aliens, social science, and dualism

an approach of a "full knowing" of *to be* inherently contradicts the very notion of knowledge and thought. the problem deals with knowledge in an passive vs active form. passive forms of knowledge deal with approaching an infinite number of discrete entities. as one academic once put it, "genius is being able to figure things out quickly." active forms of knowledge are not just digesting pre-existing knowledge, but creating new knowledge by forming connections among the discrete entities one already has acquired; active knowledge is making things work. so, if "full knowing" is something that can be taught, then it is inherently passive knowledge, and *to be* must be defined as active knowledge. if both passive knowledge and active knowledge are defined by "full knowing", then *to be* is defined by the unique combination of universals and particulars of a person. if the infinity of universals and particulars in a person is defined over an interval from point a to point b, then at least one can say social science has defined a "full knowing" of *to be* by what is not a "full knowing" of *to be* -- this includes both "not knowing" of *to be* and "not knowing" of *not to be* (if you have trouble grasping this concept, imagine the four quadrants as defined by a graph in algebra -- the first quadrant is "full knowing" of *to be*, second quadrant is "full knowing" of *not to be*, third quadrant is "not knowing" of *not to be*, fourth quadrant is "not knowing' of *to be*; basically, it's signal detection theory). of course, the use of "not knowing" in contrast to "full knowing" may not be accurate, as just because something is defined by what it is not does not mean that it is necessarily its opposite. so, perhaps "not knowing" could be "partial knowing" or "incomplete knowing", and *not to be* could be *partial being* or *incomplete being*. this is a matter that is probably best left for another day. but to complete my earlier thoughts, social science at least believes it can define "full knowing" of *to be* by whatever either of those is not. however, suppose that it cannot define the infinity of universals and particulars in a person by an interval from point a to point b. if it's defined by the span from negative infinity to positive infinity, then "full knowing" cannot know without having always known -- this implies causal determinism. ok, so how about only from point a to positive infinity, since that would represent the linear progression of time after the discovering "full knowing" at point a. this would imply causal determinism starting only from point a, which would mean either causal determinism existed in some way before point a (reverting back to the span of negative infinity to positive infinity) or that point a is the "big bang" of knowledge, and that there is perfect compatibility between epistemology and metaphysics, which we know is not possible without a perfect theory of everything spanning from negative infinity to positive infinity. how about simply at point a? the problem with this argument is that connections between discrete entities of knowledge occur over a period of time; mathematically this is supported by dividing any number by zero causing an answer of "error" on one's calculator because it is undefined. so, at best, social science can only hope to define "full knowing" of *to be* by what those entities are not, not by what they are.

ok, now for the *definitive* argument against social science being a science. i realized one night that the reason social science has been able to be reduced to science in some quarters is due to the problem of reflexivity with the human race and using some sneaky philosophical tricks to define this problem so as to favor the social science's perspective. allow me to introduce the savior to save the human race from social science...aliens! yes, aliens will save the human race, and here's how. social science ultimately reduced science to a "full knowing" of *to be* by attacking science culturally on both entities. let's assume there are conscious aliens out there who have studied science, discovered the same things we've discovered, and applied their discoveries to technology to "prove" that science works. all of a sudden, since humans cannot "be" aliens, this cultural attack on *to be* in science is nullified, as humans can simply only come *to know* aliens. as such, from a social scientist's perspective, science is no longer a "full knowing" of *to be*, but a "full knowing" of to *to know*; instead of science being reduced to a study of culture, science is reduced to a study of species. furthermore, assuming that these aliens are invulnerable to any scientific discoveries, then the ethical questions surrounding science for them become a relatively moot point, a question of realizing intentionality instead of debating life or death. culturally, this would still mean amongst the alien species that culture defines science, but in a negligible manner. i'm sure the degree of negligibility could be attacked, but it is just something to consider; it is not the core of my argument.

