Wednesday, September 30, 2009

qualia: an epistemological obstacle for social science

all forms of social science ultimately can be reduced to the level of cognition. as you might know from the mind/body problem, there are two aspects: 1) cognition, which has been studied through science and an area in which significant progress has been made, and 2) qualia, defined as from the Latin for "what sort" or "what kind," is a term used in philosophy to describe the subjective quality of conscious experience. qualia remains an immense quagmire in philosophy of science, with philosophers still being at a loss for how to explain it and science being unable to contribute any meaning research of discoveries to help philosophers with the problem. here is an excerpt from a previous blog post:

so, it follows that science only cares about person x's internal metaphysics as being part of external metaphysical states, states that are considered to be compatible with universals. person x's internal metaphysics are only of secondary importance (i will explain this a bit later).


social science also cares about person x's internal metaphysics as being part of external metaphysical states, states that are considered to be compatible with universals, but the intentionality is different because whereas science allows person x to have an internal metaphysical state compatible with the external metaphysical state of secondary importance, social science compels person x to have an internal metaphysical state compatible with the external metaphysical state, both of primary importance.



now, i have already stated that social science ultimately can be reduced to testing cognition. however, in doing so, it is also affecting a person's qualia in consciousness. there are three fundamental problems with social science regarding qualia:

1) without having any sort of objective standards by which to measure qualia, social science is only testing part of the mental states of its subjects. social science often asks questions, such as inquiries into human nature, that go beyond the scope of what cognition covers. by not accounting for qualia, when asking questions outside of pure cognition, social science is asking untestable, and therefore unanswerable questions. forms of science, including all hard science and social science that do not ask questions that relate to qualia, are unaffected by the problem of qualia.

2) the second problem is regarding the excerpt from above. prior to ww2, positivism was the prevailing notion of science, simply regarding the experimenter as a neutral observer. however, after the atomic bomb and philosophical movements, ethical implications for science rendered the experimenter as anything but neutral. in addition to affecting what subject matter was deemed appropriate for science to study, a fundamental shift occurred in which the expected results or possible results of every experiment were considered as to their effects on every person in the world who was not a subject in the experiment, including the experimenter himself. here is the difference between hard science (and also soft non-social science, such as nutrition) and social science: other than extreme forms of research, which either have death implications (nuclear and/or other weapons) or socially-controversial implications (psychotropic drugs, etc.) and the ethical implications of research done on animals, the effects of a hard science experiment on society -- including the experimenter himself -- are usually deemed negligible, as in they will contribute to a larger knowledge base of science and possibly be implemented in technology that will be used by people in society. accordingly, the intentionality of an experimenter in matching the possible results of his experiment to his own and other people's qualia is not an issue of primary importance since it is assumed that there is very wide range of possible qualia that can be compatible with the effects of the experiment's results. now, contrast that with social science, in which once the experimenter has determined the experiment to pass the higher ethical standard than that of non-social science, the effects of a social science experiment on society -- including the experimenter himself -- are not deemed negligible. in fact, the intentionality of an experimenter in matching the possible results of his experiment to his own and other people's qualia is an issue of primary importance since the very study of subjects at least in part revolves around the state of their qualia, and in attempting to anticipate how his own and other people's qualia will be affected by the experiment, the experimenter has a much narrower range of possible qualia that can be compatible with the effects of the experiment's results. this presents an epistemological dilemma for social science: it can either have the experimenter, in trying to fulfill his intentionality for anticipating qualia for his subjects and himself and the rest of society, limit the scope of his research based on these expectations and increase the odds that the experiment's results will result in the qualia of his subjects, himself, and other people all being compatible with his initial intentionality, *or* the experimenter can ignore possible expectations for the effects of the experiment's results on his and other people's qualia and only focus on the possible qualia of his subjects. however, by employing this latter approach, the experimenter increases the odds that the results of the experiment will not be compatible with his and other people's qualia, with only the qualia of his subjects being more likely to be compatible with the experimenter's intentionality for attaining a desired qualia. therefore, both approaches are compromised: the former yields compatible results within a compromised, narrower epistemological framework, and the latter, while not sacrificing anything epistemological in a scientific framework, greatly increases the odds of an experiment's failure by having the qualia of the experimenter and others be more likely to not be compatible with the initially desired qualia established by experimenter's intentionality. either way, social science can be labelled as being more "limited", either in the scope of the questions it proposes or in its success rate for its experiments. furthermore, since both approaches are based on complete speculation on the part of the experimenter and the results are completely unknown, both due to the fact that there is no standard for measuring qualia, then ultimately social science, at least concerning the experiments in which qualia is a factor, can be reduced to defining what good intentions are since there is no way to prove the success of an experiment.

