cultural versus philosophical and individual people implications in scientific epistemology

after much pontificating, i think i have finally been able to reduce culture and its claims against science to a manageable argument in a sane domain of philosophy. science initially assumed itself to inherently be of third-person ontology, with only a negligible first-person ontology. however, as the field of epistemology grew and science began being used across cultures, it appeared that first-person ontology was more than negligible, and criticisms of science were assumed under a third-person ontology with inferences for first-person ontology. as i will now demonstrate, it is the first-person ontologies of culture and science that provide the true arena for debate, not the third-person ones. upon closer examination, "pure science" versus "culturally-embedded science" is really more of a dichotomy between theoretical epistemology vs. applied epistemology in science. my definition of theoretical epistemology is in a so-called "perfect world", not necessarily where a theory of everything is possible, but the point just below that; such conditions would make science the ultimate truth and are still considered as an ideal to aim for, although knowing it is not possible to achieve, when following the scientific method. as such, first-person ontology would be negligible, and third-person ontology for the metaphysics being studied, no matter how chaotic and incompatible it was with our mathematical language, could still provide data that our epistemology legitimized as uncompromising science. applied epistemology is simply our knowledge of science using current methodologies in the real world. now, to provide some perspective, i'm going to introduce another theoretical epistemology called "theoretical opposite epistemology" which is diametrically opposed to a "perfect world", a condition in which virtually no universal truths can be attained via the scientific method and everything can only be attempted to be defined in third-person ontology through culture. now, if we span the entire spectrum from theoretical epistemology to "theoretical opposite epistemology", it becomes evident that definitions of science are dependent on the soundness of epistemology independent of the compatibility of metaphysics with our mathematical language. ultimately, science is epistemological, not metaphysical, which is why is has come under such attack in recent years.

the whole point of science is an adherence to abstract universals in consciousness so as to be commonly agreed upon that it exists as an entity with third-person ontology; failure to do so results in the failure to implement successful scientific research. so, unless one believes that all science is broken beyond repair by the effect of landscapes on our ability to conceptualize abstract universals in consciousness, then we must assume that landscapes are in fact reducible to culture, hence only possessing a first-person ontology. now, applied epistemology is the point of contention for many philosophers of science who claim that cultures impact methodologies and other aspects of scientific research so as to render science as being culturally-embedded. however, this belief is mistaken for the following reasons. "cultural" differences in methodologies ultimately come down to philosophical differences; it is simply the fact that scientists of a certain culture accept a certain methodology without any reason other than that is the way science has been conducted in their culture as opposed to scientists of another culture that accept a different methodology without any reason other than that is the way science has been conducted in their culture that these differences are deemed "cultural" instead of philosophical. however, when one actually scrutinizes the differences in methodologies, one can objectively criticize both methodologies and suggest alternatives or improvements so as to make the methodologies closer to an objective scientific methodology (see my alien blog entries if you need clarification for how i arrived at the possibility of an objective scientific methodology). the reason i make this distinction and believe mine to be the correct one instead of the prevailing one in many schools of thought regarding philosophy of science is that "cultural" implies a lack of reason, simply doing something because you've been told to do it that way and everyone else around you does it the same. on the other hand, "philosophical" implies an implementation of reason to find the most optimal method for science. so, while it may be valid to criticize current scientific research as being "culturally-embedded", there is no reason why given some time to review and critique scientific methodologies across cultures that these so-called cultural biases cannot be addressed and fixed and result in a methodology closely resembling the ideal of "pure science". so, in practice some science can be accused of being culturally-embedded, but in theory, science should not be culturally-embedded.

but certainly there are natural epistemological differences across cultures that would contribute to culturally-embedded since, right? wrong. all forms of proposed epistemologies -- theoretical, applied, and "theoretical opposite" -- should be based on the ability to conceive abstract universals in consciousness as an end-goal. as long as this holds true, science holds true because all other epistemological traits/differences should be considered irrelevant because there are more differences within a culture among its people than across cultures. so, if you want to claim that culture still affects science on some level below that of abstract processing, then that may be true. however, you'll also have to admit that there are even greater differences among the individual scientists within each culture. as such, science would then be more "people-embedded" than "culturally-embedded", and seeing as how science is primarily epistemological, it is inherently dependent on people no matter what biases created by their unique traits for the conception of science as a truth to exist -- without humans, there would be no science! so, in order for science to still be considered science, its "people-embedded" aspect must be negligible, and since the "culturally-embedded" aspect must be less than (or at most, equal to) the "people-embedded" aspect, it follows that culture also has a negligible impact on science and that science cannot be properly characterized as being "culturally-embedded".