to pure metaphysics and how much is due to unresolved epistemological issues manifested through metaphysical means."

now, there are a couple problems with this characterization of the mind. first of all, "epistemological issues" simply entails the mind in a first-person ontology, but this does not mean that the mind cannot be manifested metaphysically in a third-person ontology, and in doing so, there is nothing lost in translation or any experimental error to think of -- they are simply different ways of categorizing the same thing. second, the experimental error only exists if one views the mind from a property dualist perspective, meaning that not all of the mental ontology can be causally reduced to a physical ontology. even with this "experimental error", for the sake of social science that tests large groups of people, the error should cancel out because either 1) all the mental properties distinguishable from the physical properties of people are the same, meaning that the "experimental error" is an accounted-for variable of the experiment, or 2) the mental properties are different, but like most things relating to people, fall nicely along a bell curve, causing the establishment of a mean and effectively "canceling out" the "experimental error" to where it can be treated as an expected, steady variable of the experiment. of course, neither of these situations arises if one is a monist instead of a dualist, in which case one believes that there is no separate mental ontology and that all mental properties can be causally reduced to physical ones, and thus, there is no possibility for "experimental error".

revised: answer to an age old question (the correspondence theory of truth)

i believe that my original blog entry had some great potential, but arrived at an incorrect conclusion. while i can never guarantee with absolute certainty that any of my ideas are correct, i do believe that my revised version has been thought through much more carefully, and of course, i would appreciate any feedback as to whether you agree or disagree and why. the conclusion i arrived at was that the correspondence theory of truth is true, meaning that realism, not anti-realism, is the correct notion of the existence of an "objective, external reality".

here's an interesting observation i recently made about the correspondence theory of truth. for those needing a little refresher, here's what wikipedia says: "The correspondence theory of truth states that the truth or falsity of a statement is determined only by how it relates to the world, and whether it accurately describes (i.e., corresponds with) that world." this a point of much contention in philosophy, as ancient philosophers and most analytics believe in this theory, whereas continental and postmodernist philosophers reject it (heidegger being the most prominent since he focused much of his work on the nature of being stemming from the ancients' interpretation of it, ultimately rejecting their viewpoint on this theory). after some ruminating, it appears to me that there is some very complex philosophical territory to cover here. by believing in the correspondence theory of truth, you have to make a leap of faith regarding epistemological issues and disregarding them as irrelevant to our ability to understand metaphysics. however, not believing in the correspondence theory of truth only is compatible with the belief system of a single person; this person has established what they consider to be a universal, but it is only a universal in the context of their individuality (or if the person considers it to be a particular, which would entail their situation as being a particular, whereas believing it to be a universal renders the situation irrelevant with regards to it being universal or particular). why is this so and what is its relevance? when more than one person does not believe in the correspondence theory of truth, they are coming to a common agreement both metaphysically and epistemologically. now, imagine someone believing something that is also metaphysically and epistemologically compatible other than the correspondence theory of truth -- this person is either forming a particular belief in a particular situation, or is forming a universal belief that renders the "universality" or "particularity" of the situation irrelevant. the same occurs when dealing with two or more people: if both metaphysical and epistemological compatibility to an agreement on any sort of topic other than the correspondence theory of truth occurred between two people or more people, one could argue that such an agreement was either a particular agreement to a particular set of people, or a universal agreement, rendering the "particularity" of the situation in which the common agreement among a group of people arose irrelevant. however, when a group of people comes to a common agreement regarding the correspondence theory of truth, they have established a universal precedent for the need of the existence of the correspondence theory of truth in order to fully and completely reject it. before i return to this point to reexamine the fine print, let me clearly recapitulate the apparent contradiction: one can only fully and completely reject the correspondence theory of truth by assuming his/her epistemology and metaphysics to be correct, and in doing so has created either a universal, or a particular precedent in a particular situation. however, a group of people can only fully and completely reject the correspondence theory of truth by collectively conceiving it first, the result of which is a universal precedent. given the evidence established by the group of people, the correspondence theory of truth can never be universally dismissed. does this mean that the correspondence theory of truth can be universally affirmed? well, basically yes. consider the only situation in which the correspondence theory of truth can be rejected: by an individual thinking/acting alone. however, for all situations involving groups of people, which also entails communication using language, the correspondence theory of truth cannot be rejected; it must be affirmed. if the correspondence theory of truth can only be rejected by individuals, then their argument amounts to mere solipsism. so, once this has been established, then the correspondence theory of truth can be universally affirmed as true. the only way to attack this idea is to claim that two or more people can never come to a common agreement regarding the correspondence theory of truth that is both epistemologically and metaphysically compatible, but by doing this, you are 1) dismissing the idea that two or more people can ever conceive the same thing, which entails a communication breakdown and that all intelligibility using language is lost (epistemological), or 2) that you possess knowledge that something that appears metaphysically compatible is not, which is admitting that metaphysics can be perfectly interpreted through epistemology, which in turn not only validates the correspondence theory of truth (metaphysical) but also assumes entails epistemological compatibility. 1 and 2 are inherently incompatible with each other, and 2 is actually a proponent of the correspondence theory of truth, so 1 is the only actual attack. however, 1 either implies a) solipsism, b) a simultaneous intelligibility and unintelligibility of language (which is implausible), c) or that we know absolutely nothing (the nothing including the correspondence theory of truth). of these choices, "c" is the only choice that does not entail deceit; however it does entail complete nihilism, and functionally speaking, is completely impractical. now, i would like to make one final point. just because i have proven that the correspondence theory of truth cannot be disproven does not mean that there aren't other theories of truth (coherence theory of truth, deflationary theory of truth, etc.) that are equally as valid or perhaps even better alternatives of demonstrating truths about our universe. that being said, i believe that some of these alternatives are compatible as co-existing with the correspondence theory of truth (neither disproves the other, but one could make an argument why one theory of truth is better and thus preferred), while others are not, and the ones that are not i believe to be inherently wrong due to my proof that the correspondence theory of truth cannot be dismissed.

interlude

yeah, it's been awhile since i last posted, and the main reason has been that the scope of my ideas has been too large to do justice to in blog form, and even too extensive in a non-blog form since the amount of reading and research required to elaborate my ideas would be beyond my present capabilities. however, thinking about some of these new ideas has caused me to reevaluate some of my earlier ideas on this blog, and i've realized that some of these ideas were incorrect or did not quite hit the mark. so, the next few entries will be devoted to clarifying and cleaning up these old ideas, and then from there we'll see what direction the blog takes.