3) imagine that there is some kind of magical way we can determine a standard for qualia, and thus know what a desired qualia is. at this point, social science, for all intents and purposes, becomes an ethical debate, for experiments are determined based on an ethical framework that determines a scientific one, instead of as in non-social science, in which scientific frameworks -- again, not including extreme cases -- are of primary importance and ethical considerations follow as secondary. why do ethical considerations become primary if a standard for qualia can be determined? very easily -- consider the epistemological dilemma outlined in my second point above. ultimately, the goals of social science experiments would be to optimize the desired state of qualia, and debates would center around how to define the optimization of the desired state of qualia, with the two "scientific" frameworks following along the lines of the two positions in the aforementioned epistemological dilemma, with a sort of "middle road" probably evolving as a compromise between the two paths. however, in all cases, the fact remains that social science, given this imaginary scenario, will have become more limited than non-social science.


and now, to bring this full circle back to point 1. i mentioned that social science that does not involve qualia can be considered along the lines of hard and non-social science -- social science that exclusively focuses on cognition. since qualia is a fundamental aspect of consciousness, then it follows that only areas of social science that are not related to consciousness can be considered non-social science; only certain parts of cognitive psychology that test for unconscious processes really meet this qualification. for the rest of social science, qualia must be accounted for on every level: experiment, theory, and paradigm. qualia presents an insurmountable problem for social science defining itself as a science in every imaginable form: as being present but being willfully ignored as being present, as being intuitively accounted for but untestable, and as being testable. yes indeed, social science is stuck between a rock and a hard place when it comes to the obstacle of qualia that prevents the discipline from attaining the same status as science.

Friday, September 25, 2009

science is self-regulating

science is self-regulating

what is culture? here are the two best definitions i found from the dictionary:


the behaviors and beliefs characteristic of a particular social, ethnic, or age group: the youth culture; the drug culture.

Anthropology. the sum total of ways of living built up by a group of human beings and transmitted from one generation to another.


i've noticed that the fundamental way to attack science from a non-scientific perspective is to reduce science to a system of beliefs, which at some point relies on inferences or leaps of faith in order to form a coherent, self-contained system; as such, some have deemed science as comparable to religion, while social science has dwelled on how culture fills in the so-called gaps of science, thus making science culturally-embedded. the problem with these criticisms is that they fail to offer an alternative approach that bests science, for science is only second to reason as being able to lay claim to universal truths. with religion, the flaw is obvious: why replace a partially irrational system (science) with a totally irrational one (religion)? ultimately, while this may be a gross oversimplification for a subject on which many books have been read and entire classes have been taught, i think religion believes that establishing universals through the scientific method is not superior in any way to universals that have been establish by sheer intuition or experiential knowledge and have gradually evolved and been passed down as accepted truths much in the way culture does from one generation to the next. the legitimacy of the truths of these belief systems is supposed to be evinced in the success that these belief systems have had in the survival and grow of each religion's followers; such is also a reasonable explanation for why religious wars have been and still are at the forefront of human disagreement. the other plausible explanation is the outright rejection of universals, a belief stemming from aristotle's philosophy that universals are reinterpreted as somehow being part of particulars. however, such is not a valid solution to the universal/particular dualism proposed by plato.

now, for my favorite part, the so-called culture of science. certainly, any person's life profession is going to impact their ways of life and cause them to bond with others in the profession who share a similar life approach. this alone, however, does not explain how science is culturally-embedded. when differences appear between methodologies from two different cultures on a consistent basis, thus negating the possibility of sheer coincidence, it can be determined that the differences are due to cultural differences, differences in the sum total of ways of living built up by a group of human beings and transmitted from one generation to another. ok, so it follows that science is not totally independent from cultural influences. so, 1) how do we rid science of cultural influences, and 2) how do we define what those cultural influences amount to? i have previously addressed point 1 using aliens a way to regulate scientific methodologies by comparing them across species instead of across cultures, and then applying this concept to comparing methodologies without the need for actual aliens. however, i'm sure many social scientists would claim that culture operates on so many implicit levels that attempting to weed out methodological differences is still a cultural practice in and of itself. my previous blog entry refuted this by placing science on an abstract pedestal, thus making it immune to cultural practices, and if it is not immune to cultural practices, then it is at least as much dependent on the differences among individual scientists as it is among different cultures. unfortunately, this is only a theoretical perspective on how science operates among the minds of its adherent, and has not been proven.

so the big question remains: how do we define culture? since "hard science" does not appear interested in examining culture, then social science, by claiming the study of culture, has ultimately reduced science to social science and rendered the claims of each discipline to being interdependent, with both adopting their own methodological approaches and neither discipline being able to lay a superior claim to universal truths. however, just because social science appears to be the only discipline that studies culture in a remotely objective fashion doesn't let it off the hook from criticisms of its own methodologies. since science is second only to reason at finding universal truths, then how can social science pretend to be better at regulating the irrational aspects of science than science is able to self-regulate? simply put, culture can be broken down into behaviors and beliefs. what social science, particularly anthropology has done, is studied behaviors using a methodology as scientific as possible, then attempted to make these behaviors compatible within the context of theoretical frameworks established by the discipline. as such, social science considers its study of science as scientific and simply an extension of science since social science can ultimately be reduced to science. however, there is a dark secret that social science tries to deny or neatly gloss over: examining beliefs by themselves in addition to their manifestation through behaviors (and sometimes through language). sure, social science pretends that beliefs can be manifested through behaviors and language, but one knows from simple behaviorism in psychology that behaviors do not 100% correlate to what is in one's mind, the place where beliefs reside. anthropology actually tried to make in-roads in this area in the 1960's with cognitive anthropology, but the sub-discipline quickly became untenable and was essentially abandoned.

