answer to an age old question

here's an interesting observation i recently made about the correspondence theory of truth. for those needing a little refresher, here's what wikipedia says: "The correspondence theory of truth states that the truth or falsity of a statement is determined only by how it relates to the world, and whether it accurately describes (i.e., corresponds with) that world." this a point of much contention in philosophy, as ancient philosophers and most analytics believe in this theory, whereas continental and postmodernist philosophers reject it (heidegger being the most prominent since he focused much of his work on the nature of being stemming from the ancients' interpretation of it, ultimately rejecting their viewpoint on this theory). after some ruminating, it appears to me that both sides are wrong. by believing in the correspondence theory of truth, you have to make a leap of faith regarding epistemological issues and disregarding them as irrelevant to our ability to understand metaphysics. however, not believing in the correspondence theory of truth only is compatible with the belief system of a single person. why is this so and what is its relevance? when more than one person does not believe in the correspondence theory of truth, they are coming to a common agreement both metaphysically and epistemologically. now, if both metaphysical and epistemological compatibility to an agreement on any sort of topic other than the correspondence theory of truth occurred between two people or among n people, one could argue that such an agreement was either a particular agreement to a particular set of people, or a universal agreement, rendering the need for a common agreement among a group of people irrelevant. but in coming to a common agreement regarding the correspondence theory of truth, a group of people has established a universal precedent, albeit in a particular setting, for the need of the existence of the correspondence theory of truth in order to fully and completely reject it. before i return to this point to reexamine the fine print, let me clearly recapitulate the apparent contradiction: one can only reject the correspondence theory of truth by collectively conceiving it first. now, in reexamining the fine print, one notices my use of the terms "universal" and "particular"; universal is attached to the correspondence theory of truth, and particular is attached to the common agreement. what this entails is that the correspondence theory of truth can only be rejected under particular circumstances -- the correspondence theory of truth can never be completely and universally dismissed. on the other hand, believing in the correspondence theory of truth as a common agreement among a group of people is still, due to being a common agreement, a particular circumstance. so, in short, the correspondence theory of truth can never be universally denied, but only affirmed under particular circumstances.