the problem with morals, free will, and the mind-body problem

badiou states that, "moral law cannot be deduced from any utilitarian consideration or natural propensities." let's revisit where my proof started its launch:

intentionality is realizing first-person motives in third-person perspective/being

intentionality of free will is only in first-person, which is either an impetus at a point in time, or an infinite chain of impetuses (to choose free will)

person is responsible for initial impetus, but without third-person aspect of intentionality, there is no reflexivity or definition of the self with respect to the external

the problem philosophers have had with morals is that they haven't properly defined them within the context of the mind-body problem, in particular the aspect of consciousness. consciousness is what allows us to possess reflexivity, the ability to look at a mirror and say, "that's me!" my previous posts have addressed how the issue of consciousness inherently causes the notion of free will to be an ethical one, not a moral one despite having some moral foundations. in my 24 point outline, i reduced free will to what i consider to be its moral foundations: the "intentionality of free will". since morals ultimately stem from a source independent of ethical considerations, a source that only exists in the first-person ontology, i basically avoided the mind-body problem for the sake of my current schema by eliminating the problem of reflexivity. the debate now considers whether the intentionality of free will can exist over a period of time, and if so, if this changes its value and/or designation within the idea of morals. the answer is that it does not change its value and/or designation, because without the capacity for reflexivity, protracting the intentionality of free will over a period of time just amounts to discrete intervals of morals to accumulate on top of each other without any ability for a person to manage, arrange, or alter them differently from the initial ways they arrived. the infinite chain of impetuses (implementation of ryle's regress using to choose instead of to think -- e.g. to choose free will), while still posing a dilemma for solving the mind-body problem, is rendered irrelevant to the purposes of the intentionality of free will, because without reflexivity, consciousness is not involved, and thus free will cannot be behind the initial impetus and ryle's regress is nullified. thus, the impetus is inherently defined by natural propensities.

so here are the problems philosophers have had defining morals within the context of the mind-body problem. first of all, philosophers have mistaken "internal ethics" as morals; "internal ethics" being intentionality realizing first-person motives in third-person perspective/being via reflexivity without any *detectable* physical action taking place -- the emphasis is on *detectable*! when one sits and ruminates over something for a few minutes without moving or budging a bit, this sort of demeanor is view philosophically as a moral situation, as the person is not exhibiting any noticeable action. however, this is specious on two counts: 1) by not acting, the person is still taking an action, and 2) there are physical manifestations occurring in the brain corresponding to the person's thoughts in his/her mind, physical manifestations which are "internal actions" as opposed to "external actions" like a person raising his/her hand. secondly, when this problem is clarified, one realizes that the idea of free will has to be internalized with exclusive first-person ontology. this is critical, because with third-person ontology you are simply expanding the domain of ethics further and further internally without addressing the fundamental "moral" foundations. i addressed the underlying problem by creating an "intentionality of free will", which in and of itself is a paradox, for it attempts to account for a reflexive phenomenon using only first person ontology. by doing this, i have demonstrated that the intentionality of free will is simply a construct to prove that the idea of an intentionality of free will is actually impossible. as a result, the initial moral impetus has been reduced to those of natural propensities.

if an intentionality of free will could exist, then so could the idea of morals; this is compatible with the widespread belief that morals, or "moral law" is a universal phenomenon with third-person ontology. so, how about the mind-body problem being a wastebasket solution allowing continental and postmodernist philosophers to argue at length regarding the ideas of morality? the reason this doesn't work is because ultimately the idea of free will stems from consciousness, which assumes the capacity for reflexivity. so, while there may be moral foundations at the heart of every decision we make, and these foundations are of natural propensities, eventually when these foundations are manifested in consciousness, it is there that the mystery of what ultimately causes our decision-making processes to occur exists. so ultimately, the final decision is, by being controlled by consciousness, an ethical one, not a moral one. however, it is possible 1) to question how unconscious processes lead to conscious ones, and as result, how moral ones can transform into ethical ones, and 2) to question how much morals -- or natural propensities as i have translated them into -- contribute to affecting conscious decision-making, and if there are ways in which unconscious moral processes can "overwhelm" conscious ethical processes and, in essence, subvert our normal framework for making choices. both issues remain as points of contention with the mind-body problem in philosophy of mind.

now, to address a few questions that have been raised regarding the following sequence of points:

since impetus is irrational, human nature can be reduced to animal nature

animals are assumed to act in the best interest of themselves and their species

therefore, all impetuses by all humans must be assumed to be in the best interest of themselves and their species at any given time and place

all impetuses must be considered good if one believes it is human nature to be acting in the interests of both the self and the species (if considered bad, then our entire species would be considered misanthropic, which is not a plausible scenario)

since animals act in the best interest of both themselves and their species, it is impossible to determine whether it is more moral to be selfish or selfless

all people, at their most fundamental basis, must be considered to be good people if one believes in morals; if one does not believe in morals, then people at their most fundamental basis are effectively neutral

if all people are considered good people, then all their impetuses must be good, and without a distinction between good and bad, good is no longer considered good, but carries an amoral or neutral designation

my designation of impetuses being good is regarding animal nature and their survival instinct for the benefit of themselves and their species; this is the basis upon which the rest of my inferences about human nature and morality are predicated. if one feels that this definition is either too implicative of ethics and/or utilitarianism, then you have once again left the question of morality open to any sorts of unprovable philosophical designations established with whatever reasons one deems appropriate. however, by doing this, since i've reduced human nature to animal nature, whatever designations one assigns human morality are also pertinent to animals. so, if one claims that human morality is a "chaotic abyss", then one must also admit that animal impetuses are similarly a "chaotic abyss", which doesn't make any sense within the context of widely accepted beliefs about animal behaviors. as such, one is basically clinging to the inherent chaos of everything in the universe, which to me, is assigning morality a designation of amorality, which is a self-defeating argument. but then one can expect postmodernist philosophers to delve further into obscurantism, relating this amorality to some sort of mysticism or unexplainable phenomenon that magically transcends science or human comprehension, etc. -- basically, beliefs that are either completely non-pragmatic, indicative of severe psychological problems, or representative of a mindset of someone who's been thoroughly brainwashed by a religious cult. by attacking the inherent obvious "goodness" exhibited by the behavior of an animal species, one is also basically undermining the fundamental notion that larger universal behaviors can result in biological organisms from the assembly of smaller component parts -- a very conservative approach to knowledge -- or is denying the "goodness" of animal behavior as being stupid, or incapable of moral characteristics. this latter explanation would work fine, if not for the fact that i've reduced human nature to animal nature. by denying the "goodness" of animal behavior, one is either being intellectually dishonest and/or conservative by being overly-reductionist in approaching and characterizing behavior of animals, or is claiming that morality is stupid, and thus basically amoral since the "stupid" behavior of animals also forms the basis of human behavior and morality.