is there a better solution to examine people's beliefs than through their behaviors? of course! the study of cognition, or cognitive science. let's examine a theoretical example. my previous blog entry postulated that science, by operating on an abstract level, should not be affected by cultural influences, or if it was, then it was affected as much by differences among individuals as differences among cultures. this abstract level is what plato would consider to be universals conceived in one's mind. now, imagine we have real-time brain scanning for scientists from different cultures as they conduct the same experiment coinciding with videotaping them as they speak during each part of the experiment as part of a demonstration. now, although this is somewhat of a gross oversimplification, what one would have to do is find correlations for brain activity for each part of the experiment, and theoretically he/she could figure out how much of the methodology's process includes abstract thinking, how much non-abstract thinking similarities and differences there are for scientists in the same culture compared to scientists in other cultures (for determining culture's influence), and how much non-abstract thinking similarities and differences there are for scientists across cultures (for determining the effects of each particular scientist's uniqueness on implementing the experiment's methodology). now, i could introduce some fancy names for neurological equipment and terminology for brain parts on a macro and micro level, but i'm too lazy to look them up at the moment. anyway, the point is that as technology improves, greater emphasis on determining culture's impact on science will be proven via science. as such, science has the potential, depending on the success of developing neurological technology, to eventually be seen as a self-regulating discipline, with social science's criticisms simply serving as a transitory, stop-gap creation to attempt to explain science's deficiencies. of course, it is possible that technology will not improve to the point where we can adequately assess people's beliefs by examining their brains, and if such is the case, then we will continue to rely mainly on behavior for assessing culture's impact on science. the problem with social science claiming that science is culturally-embedded isn't with some of their findings that there are in fact differences in scientific methodologies that most certainly appear as the result of cultural differences; these observations are true and important to regulating science and making it as objective as possible, and can even be seen as a form of science regulating itself had the investigations been carried out by scientists instead of social scientists. the reason for this is that scientists would simply have to identify cross-cultural differences in methodology and attempt to rectify them philosophically; scientists do not need background in studying cultures in order to identify culture's influence on scientific methodologies. but returning to social science, the problem is that social science claims more than it can substantiate by reducing science to a cultural phenomenon, to the point where culture, instead of just poking a few holes through an otherwise solid universal truth found via science, has been used as a tool to throw the entire validity of science into question, and furthermore given social science the authority to regulate science instead of allowing science to regulate itself. social science claims more than it can substantiate because it makes too many assumptions and inferences in its methodology of studying behavior exclusively, then attempts to fill any remaining holes with an extensive theoretical framework that is not fully justified by scientific inquiry. as such, a large part of social science's criticisms of science boil down to philosophy that is not currently falsifiable at present nor can one make firm inferences from, as one does with something like evolution. i think this is a rather irresponsible approach, and while certainly the ideas might be valid -- we won't know for sure until neurological testing improves -- they should be accompanied by the disclaimer that they are just ideas, not facts. the idea that any of these theories is valid due to its rigor is completely false, and has everything to do with winning arguments than actually proving something, in this case the something being to what degree culture influences science. ultimately, valid attacks against science must be rational arguments against irrational aspects of a supposedly rational discipline. having faith in science is believing that ultimately humans can behave rationally enough to produce a body of knowledge that is objective despite the inherently irrational elements in human nature and living habits.



Friday, September 18, 2009

cultural versus philosophical and individual people implications in scientific epistemology

after much pontificating, i think i have finally been able to reduce culture and its claims against science to a manageable argument in a sane domain of philosophy. science initially assumed itself to inherently be of third-person ontology, with only a negligible first-person ontology. however, as the field of epistemology grew and science began being used across cultures, it appeared that first-person ontology was more than negligible, and criticisms of science were assumed under a third-person ontology with inferences for first-person ontology. as i will now demonstrate, it is the first-person ontologies of culture and science that provide the true arena for debate, not the third-person ones. upon closer examination, "pure science" versus "culturally-embedded science" is really more of a dichotomy between theoretical epistemology vs. applied epistemology in science. my definition of theoretical epistemology is in a so-called "perfect world", not necessarily where a theory of everything is possible, but the point just below that; such conditions would make science the ultimate truth and are still considered as an ideal to aim for, although knowing it is not possible to achieve, when following the scientific method. as such, first-person ontology would be negligible, and third-person ontology for the metaphysics being studied, no matter how chaotic and incompatible it was with our mathematical language, could still provide data that our epistemology legitimized as uncompromising science. applied epistemology is simply our knowledge of science using current methodologies in the real world. now, to provide some perspective, i'm going to introduce another theoretical epistemology called "theoretical opposite epistemology" which is diametrically opposed to a "perfect world", a condition in which virtually no universal truths can be attained via the scientific method and everything can only be attempted to be defined in third-person ontology through culture. now, if we span the entire spectrum from theoretical epistemology to "theoretical opposite epistemology", it becomes evident that definitions of science are dependent on the soundness of epistemology independent of the compatibility of metaphysics with our mathematical language. ultimately, science is epistemological, not metaphysical, which is why is has come under such attack in recent years.