so, according to the above, social science can be reduced to science -- of a second-order; *to know* is first-order, "knowing" of "to know" is second-order. but certainly social science can wiggle its way out of this trap, can it not? first, let me address a fundamental concept of social science vs. science, what i consider to be the relativity principle. the closer social science gets to science, the less the domain of information and knowledge it can cover due to a decreasing number of variables needed in order to arrive at more focused and assertive conclusions. the farther social science gets from science, the greater the domain of information and knowledge it can cover due to an increasing number of variables, forcing one to arrive at less-focused and less-assertive conclusions. thus, social science can deny being reduced to science because social science itself can determine its own end goals to fulfill its definition of science; social science is no longer reduced to science under this paradigm's assumptions, social science *is* science. why is this? because science aims at discovering objective truths, but knows it cannot ultimately reach them, so it settles for approximations. social science, now being science itself but without the severe domain restrictions imposed by "hard science", can therefore set the bar however high it wants according to its needs and still claim to be aiming at reaching objective truths, because these ultimately can be reduced to cultural standards, right? well, not quite. the problem social science encounters is the idea of an infinite domain; at infinity, science becomes art because causality is abandoned.  however, in being a science, social science knows that its end goal is merely an ideal and can only be approximated in reality, and it is this experimental error that prevents science from knowing when it has truly reached a state where causality is abandoned; ideally, a 0% correlation between cause and effect would mean the realization of art, but the introduction of experimental error prevents a social scientist from ever knowing if his/her experiment has truly reached a state of zero causation. as such, social science can never reach a state of being true art. so, even if social science is an art, it can never realize that it is an art because of the confounding variable of experimental error. this in turn leads to the following conclusions:

1) by introducing a theoretical alien species, social science can no longer reduce science to a study of culture, and by being simply a study of species, social science is reduced to *second-order* science.

2) social science is science according to however it wants to define science. by acknowledging that there are different levels of objective truths based on the size of the domain, social science sacrifices the goal of science to aim for an objective truth by subjectively determining the degree of causality it deems necessary for an experiment. this would be fine if social science ultimately kept a limit on its domain size so as to keep its relationship between cause and effect to stand distinguished in the face of expected experimental error. however, by forever increasing its domain -- as is demanded by social science's end goal of a "full knowing" of *to be* -- the greater the possibility for social science to become an art without being aware of it. so, by reducing science to social science, social science has unintentionally opened the door for reducing science to art.

therefore, if social science wishes to be reduced to science, it is a science of a *second-order*. if social science does not wish to be considered inferior and reduced to science, then it can become science, but in doing so, undermines itself by relativizing science based on domain size, and by aiming to achieve a "full knowing" of *to be*, asserts end goals diametrically opposed to the original goals of science by risking becoming an art without knowledge of having achieved such a state. as such, if social science wishes to be science, it will destroy both and render them useless. if social science wishes to have any meaning, it must submit to science as being reduced to the *second-order* instead of the *first-order*.

criticism: does studying biology make it a *second-order* science? the answer is no, because one is attempting to obtain a "full knowing" of *to know*, not a "full knowing" of *to be*. what about the idea that the since we are composed of atoms and molecules, that they define *to be*, and therefore chemistry and physics (along with biology) are ultimately a study of "full knowing" of *to be*, which is compatible with the definition of social science? well, first of all, this assumes a strict materialist perspective in the mind-body dichotomy. the problem with this idea is epistemological; science aims, in theory, for an external objective truth about the universe. if epistemology covers *to know* and metaphysics covers *to be*, and social science is reduced to levels of hard science (atoms, molecules, etc.), then only two conclusions can be drawn, both of which are incompatible with social science's end goals. for one, by reducing social science to hard science, social science is forced to abandon epistemology and the idea of *to know* because it has claimed an idea of *to be* on those levels. as such, social science must choose between either metaphysics or epistemology, and since epistemology is ultimately subsumed under metaphysics, social science simply amounts to *to be*, and *to be* fits the definition of art rather than that of science. furthermore, since abandoning epistemology means the metaphysics, in order for social science to succeed as an art by being *to be*, then social science must be a theory of everything. if it is not a theory of everything, then epistemology cannot be subsumed by metaphysics and there will always remain an element of "to know" with "to be", which equates to the end goal of social science being a "full knowing and full being" of "to know and to be". i don't claim to be a logician, but from what i can tell, it seems that this leaves us with two mutually exclusive propositions, which makes the possibility of a "full knowing and full being" of "to know and to be" null and void.

