revised: answer to an age old question (the correspondence theory of truth)

i believe that my original blog entry had some great potential, but arrived at an incorrect conclusion. while i can never guarantee with absolute certainty that any of my ideas are correct, i do believe that my revised version has been thought through much more carefully, and of course, i would appreciate any feedback as to whether you agree or disagree and why. the conclusion i arrived at was that the correspondence theory of truth is true, meaning that realism, not anti-realism, is the correct notion of the existence of an "objective, external reality".

here's an interesting observation i recently made about the correspondence theory of truth. for those needing a little refresher, here's what wikipedia says: "The correspondence theory of truth states that the truth or falsity of a statement is determined only by how it relates to the world, and whether it accurately describes (i.e., corresponds with) that world." this a point of much contention in philosophy, as ancient philosophers and most analytics believe in this theory, whereas continental and postmodernist philosophers reject it (heidegger being the most prominent since he focused much of his work on the nature of being stemming from the ancients' interpretation of it, ultimately rejecting their viewpoint on this theory). after some ruminating, it appears to me that there is some very complex philosophical territory to cover here. by believing in the correspondence theory of truth, you have to make a leap of faith regarding epistemological issues and disregarding them as irrelevant to our ability to understand metaphysics. however, not believing in the correspondence theory of truth only is compatible with the belief system of a single person; this person has established what they consider to be a universal, but it is only a universal in the context of their individuality (or if the person considers it to be a particular, which would entail their situation as being a particular, whereas believing it to be a universal renders the situation irrelevant with regards to it being universal or particular). why is this so and what is its relevance? when more than one person does not believe in the correspondence theory of truth, they are coming to a common agreement both metaphysically and epistemologically. now, imagine someone believing something that is also metaphysically and epistemologically compatible other than the correspondence theory of truth -- this person is either forming a particular belief in a particular situation, or is forming a universal belief that renders the "universality" or "particularity" of the situation irrelevant. the same occurs when dealing with two or more people: if both metaphysical and epistemological compatibility to an agreement on any sort of topic other than the correspondence theory of truth occurred between two people or more people, one could argue that such an agreement was either a particular agreement to a particular set of people, or a universal agreement, rendering the "particularity" of the situation in which the common agreement among a group of people arose irrelevant. however, when a group of people comes to a common agreement regarding the correspondence theory of truth, they have established a universal precedent for the need of the existence of the correspondence theory of truth in order to fully and completely reject it. before i return to this point to reexamine the fine print, let me clearly recapitulate the apparent contradiction: one can only fully and completely reject the correspondence theory of truth by assuming his/her epistemology and metaphysics to be correct, and in doing so has created either a universal, or a particular precedent in a particular situation. however, a group of people can only fully and completely reject the correspondence theory of truth by collectively conceiving it first, the result of which is a universal precedent. given the evidence established by the group of people, the correspondence theory of truth can never be universally dismissed. does this mean that the correspondence theory of truth can be universally affirmed? well, basically yes. consider the only situation in which the correspondence theory of truth can be rejected: by an individual thinking/acting alone. however, for all situations involving groups of people, which also entails communication using language, the correspondence theory of truth cannot be rejected; it must be affirmed. if the correspondence theory of truth can only be rejected by individuals, then their argument amounts to mere solipsism. so, once this has been established, then the correspondence theory of truth can be universally affirmed as true. the only way to attack this idea is to claim that two or more people can never come to a common agreement regarding the correspondence theory of truth that is both epistemologically and metaphysically compatible, but by doing this, you are 1) dismissing the idea that two or more people can ever conceive the same thing, which entails a communication breakdown and that all intelligibility using language is lost (epistemological), or 2) that you possess knowledge that something that appears metaphysically compatible is not, which is admitting that metaphysics can be perfectly interpreted through epistemology, which in turn not only validates the correspondence theory of truth (metaphysical) but also assumes entails epistemological compatibility. 1 and 2 are inherently incompatible with each other, and 2 is actually a proponent of the correspondence theory of truth, so 1 is the only actual attack. however, 1 either implies a) solipsism, b) a simultaneous intelligibility and unintelligibility of language (which is implausible), c) or that we know absolutely nothing (the nothing including the correspondence theory of truth). of these choices, "c" is the only choice that does not entail deceit; however it does entail complete nihilism, and functionally speaking, is completely impractical. now, i would like to make one final point. just because i have proven that the correspondence theory of truth cannot be disproven does not mean that there aren't other theories of truth (coherence theory of truth, deflationary theory of truth, etc.) that are equally as valid or perhaps even better alternatives of demonstrating truths about our universe. that being said, i believe that some of these alternatives are compatible as co-existing with the correspondence theory of truth (neither disproves the other, but one could make an argument why one theory of truth is better and thus preferred), while others are not, and the ones that are not i believe to be inherently wrong due to my proof that the correspondence theory of truth cannot be dismissed.