the whole point of science is an adherence to abstract universals in consciousness so as to be commonly agreed upon that it exists as an entity with third-person ontology; failure to do so results in the failure to implement successful scientific research. so, unless one believes that all science is broken beyond repair by the effect of landscapes on our ability to conceptualize abstract universals in consciousness, then we must assume that landscapes are in fact reducible to culture, hence only possessing a first-person ontology. now, applied epistemology is the point of contention for many philosophers of science who claim that cultures impact methodologies and other aspects of scientific research so as to render science as being culturally-embedded. however, this belief is mistaken for the following reasons. "cultural" differences in methodologies ultimately come down to philosophical differences; it is simply the fact that scientists of a certain culture accept a certain methodology without any reason other than that is the way science has been conducted in their culture as opposed to scientists of another culture that accept a different methodology without any reason other than that is the way science has been conducted in their culture that these differences are deemed "cultural" instead of philosophical. however, when one actually scrutinizes the differences in methodologies, one can objectively criticize both methodologies and suggest alternatives or improvements so as to make the methodologies closer to an objective scientific methodology (see my alien blog entries if you need clarification for how i arrived at the possibility of an objective scientific methodology). the reason i make this distinction and believe mine to be the correct one instead of the prevailing one in many schools of thought regarding philosophy of science is that "cultural" implies a lack of reason, simply doing something because you've been told to do it that way and everyone else around you does it the same. on the other hand, "philosophical" implies an implementation of reason to find the most optimal method for science. so, while it may be valid to criticize current scientific research as being "culturally-embedded", there is no reason why given some time to review and critique scientific methodologies across cultures that these so-called cultural biases cannot be addressed and fixed and result in a methodology closely resembling the ideal of "pure science". so, in practice some science can be accused of being culturally-embedded, but in theory, science should not be culturally-embedded.

but certainly there are natural epistemological differences across cultures that would contribute to culturally-embedded since, right? wrong. all forms of proposed epistemologies -- theoretical, applied, and "theoretical opposite" -- should be based on the ability to conceive abstract universals in consciousness as an end-goal. as long as this holds true, science holds true because all other epistemological traits/differences should be considered irrelevant because there are more differences within a culture among its people than across cultures. so, if you want to claim that culture still affects science on some level below that of abstract processing, then that may be true. however, you'll also have to admit that there are even greater differences among the individual scientists within each culture. as such, science would then be more "people-embedded" than "culturally-embedded", and seeing as how science is primarily epistemological, it is inherently dependent on people no matter what biases created by their unique traits for the conception of science as a truth to exist -- without humans, there would be no science! so, in order for science to still be considered science, its "people-embedded" aspect must be negligible, and since the "culturally-embedded" aspect must be less than (or at most, equal to) the "people-embedded" aspect, it follows that culture also has a negligible impact on science and that science cannot be properly characterized as being "culturally-embedded".

Wednesday, September 16, 2009

the problem with morals, free will, and the mind-body problem

badiou states that, "moral law cannot be deduced from any utilitarian consideration or natural propensities." let's revisit where my proof started its launch:

intentionality is realizing first-person motives in third-person perspective/being


intentionality of free will is only in first-person, which is either an impetus at a point in time, or an infinite chain of impetuses (to choose free will)


person is responsible for initial impetus, but without third-person aspect of intentionality, there is no reflexivity or definition of the self with respect to the external



the problem philosophers have had with morals is that they haven't properly defined them within the context of the mind-body problem, in particular the aspect of consciousness. consciousness is what allows us to possess reflexivity, the ability to look at a mirror and say, "that's me!" my previous posts have addressed how the issue of consciousness inherently causes the notion of free will to be an ethical one, not a moral one despite having some moral foundations. in my 24 point outline, i reduced free will to what i consider to be its moral foundations: the "intentionality of free will". since morals ultimately stem from a source independent of ethical considerations, a source that only exists in the first-person ontology, i basically avoided the mind-body problem for the sake of my current schema by eliminating the problem of reflexivity. the debate now considers whether the intentionality of free will can exist over a period of time, and if so, if this changes its value and/or designation within the idea of morals. the answer is that it does not change its value and/or designation, because without the capacity for reflexivity, protracting the intentionality of free will over a period of time just amounts to discrete intervals of morals to accumulate on top of each other without any ability for a person to manage, arrange, or alter them differently from the initial ways they arrived. the infinite chain of impetuses (implementation of ryle's regress using to choose instead of to think -- e.g. to choose free will), while still posing a dilemma for solving the mind-body problem, is rendered irrelevant to the purposes of the intentionality of free will, because without reflexivity, consciousness is not involved, and thus free will cannot be behind the initial impetus and ryle's regress is nullified. thus, the impetus is inherently defined by natural propensities.