the other conclusion that can be drawn is that "to know* exists independently of hard science (atoms, molecules, etc.), and by employing a form of mind-body dualism, that it is possible for a "full knowing" of *to be*. however, even if one favors dualism over materialism, the problem is not solved unless one equates the mind with *to know* (first-person ontology) and everything else (including the body) with *to be* (third-person ontology); the mind is viewed as a construct unable to be perceived epistemologically by an external observer, and instead is classified under *being* as described by metaphysics -- when pertaining to humans, the human condition -- with metaphysics being the existence of everything other than the capacity *to know*. so, there appears to be no overlapping conflict between *to know* and *to be*. however, since in order to escape being subsumed by the metaphysical world *to know* can only be experienced by the individual, some interesting dilemmas result. it appears, for the time being, that it is possible using dualism for there to exist a "full knowing" of *to be*. however, let's examine these dilemmas. first of all, one has to define where the metaphysics ends (third-person ontology) and the epistemology (first-person ontology) begins; since cartesian dualism has all but been abandoned, the only philosophers in the world who believe in dualism are property dualists, and even they are in the minority (they espouse that physical entities that cause consciousness possess both a physical property and a mental property separate from each other but co-existing simulaneously). so, one would have to define where consciousness and unconsciousness arise from the hard science of atoms and molecules, or if in fact consciousness can be explained from a holistic perspective that somehow skirts around the reductionist framework of hard science. another issue is that social science, in aiming for a "full knowing", somehow implies that knowledge can be transferred from one person to another. so, naturally this assumes translating epistemological knowledge of one person into a metaphysical language which is then translated back in epistemological form in this other person's mind. so, a few questions arise here. first of all, where exactly are the transformations defined? secondly, is anything lost in translation? the second issue is a major obstacle for this argument to succeed, because translating knowledge can only be done via some sort of language, and post-structuralists have already attacked the structural objectivity of language by relating it to each individual's interpretation. the third problem is that the definition of "full knowing" is defined as *how*, not *why*. epistemological considerations always stem from *why*; a cognitive psychology professor i had in college once said if you could tell him *why* he raised his finger at any given time, then you would automatically receive an A for the course. since in theory, cognitive science at its best could only answer *how* and not *why*, then the same can be said for social science at best (and as i have described in an earlier post, it is likely worse than cognitive science due to its focus on more than a single individual). at present, the mind-body dichotomy is addressed as a *how* issue, but if the problem is ever solved, then *why* will be as well; fundamental questions of human nature like free will should be concretely answered to the point where the infinity of possibilities concerning one's actions can be explained with full cause and effect at all times and places. and as such, social science should finally be realized as science with no ifs, ands, or buts. however, it appears extremely unlikely that the mind-body dichotomy will be solved, which leaves us simply with the different schools of thought trying to address *how* the mind-body dichotomy exists, with some schools appearing to have better explanations than others, and as a result being better reflections of the truth.

therefore, i have reduced social science's claim to be science -- albeit still a second-order one -- without compromising its end goal of approaching a "full knowing" of *to be* to being dependent on property dualism, a mind-body dichotomy view that that has very few adherents in the field of philosophy of mind; most philosophers of mind are materialists of some sort, and their views would be compatible with the other suggestions i have made about social science not being a science in this blog entry and others.

now, there is a little addendum i would like to add to this argument: the possibility of philosopher John Searle's biological naturalism. in short, biological naturalism is a form of materialism that best caters to those wishing to employ some aspects of dualism in their theories without resorting to dualism per se. here is a little background from wikipedia:

Searle denies Cartesian dualism, the idea that the mind is a separate kind of substance to the body, as this contradicts our entire understanding of physics, and unlike Descartes, he does not bring God into the problem. Indeed, Searle denies any kind of dualism, the traditional alternative to monism, claiming the distinction is a mistake. He rejects the idea that because the mind is not objectively viewable, it does not fall under the rubric of physics.

Searle believes that consciousness "is a real part of the real world and it cannot be eliminated in favor of, or reduced to, something else" whether that something else is a neurological state of the brain or a software program. He contends, for example, that the software known asDeep Blue knows nothing about chess. He also believes that consciousness is both a cause of events in the body and a response to events in the body.

On the other hand, Searle doesn't treat consciousness as a ghost in the machine. He treats it, rather, as a state of the brain. The causal interaction of mind and brain can be described thus in naturalistic terms: Events at the micro-level (perhaps at that of individual neurons) cause consciousness. Changes at the macro-level (the whole brain) constitute consciousness. Micro-changes cause and then are impacted by holistic changes, in much the same way that individual football players cause a team (as a whole) to win games, causing the individuals to gain confidence from the knowledge that they are part of a winning team.

He articulates this distinction by pointing out that the common philosophical term 'reducible' is ambiguous. Searle contends that consciousness is "causally reducible" to brain processes without being "ontologically reducible." He hopes that making this distinction will allow him to escape the traditional dilemma between reductive materialism and substance dualism; he affirms the essentially physical nature of the universe by asserting that consciousness is completely caused by and realized in the brain, but also doesn't deny what he takes to be the obvious facts that humans really are conscious, and that conscious states have an essentially first-person nature.