so here are the problems philosophers have had defining morals within the context of the mind-body problem. first of all, philosophers have mistaken "internal ethics" as morals; "internal ethics" being intentionality realizing first-person motives in third-person perspective/being via reflexivity without any *detectable* physical action taking place -- the emphasis is on *detectable*! when one sits and ruminates over something for a few minutes without moving or budging a bit, this sort of demeanor is view philosophically as a moral situation, as the person is not exhibiting any noticeable action. however, this is specious on two counts: 1) by not acting, the person is still taking an action, and 2) there are physical manifestations occurring in the brain corresponding to the person's thoughts in his/her mind, physical manifestations which are "internal actions" as opposed to "external actions" like a person raising his/her hand. secondly, when this problem is clarified, one realizes that the idea of free will has to be internalized with exclusive first-person ontology. this is critical, because with third-person ontology you are simply expanding the domain of ethics further and further internally without addressing the fundamental "moral" foundations. i addressed the underlying problem by creating an "intentionality of free will", which in and of itself is a paradox, for it attempts to account for a reflexive phenomenon using only first person ontology. by doing this, i have demonstrated that the intentionality of free will is simply a construct to prove that the idea of an intentionality of free will is actually impossible. as a result, the initial moral impetus has been reduced to those of natural propensities.


if an intentionality of free will could exist, then so could the idea of morals; this is compatible with the widespread belief that morals, or "moral law" is a universal phenomenon with third-person ontology. so, how about the mind-body problem being a wastebasket solution allowing continental and postmodernist philosophers to argue at length regarding the ideas of morality? the reason this doesn't work is because ultimately the idea of free will stems from consciousness, which assumes the capacity for reflexivity. so, while there may be moral foundations at the heart of every decision we make, and these foundations are of natural propensities, eventually when these foundations are manifested in consciousness, it is there that the mystery of what ultimately causes our decision-making processes to occur exists. so ultimately, the final decision is, by being controlled by consciousness, an ethical one, not a moral one. however, it is possible 1) to question how unconscious processes lead to conscious ones, and as result, how moral ones can transform into ethical ones, and 2) to question how much morals -- or natural propensities as i have translated them into -- contribute to affecting conscious decision-making, and if there are ways in which unconscious moral processes can "overwhelm" conscious ethical processes and, in essence, subvert our normal framework for making choices. both issues remain as points of contention with the mind-body problem in philosophy of mind.


now, to address a few questions that have been raised regarding the following sequence of points:


since impetus is irrational, human nature can be reduced to animal nature


animals are assumed to act in the best interest of themselves and their species


therefore, all impetuses by all humans must be assumed to be in the best interest of themselves and their species at any given time and place


all impetuses must be considered good if one believes it is human nature to be acting in the interests of both the self and the species (if considered bad, then our entire species would be considered misanthropic, which is not a plausible scenario)


since animals act in the best interest of both themselves and their species, it is impossible to determine whether it is more moral to be selfish or selfless


all people, at their most fundamental basis, must be considered to be good people if one believes in morals; if one does not believe in morals, then people at their most fundamental basis are effectively neutral


if all people are considered good people, then all their impetuses must be good, and without a distinction between good and bad, good is no longer considered good, but carries an amoral or neutral designation



my designation of impetuses being good is regarding animal nature and their survival instinct for the benefit of themselves and their species; this is the basis upon which the rest of my inferences about human nature and morality are predicated. if one feels that this definition is either too implicative of ethics and/or utilitarianism, then you have once again left the question of morality open to any sorts of unprovable philosophical designations established with whatever reasons one deems appropriate. however, by doing this, since i've reduced human nature to animal nature, whatever designations one assigns human morality are also pertinent to animals. so, if one claims that human morality is a "chaotic abyss", then one must also admit that animal impetuses are similarly a "chaotic abyss", which doesn't make any sense within the context of widely accepted beliefs about animal behaviors. as such, one is basically clinging to the inherent chaos of everything in the universe, which to me, is assigning morality a designation of amorality, which is a self-defeating argument. but then one can expect postmodernist philosophers to delve further into obscurantism, relating this amorality to some sort of mysticism or unexplainable phenomenon that magically transcends science or human comprehension, etc. -- basically, beliefs that are either completely non-pragmatic, indicative of severe psychological problems, or representative of a mindset of someone who's been thoroughly brainwashed by a religious cult. by attacking the inherent obvious "goodness" exhibited by the behavior of an animal species, one is also basically undermining the fundamental notion that larger universal behaviors can result in biological organisms from the assembly of smaller component parts -- a very conservative approach to knowledge -- or is denying the "goodness" of animal behavior as being stupid, or incapable of moral characteristics. this latter explanation would work fine, if not for the fact that i've reduced human nature to animal nature. by denying the "goodness" of animal behavior, one is either being intellectually dishonest and/or conservative by being overly-reductionist in approaching and characterizing behavior of animals, or is claiming that morality is stupid, and thus basically amoral since the "stupid" behavior of animals also forms the basis of human behavior and morality.

Monday, September 14, 2009

24 point outline proving morals do not exist

if free is assumed to exist, free will is defined by being independent of divine and physical forces


free will has only first-person ontology; it is not a third-person entity/being


intentionality is realizing first-person motives in third-person perspective/being


intentionality of free will is only in first-person, which is either an impetus at a point in time, or an infinite chain of impetuses (to choose free will)


person is responsible for initial impetus, but without third-person aspect of intentionality, there is no reflexivity or definition of the self with respect to the external


impetus is first-person ontology, so good or bad aspect of impetus is not third-person ontology


impetus is therefore specific to people, and without a way to judge morals -- just like there is no way to judge what it is like to experience of unique consciousness for each individual -- we cannot determine if impetus is good or bad


impetus is specific to individual person because the definition of free will directly implies choice for the individual


impetus is first-person ontology only, so since it is not result based, we are left with:

a) good or bad aspect of impetus is in the eye/mind of the beholder if impetus is viewed as a particular or with relativity without a universal standard

b) good or bad aspect of impetus has a universal standard accommodating all particulars of all situations


if b is true, then we can never know what the universal standard is because we would need the impetus to have a third-person ontology in addition to first-person.


therefore, the impetus is either entirely subjective, or entirely objective without any possible objective standard


it follows that if *b* is the case, then being objective without any objective standard makes the goodness of the impetus an act of faith


an act of faith means that the impetus is irrational


it follows that if *a* is the case, then we eventually arrive at the same conclusion as for *b* because being entirely subjective means impetus is entirely irrational/unexplainable


irrational impetus defines the basis of human nature


since impetus is irrational, human nature can be reduced to animal nature


animals are assumed to act in the best interest of themselves and their species


therefore, all impetuses by all humans must be assumed to be in the best interest of themselves and their species at any given time and place


all impetuses must be considered good if one believes it is human nature to be acting in the interests of both the self and the species (if considered bad, then our entire species would be considered misanthropic, which is not a plausible scenario)


since animals act in the best interest of both themselves and their species, it is impossible to determine whether it is more moral to be selfish or selfless


all people, at their most fundamental basis, must be considered to be good people if one believes in morals; if one does not believe in morals, then people at their most fundamental basis are effectively neutral


if all people are considered good people, then all their impetuses must be good, and without a distinction between good and bad, good is no longer considered good, but carries an amoral or neutral designation


therefore, whether or not we believe in morals, all people, at their most fundamental basis, must be considered of one designation, being an amoral or neutral one


additionally, morals simply exist as an intellectual construct, or more accurately, a universal and abstract idea in our consciousness, in a manner not fundamentally different from knowing the concept of numbers, etc. so, in reality, morals exist as ideas, not as morals in and of themselves

Friday, September 11, 2009

morals are a form of science

recently, i've been contemplating the ideas of morals. i realized a key component that i had omitted from a previous entry: morals are not just dependent on intentionality and the mind-body problem, for these are simply the mechanisms or vehicles for which morals are realized externally. morals, in the purest sense, are ascertaining the difference between right and wrong, good or bad; the success of one's application of this is through ethics. how do we know what is good or bad in the universe? well, here's a little brain teaser for you. pain and suffering are considered bad, right? but then, there's the axiom, "no pain, no gain." so, if gain is considered "good", then morals have an inherent substructure through which they operate, either via the channel of morals exclusively or via their interaction with other factors in creating the combinatory field known as ethics, and either way there seems to be an inherent "bad" within a larger "good". perhaps this is necessary as, according to some people, things are defined by their opposites, so perhaps the magnitude of the "bad" within a larger "good" indicates the magnitude of goodness within the entity of good.

weaving this concept back into my prior post on this topic would very monotonous, pedantic, and time-consuming without arriving at different conclusions. so, if you're smart enough, you should intuitively see how the above considerations are fully compatible with the framework i previously established. however, i would now like to make a simple point about morals using the scientific method. let's forget about the idea of "no pain, no gain." instead, assume that all pain and suffering is inherently bad. pain is perhaps a part of, or at the very least, interpreted by consciousness. consciousness, in some forms (but not all), exhibits itself through behavior. now, imagine an experiment where a person must place a body part in ice cold water and remove the body part from the water when they have reached their maximum tolerance threshold for pain. upon repeating the experiment multiple times on various subjects, it becomes quite evident that placing this body part in ice cold water causes pain and suffering for these subject, and thus scientifically, a causality can be assumed relating to all people. so, we have come to *know* and define pain via the scientific method. now, imagine a situation where two people are walking on thin ice when all of a sudden a crack breaks open a patch and one of the persons falls into ice cold water. now, of course it would be "common sense" to know that the person in the water is in pain and the other person should attempt to pull the person in the water out of it. however, let's compare the certainty of *knowing* what the other person is feeling.

quoting a previous blog entry (to know vs to be (notes)):
to know as part of collective consciousness: to know how to know; since can't be done without pure abstraction (in practice), 3rd person ontology is required for being as translator between two 1st person epistemologies

to translate what i have written above and apply it to the current situation, the scientific method is an acquisition of knowledge of the first-order: simply *to know*; for this situation, the conclusion that placing people in ice cold water results in them consciously feeling pain and suffering has been arrived at through the scientific method. for the situation where a person accidentally falls into ice cold water, there are two ways that a person can attempt to understand the other person's pain and suffering. the first is to assume that the situation, were it to occur the same way multiple times, would result in the same outcome -- the person in the ice cold water being in pain and suffering and exhibiting this behaviorally through some form of communication, such as screaming. the second way is to know as part of a collective consciousness, or in as it relates to this situation, is better known as empathy. this, however, is "knowing how to know", which is an acquisition of knowledge of the second-order. as such, it would be more justifiable to attempt to rescue the person in the ice cold water using first-order knowledge than second-order knowledge, and between the two types of first-order knowledge, the kind obtained through science, being done through rigorous practice, is more certain than the kind obtained through assuming a situation to be scientifically reproducible, being done in theory and not through rigorous practice.