It can be tempting to see the theory as a kind of property dualism, since, in Searle's view, a person's mental properties are categorically different from his or her micro-physical properties. The latter have "third-person ontology" whereas the former have "first-person ontology." Micro-structure is accessible objectively by any number of people, as when several brain surgeons inspect a patient's cerebral hemispheres. But pain or desire or belief are accessible subjectively by the person who has the pain or desire or belief, and no one else has that mode of access. However, Searle understands mental properties to be a species of physical property -- ones with first-person ontology. So this sets his view apart from a dualism of physical and non-physical properties. His mental properties are putatively physical.

it seems to me that by maintaining different ontologies, the distinction between epistemology and metaphysics (first-person ontology vs. third-person ontology) is upheld; *to know* is a mental property that is a species of a physical property with first-person ontology, and *to be* -- the micro-physical properties -- remain with a third-person ontology. so, while *to know* and *to be* can co-exist from a physical perspective, their ontological differences makes it impossible for a person to realize both simultaneously the way the end goal of a "full knowing" of *to be* demands.

social science is not equal to science

here's another email i wrote that i felt was appropriate for public view:

this quote is from our aim discussion: "and science doesn't care, because ultimately it sacrifices internal metaphysics in favor of epistemology."

let me rephrase what i said: science cares in that it ultimately cares about the internal metaphysics of every person except the person doing the experiment, who sacrifices his/her internal metaphysics in favor of epistemology.

social science cares about the internal metaphysics of every person, including the person doing the experiment. person x doing a social science experiment has an internal metaphysics, including nervous system and consciousness. social science, then, is inherently defined by person x's ability to match an external metaphysical state (outcome of experiment) with a desired internal metaphysical state, a state of one of an infinite number of possible states. as such, intentionality for social science has both projecting and reflexive consequences.

pre-ww2 science does not care about the internal metaphysics of person x. science is defined by person x's ability to obtain an external metaphysical state regardless of its effect on person x's internal metaphysics, which also consists of an infinite number of possible states. therefore, the intentionality for science initially has only projecting consequences. post-ww2 science initially cares about the internal metaphysics of person x, but only as an accepted one of many possible theoretical states of the external metaphysical state (as a person of a larger group of people), not as person x's desired, more specific internal metaphysical state compatible with the universals of the external metaphysical state (this is crucial to my argument). and obviously, the projecting consequences of an experiment are ethically considered before the science is applied to technology which in turn affects the larger group of people.

so, it follows that science only cares about person x's internal metaphysics as being part of external metaphysical states, states that are considered to be compatible with universals. person x's internal metaphysics are only of secondary importance (i will explain this a bit later).

social science also cares about person x's internal metaphysics as being part of external metaphysical states, states that are considered to be compatible with universals, but the intentionality is different because whereas science allows person x to have an internal metaphysical state compatible with the external metaphysical state of secondary importance, social science compels person x to have an internal metaphysical state compatible with the external metaphysical state, both of primary importance.

here is how i've defined the distinction. ultimately, except in a world where a theory of everything is possible, epistemology remains separate from metaphysics; *to know* and *to be* are two separate entities. in science, *to know* takes precedent over *to be* for two reasons. first of all, science is considered from the perspective of consciousness, not from the study of consciousness. this is important because science first and foremost values *to know* and considers the resulting *to be* caused by the *to know* to be of negligible importance. second, i can use social science "turning the lens" on science to support my case here. science indeed is a culture, and this culture ultimately determines and defines most aspects of the *to be* part of science; not only is the *to be* in science considered negligible, but the range of its acceptability has been culturally determined to be quite wide.

cognitive science actually straddles both worlds, and in doing so, has yet to espouse a sound theoretical framework, which is one of the discipline's current pitfalls as being a distinct discipline of its own instead of a collage of parts of a handful of other disciplines; this indicates that cognitive science is still in its beginning stages. unlike science, cognitive science gives equal weight to both *to know* and *to be*, and there still is great debate as to which side cognitive science should eventually choose; at present, the majority of evidence favors *to know*, but decades from now, with the appropriate technology, *to be* might become the preferred inquisitional method. this is why your comment that, "it was only the asshats in cog sci who pretended they were the saviors who didn't get that" cracked me up -- you only got part of the story (more on this later). cognitive science gives equal weight to both because it undertakes both the *to know* side -- the perspective of consciousness -- and the *to be* side -- the study of consciousness from a material perspective, e.g. neuroscience, etc. now, as far as culture is concerned, cognitive science follows science for both sides, but ultimately should abandon the end goals of science for the *to be* side in that cognitive science should be considered directly, not secondarily, concerned with the effects of its research on humans and what this means for society. however, in not considering concerned with the metaphysical aspects of its research, cognitive science follows science's direction for the *to know* side; at present, culture ultimately determines and defines most aspects of the *to know* part of cognitive science due to the lack of sufficient evidence to arrive at a different conclusion. however, unlike science, the *to be* in cognitive science, even with the current body of knowledge, cannot be considered negligible. accordingly, it is this side of cognitive science that, while currently following cultural standards, is really in conflict with its own interests, and as such, has chosen to delay addressing them. this is where cognitive science should eventually be compatible with social science; right now cognitive science is still too busy chasing its tail trying to be the true "hard" science of soft science instead of addressing how its current body of research might shed light on the discipline's ability to culturally govern itself regarding its *to be* aspect, and to a somewhat lesser extent, its *to know* aspect. this moderate dichotomy segues into my theory of social science.