now, we can relate the understanding gained through these examples to more subjective situations regarding pain and suffering. unlike placing people in ice cold water, definitions of pain and suffering are much harder to determine via the scientific method for other types of situations. for example, how does one measure the pain someone suffers through a lifetime of trauma after witnessing one comrade after another die before his eyes on the battlefield in war? how does one measure the pain someone suffers from being homesick? (this is an example to which "no pain, no gain" might be applicable, but let's postpone that discussion for another day). after a certain point, one realizes that science becomes less and less useful in determining pain to where it simply has no bearing on the subject at all anymore. at this point, the other person verbally and/or physically communicating and empathy are the only ways one can attempt to determine the pain and suffering another person is feeling. returning to points a and b in my post "to know vs to be (notes)", both of these methods are "knowing how to know", thus being of the second-order of knowledge. so, in situations where science is not applicable, determining how much pain and suffering another person is in is based on second-order knowledge. because science is not applicable, the part of science that relates to ethics regarding the realization of one's morals is rendered ineffective. as a result, the best moral decision one can make is the determining of good within the context of the collective consciousness: the person making the decision, the person who is in pain and suffering, and everyone else. if one is a product of genes and environment, then his/her definition of what is good is predetermined by cultural, societal, and historical standards; in more analytic terms, the consciousness of the decision maker being the sum output of all previous and present metaphysical and epistemological inputs realized in the decision maker's first-person ontology. however, if the idea of free will is applied, then this means there is something additional to all previous and present metaphysical and epistemological inputs realized in the decision maker's first-person ontology, and furthermore, that this additional something is controlled by that person independent of any external input. as such, the definition of what is good is in the mind of the beholder. either way, the idea of a person committing a moral action is nullified. without free will, a person is simply an input-output conduit through which everything else operates, and while people and society can in their own minds decide whether or not the action taken was good or bad, the person is absolved of any responsibility and the opinions of everyone else is purely subjective. when free will is involved...please read my next post.

Wednesday, September 9, 2009

analytic vs continental/postmodernist philosophy

regarding why postmodernist philosophy is inadmissible to the analytic domain (i'm actually using continental, of which postmodernist is an extension of), it's pretty much self-evident from the wikipedia page:

1) analytic supports scientism as the best platform for metaphysics and experience; continental/postmodernist rejects it. accordingly, analytic attempts, using logic, to model itself after the natural science, whereas continental maintains the tradition the philosophy is considered to be in the humanities.

2) in place of scientism, continental/postmodernism uses cultural, social, and historical experiences

3) continental/postmodernist philosophy believes that human agency can changes these conditions of experience.

4) One of the large differences between analytic sources and continental/postmodern sources is that the analytic tradition by and large guards at least some of the tenets of liberalism, while many continental sources flirt with, or completely immerse themselves in, Marxism.


my conclusion that choices are ultimately ethical and not moral proves that i am actually a mix of both approaches, although virtually all of my reading has been in the analytic realm. however, since ultimately i have reduced ethics to metaphysics, and the mind-body problem is an issue that is only seriously addressed by analytic philosophy, this, along with a few other reasons, are why i choose analytic over continental/postmodernist. the three points establish the differences between the two schools regarding the mind-body problem: the metaphysical premises from which to engage intellectual discourse is completely different as analytic chooses science as the basis of experience, and continental/postmodernist chooses culture (in and of itself a construct of consciousness, which further confuses addressing the mind-body problem), society, and history among other things. then, their conclusions regarding how to deal with the mind-body problem are totally different. analytic ultimately tries to be objective by treating philosophy and science in more traditional senses, and does not offer a reason for pursuing the mind-body problem even though that is one of the fields most predominant issues. so, i find this to be unsatisfactory. but continental/postmodernist is even worse because it claims to have already found the answer by saying that human agency can change the conditions of experience. by doing so, it implies an element of free will (analytic does not necessarily), thus claiming to have "solved" the mind-body problem by claiming a meaningful conclusion without justifying how it arrived there from its initial set of metaphysical premises. if continental/postmodernist did not imply free will, then i would say that it merely put aside the mind-body problem, but it does not do this. this is why i've always been suspicious about continental/postmodernist philosophy: it does not address the mind-body problem, to which i believe almost every philosophical issue can be reduced to, and then it has the arrogance to claim it has an answer to the problem (a partial answer anyway regarding free will -- it has yet to fit make this general implication compatible with a functional framework, seeing as how continental/postmodernist never establish possible frameworks for the mind-body problem in the first place) without demonstrating proof by creating its own metaphysical vocabulary and premises which are not generally not falsifiable, and furthermore claims to, through artificial constructs, hold power over the entire domain of human issues, from science to art.