now, onto social science. in attempting to follow science, social science has proclaimed to only care about *to know*, and it should follow that *to be* will fall into its right place as a result -- such is wishful thinking. by placing emphasis on *to know*, social science, like science, evaluates things from the perspective of consciousness. however, unlike science, the resulting *to be* caused by *to know* is not deemed negligible because doing so would ultimately conflict with the inherent goal of social science "knowing to be"; the conflict is caused by social science's concern with *to know*, which is inherently epistemological, being fully compatible with *to be*, which is inherently metaphysical. second, unlike science, which is primarily influenced by culture regarding its aspects of *to be* in its methodology and has a range of acceptability for its negligible *to be* that has been culturally determined to be quite wide, social science is in control of its own destiny; by studying culture, social science claims to be the ultimate authority on how to govern culture's role in its own experiments. instead of turning out to be social science's claim to victory, this actually is revealed to be social science's achilles heel. social science cannot ultimately accept any amount of negligibility for *to be* if the discipline is to remain true to striving for its end goals. so, if a theory of everything can never be attained, then social science is left with only one possible solution for reaching its goal of "knowing of to be". social science must believe that there are a certain number of universals (infinite if necessary) that can compatibly subsume the particulars of every person, and that all of these universals somehow positively reinforce what it means *to be*. revisiting "point 2", if simply one universal negatively affects what it means *to be*, then social science collapses under its own weight of an inherent paradox. regardless, let's assume that the goal of attaining a certain number of universals of *to be* are compatible with every person's particulars. how will it know when it has succeeding in reaching this magic number of universals? and if the universals are infinite in number, as is expected to match the infinity of knowledge (*to know*), the social sciences can never quite reach its goal of "knowing to be", but as long as none of its discovered universals negatives affects what it means *to be*, social science remains having an incomplete "knowing of to be" and perpetuates itself through faith that what it doesn't know yet will not debunk the entire discipline. contrast this to science, in which discovered "setbacks" simply force science to arrive at new truths, sometimes discarding entire paradigms in the process. how can social science follow science in being able to withstand discoveries deemed to negatively affect what it means *to be*? very simple: admit that they can never determine what it means *to be* without a theory of everything, thus allowing the "negative" discoveries to simply become "discoveries". but in doing so, social science must abandon its end goal of "knowing of to be" and replace it with "knowing of to know". thus, it follows that social science is a science only when it is solely concerned with epistemological considerations, not metaphysical ones.

i figured that postmodernists would misconstrue this distinction due to a lack of background in analytic philosophy. from what i gather, the problem with postmodernist philosophy is that it is based on terminological constructs that can be relativized to each other and accommodate an infinite number of possible situations -- a recipe for subjective interpretation. and it is this recipe that i have overturned using solid, consistent philosophical argumentation. i will stand by what i have written (barring possible mistakes that can be corrected by proof-reading and do not fundamentally invalidate my theory), and welcome anyone to take their best shot at objectively debunking my proof, particularly without twisting the rules so as to subject my piece to the rigors of their paradigms. furthermore, regarding these studies that "prove" social science is science, it should appear obvious by now that in ignoring the distinction between epistemology and metaphysics, one should be able to conduct just about any study that will be able to slip under the radar of any philosophy of science rooted in postmodernism. what's funny is that "knowing of to know" is simply a concept derivative of ryle's regress (i think that i think that i think that (to infinity)...*something*). so, since "knowing of to know" can be extended as a series ("knowing of knowing of knowing of (to infinity)...*to know*), social science is ultimately stuck in the same quagmire as cog sci regarding having a sound theoretical framework in philosophy of mind. of course, i doubt postmodernist philosophers considered this possibility when constructing their theories. in any case, philosophy of mind deals with the study of consciousness, which is what i have ultimately reduced social sciences too. when social science studies people, it either a) ignores the variable of consciousness, or b) it studies consciousness as it manifests itself through forms other than consciousness itself. true hard science (chemistry and physics) does not have to deal with the variable of consciousness or study consciousness in and of itself (biology only negligibly does so as to remain much closer to chemistry and physics than social science). therefore, the scientific method is applicable to chemistry and physics (and for the most part, biology), but is not *ultimately* applicable to social science; the method of social science is synonymous with philosophy of mind, which is anything but sound as a definitive, holistic framework and will likely remain in a quagmire forever despite future improvements in technology to study consciousness. this is demonstrative proof that social science is not equal to science.

re: the "asshats" at cog sci will ultimately save social science from its postmodernist paradigm, it's just that you'll probably be collecting social security by the time it happens. cog sci is the hardest of the "soft" sciences. it was the asshats in anthropology who initially failed to construct their own cognitive model(see cognitive anthropology). and while i can sympathize with you about some of the problems with economics and its dominance in the social sciences, don't forget that economic anthropology was an epic failure, so consider criticizing your own discipline for failing to offer better alternatives. and since when is cog sci falling off the map? maybe in anthro, because they finally realized that at this stage the two are really not compatible or complimentary as they had hoped. but cog sci on its own hasn't fallen off the maps; you can check college catalogs if you need verification. also, remember that even though i'm from the cog sci camp and i ultimately believe it will be integrated with social science, by undermining social science, i have also undermined cog sci as well. so, the philosopher in me has turned me against my own previous discipline.

social science (anthro and psych in particular) debunked!

i continued my exchange with this friend, who is responsible for the quote in the next sentence (remember that i'm addressing the friend as "you", not *you* the reader):  addressing your idea that. "so i'm not entirely sure the social sciences ever try for "to be" but rather for a full "knowing" of "to be"." your statement defines knowing simply as a positive accumulation of sorts, not also defined by "not knowing", which is equally as important. if you consider both "knowing" and "not knowing" as including all forms of knowledge (think of knowing as going towards positive infinity, and not knowing as going towards negative infinity), then when social science aims for a "full knowing" of "to be", it means that it knows what is necessary both to know and not to know. however, in knowing what not to know, it follows that...

1) those who reach this point of "full knowing" "do not know" because they know what not to know. this means that their experience of "not knowing" amounts to being aware of universals whose particulars they should not investigate. so, even though these people "do not know", since they do know the universals of what not to know, they actually do know *something* in the category of "not knowing". which leads me to the second point...

2) those who reach this point of "full knowing" are obligated to censor what others should not know in order for those people simply "not to know" instead of "knowing what not to know". so, what it boils down to is that whereas people from point 1 have knowledge of universals under the category of "not knowing", the people who are censored are denied knowledge of universals under the category of "not knowing"; simply put, point 1 people "know what not to know", whereas people from point 2 just "do not know, period". now, you may ask why are point 1 people obligated to censor point 2 people? the answer lies in a fundamental paradox of the statement that, "so i'm not entirely sure the social sciences ever try for "to be" but rather for a full "knowing" of "to be"."; the paradox pits epistemology against metaphysics. the point 1 people are epistemologically superior to point 2 people due to point 1's people's "knowing what not to know" under their "not knowing" category, but point 2 people are metaphysically superior to point 1 people because they genuinely do not know at any level what social science will have determined people should not know in order to obtain a "*full knowing* of *to be*". point 1 people possess the greater wisdom (possessing a better *full knowing* of *to be*), while point 2 people possess the more ideal human experience (possessing a *full knowing* of a better *to be*). at first glance, one might say that in order for social science to rid itself of this paradox, it must choose whether to favor epistemology or metaphysics in determining whether point 1 people (progress through knowledge) or point 2 people (enlightenment through experience or lack thereof -- an "innocence" of sorts) fully understand the human condition (favors point 1 people) and/or have the optimal human experience (favors point 2 people); at some point, progress and enlightenment are inherently incompatible. however, when one realizes that simply that the two types of people relativize both the idea of *full knowing* and *to be* to each other, then that nullifies even the theoretical desired end goal of social science because it is impossible to have both the *better* "full knowing" and the *better* "to be".