about the only areas where the two fields have overlap is in 1) philosophy of science and 2) marxism (analytical marxism is an area applying analytical approaches to marxism), and 3) ethics. outside of these areas, the two fields, depending on how the situation, either cover entirely different subject matter or employ entirely different approaches so as to render engagement between the two fields as compatible as two people speaking two different languages to each other. in my opinion, this could be rectified if both fields were to reduce much of their subject matter to the mind-body problem; at this juncture, i believe much of the obscurantism (continental) and unproven assumptions (analytic) could be addressed and perhaps a new philosophical framework and vocabulary could be built from the ground up and branch off to cover other areas of interest. within the areas of overlap i listed earlier, i'd imagine that the continental/postmodernist school's rejection of scientism is a huge point of contention that neither side can come to a satisfactory agreement on to establish a level playing field of sorts. thus, all of the above is why continental/postmodernist philosophy is inadmissible in the domain of analytic philosophy and vice-versa. and it is also why anyone arguing in the other person's domain is going to lose regardless of how intelligent and clever the person's argument is; when you play by the other person's set of rules, you always lose.

there's a reason why most philosophy departments in the country -- from ivy league to the uc's -- consider themselves analytic: because it most closely falls in line with the rigors of the history of the discipline of philosophy, not necessarily the original goals of the discipline. as a result, continental/postmodernist philosophy has mostly been banished to the social sciences and humanities under the guise of "theory". what this amounts to is that theorists claim more than they can substantiate, whereas real philosophers try at all costs to avoid such pitfalls. however, i understand the practical necessity for the existence of "theory", so i try not to belittle it. i do however, take issue with the notion that continental/postmodernist philosophers could defeat analytics; if this were the case, then most philosophy departments in the country would adopt the continental/analytic approach and no longer would there be "theory" courses taught in other departments.

Tuesday, September 8, 2009

no virginia, choices are not ultimately moral

if everything is a moral choice, one has to make the distinction between right and wrong or varying degrees of each on a spectrum. human beings expressing personal choice that is not simply determined by physical or divine forces indicates that one has "free will", somehow transcending physical and divine forces. intentionality is the mechanism by which free will is realized; one directs an abstract understanding of an idea through an action that affects reality independent of the abstract understanding catalyzed via time. how well the abstract understanding is realized in reality through action is indicative of the strength of one's will. as such, a two-fold problem exists:


first of all, in order for the abstract understanding to occur, conscious and unconscious processes must be at work in the brain. because consciousness is involved, so is the mind-body problem; if the mind-body problem were solved so that it was determined that humans do not possess any sort of free will, then humans are also absolved of any moral responsibility because they do not control any of their choices.


the second problem, assuming humans possess some amount of free will, is the degree to which one can realize the will. so, let's assume a situation presents itself to a group of people that requires an application of intelligence through which the scientific method can achieve more success than by not using it. people in group A make a more "moral" decision than group B. however, group B uses the scientific method to arrive at their decision, whereas group A makes a decision based purely from experience, intuition, and group consensus. if group B's choice results in a more "moral" result than groups A's, then which group is more "moral"? i believe that one would say that group A is more "moral", but group B is more "ethical". thus, ethics are defined as the success by which one's morals are realized.



ok, but returning to morals, we are left with a few problems. first of all, there is the question of purity of thought. for example, it would be unethical for someone to attack another person with provocation. however, it is immoral simply to think of implementing such an action as a possible choice before finally deciding against it before taking action. if we can consciously control what we think, then at what point is the initial impetus for thinking and how do we control it? using ryle's regress (i think that i think that i think that… (to infinity)), at least we can arrive at some sort of causality within a thought itself for how the final aspect of the thought is arrived at, although its impetus is still not well-defined. as such, the result of the thought as an impetus is defined through ryle's regress, but the "impetus of the larger impetus" is not. as such, ryle's regress merely skirts around the larger issue at hand and is not a satisfactory solution.



the second problem about morals is the problem of intentionality and the "leftover" failures of a series of decisions leading to a cumulative effect on a person's ability to choose. let's reconsider people from groups A and B. assume that people from group A, by making 100% morally correct choices that are less ethical than group B's, remain morally pure over the course of having to make decisions for a number of situation over a period of time. assume that group B only makes 50% morally correct choices that are more ethical than group A's, amounting to an accumulation of immorality over the course of making a number of decisions. however, in understanding their immorality, group B has still made more ethical choices over a period of time than group A. if one believes that making morally correct choices, regardless of their results, over the long haul causes people to make better moral (by default) and ethical choices (ethical being the important barometer by which "success" of a decision is measured), then one ultimately must come to the conclusion that all choices are moral. however, if one believes that making less morally correct choices, results considered, over the long haul causes people to make better ethical choices due to a person's awareness and intelligence, then one ultimately must come to the conclusion that all choices are practical, predicated on rationalism and empiricism, combined with experience. adding the moral component to the mix, we are left with the conclusion that all choices are ultimately ethical, not moral.