3) to make matters worse for social science, it follows that its theoretical desired end goal is ill-defined. if the definition of "full knowing" is infinite and undetermined, then a) being infinite, it cannot be fully experienced by the individual in a finite lifetime, b) since full = complete, "full knowing" being undetermined means that it is incomplete, and thus not full, and c) "full knowing" being infinite and undetermined is fundamentally predicated on some number of particulars for each individual for which no number of universals can compensate for (unless one has an infinite number of universals, which then eliminates the possibility for the existence of particulars and indicates that we have found a perfect *theory of everything*). on the other hand, if the definition of "full knowing" is finite and determined, then it follows that this "full knowing" is inconsistent with the greater number (although not necessarily, but possibly infinite) of particulars presented to people in reality. by definition of being finite and determined, "full knowing" will always be overwhelmed with a number of particulars that are defined by the set with n being the finite number representing "full knowing" as finite and determined {particular subscript n+1, particular subscript n+2...particular subscript n+infinity}. thus, even in theory, the end goal of a "full knowing" of "to be" is proven fallacious. as such, social science must ultimately either favor the end goals of science ("full knowing") or the arts/humanities ("to be") as the optimal form of human experience; the middle ground has been proven null and void by the above argumentation. this is further supported by the inherent incompatibility between epistemology and metaphysics unless they exist under a perfect theory of everything, a state of which has been proven impossible by a previous argument of mine unless we live in a universe governed by the law of causal determination covering all time and space. and if causal determination reigns over the universe, then ultimately the study of anything is pointless because everything is interpreted as existing as "just is" (for a point *p* in time and space) or as "just because" (for any interval longer than point *p* in time and space).

questioning the social sciences (anthro and psych in particular)

the following is taken from an exchange with a friend on the following topic. as such, in addressing "you", i am addressing the friend, not *you* the reader.

now, i see something i want to point out with the topic of "the inherently social construction of the nature of humanity". inherent is defined in the dictionary as "existing in someone or something as a permanent and inseparable element, quality, or attribute". so, if the social construction of human nature is a permanent and inseparable element of human nature, and we can't know why it exists in this manner, then we are essentially saying that social construction is natural to human nature, and arguing that something is natural as a valid reason for something is a logical fallacy. ok, so i assume that you didn't go that route and instead tried to argue that the social construction of human nature being a permanent and inseparable element of human nature exists for a reason or reasons. this can be addressed outside of the social sciences in the metaphysical branch of philosophy, in particular ontology. but going back to the argument, you are assuming that human nature and its social construction are somehow interrelated, and that you can prove some sort of causality between the two as evidenced through human behavior patterns in such categories as articles and identifiers central to identity formation, traditional precedents carried from one generation to the next, how survival is directly tied to cultural habits and organizational hierarchies, etc. ok, so that's legitimate. however, the idea of social construction as being a different, yet interconnected entity with human nature is ultimately at the crux of some issues i have with social science approaches.social science approaches tend to adopt terminology that gives what actually exists in metaphysical reality a life of its own so to speak, amounting to more than the sum of its parts. these terms, representing ideas on the macro-level, are then thrust through some sort of formula of sorts, which is then supposed to determine what the truth actually is regarding everything with life and people on the most infinitesimally micro-levels and holistic levels. my reservations aside, the idea of social construction as being interconnected with human nature is simply a translation of the true essence of human nature into semi-verifiable forms, such as cultural behavior patterns. and my question then is as follows: at what point does the essence of human nature morph into forms of social construction? it seems that social science, instead of addressing this fundamental question, instead assumes it to be inherent to the nature of studying the human condition, with the emphasis being on the rigor of analysis of what is translated from human nature into verifiable things that are classified under the theoretical category "social construction". if we can't define why or how human nature is connected to the idea of social construction ("how" might be sort of answered by cog sci approaches eventually), then we simply arrive at language games. one can attempt to address why human nature is connected to social constructions, but in doing so, one simply introduces more "constructions" (whether they can be classified as "social" constructions or not depends on the approach one is taking and the interpretations of those attempting to understand this person) via language in order to attempt to solve the initial question. so yes, it appears to me that social science is stuck in a quagmire either way -- if it assumes certain constructs to be necessary, then it is taking a leap of faith or committing a logical fallacy by believing the causality to be natural to the human condtion; if it attempts to explain why these constructs are necessary, then the result is a new set of constructs that further confuses and complicates the problem. of course, at a certain point in any discipline -- even hard science -- there are only so many "why's" you can ask before you end up at the answer of "just because." however, the fact that it takes only one "why" to undermine the metaphysical structure of the interconnectedness of social constructions and human nature seems to point to the conclusion that social science lacks the necessary reductionist premises for a sound methodology to sufficiently *prove* something. this doesn't mean that once one goes beyond the underlying assumption that one cannot employ the scientific method to prove things; it simply means that, at best, they can prove the translation of the human condition, not directly the human condition itself. seeing how that is the desirable endpoint of the social sciences, i don't see how the social sciences prove anything about the human condition any better than philosophy, art, or the humanities; instead, they simply offer more concrete, informed, and educated -- but not necessarily "better" -- metaphors using scientific approaches where they are deemed appropriate (and where they are deemed appropriate is another debate in and of itself) in a futile effort to explain the unexplainable and to some degree, claim to have knowledge about the human condition that is unknowable to those outside of the social sciences (this claim is both true and untrue and worthy of a paragraph in and of itself, but i'm not up for writing it tonight). and to me, despite my "training" in cog sci, i know that it eventually, even in an ideal world, could only explain the "how" of the human condition and not the "why", which i guess is why i turned to art for truth instead of any forms of science. and it is why i am ultimately a philosopher at heart and not a scientist.

you told me that rigor doesn't necessarily cause one to arrive at more correct conclusions, it simply makes one's arguments more defensible. if an argument is fundamentally flawed, then it can be taken down by not being able to satisfy "why" on the most basic level, e.g. logic fallacies. however, with rigor, it seems that one makes an argument within an accepted school of thought and discipline in which "why" is either assumed or accepted as being true at all necessary levels for the evidence to support the theory. so, if the "whys" are validated, then it appears to follow that rigor simply equates to how well one is able to defend a theory. to make an analogy, rigor is simply like having a puzzle completed without knowing how it was completed; its completeness at that point in time is inherent proof of *how* its pieces interact with each other to form a larger whole. so, less rigorous theories have pieces that don't fit as neatly as theories that have more rigor; the ideal perfectly completed puzzle can never actually be realized in science because of its inherent limitations (experimental error, to what level things can be reduced, the effect of the experimenter on the experiment, etc.), and this is even more true in the social sciences for a number of reasons that i don't need to go over right now. anyway, if more rigor in a theory simply amounts to having pieces of a puzzle that fit together more neatly, then it follows that while social science employs scientific methods at certain points, it is not a true science because 1) it doesn't pass the initial, fundamental "why" test due to not being able to fulfill methodological requirements on the appropriate reductionist levels, and 2) the end goals of the discipline are not concerned with discovering the truth because the discipline cannot provide sufficient "why" pieces to the puzzle, so it instead measures the validity of a theory based on how neatly the "how" pieces to the puzzle fit. as such, social science is really more of an attempt to accurately describe something than prove it, which while making people more informed, does not necessarily make them more enlightened. if social science could provide the "why" pieces to the puzzle, then its theories would have more validity across time and space; with "how" pieces to the puzzle, one can only portray what appears to be the truth at a given point in time in a certain place and merely speculate as to why the pieces arrived at that specific state and where the pieces might go afterwards. applying its approach to real life, science should be able to explain the past and predict the future. social science only reveals partial-truths on a quasi-macro level (social psych is a good example of this), and whenever it oversteps its boundaries (like trying to reveal complete truths on a macro, micro, or holistic level), it simply results in an intellectual game of cleverness and one-upsmanship when done in bad faith, and genius, creative use of tactics executed through brilliant strategies when done in good faith. unfortunately, the intellectual game, whether done in good faith or bad faith, does not result in arriving at any conclusions of a higher degree of truthfulness. when interpreted with interest, the game can be appreciated as a form of high art of sorts. when interpreted with deep, objective analysis, the game is simply what it is -- a game. and like most non-physically emphasized games, the smarter and more educated the person, the faster and better they beat the competition.

your daily dose of philosophy: theories of everything

ok, so my first two posts were music related. now here's something from left field to shake things up a bit. it might take a while to digest, so be patient. i've had a second opinion verify that it does make sense and is internally consistent.

there is a fundamental idea in philosophy and theory about being able to ultimately reduce something to something else, becoming subsumed under the domain of the something else. as you know, philosophy consists of 5 main branches (logic, epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, and aesthetics). a while back, i was able to prove to my satisfaction that ethics and aesthetics couldn't exist without metaphysics, but not vice-versa (i'm not sure how i did this, but for the sake of my current argument, assume it to be true). then, i think i basically pitted epistemology against metaphysics, with the winner being able to take logic under its wing. i think that the fundamental problem with philosophy, other than the obvious ones of only arriving at a *loose* connection between logic and language and the very ambiguity of language itself, is that these two branches are incompatible, which leads to a theoretical divide. if metaphysics is defined as "investigating the nature of being and the world" and epistemology "is concerned with the nature and scope of knowledge", then it seems to me that epistemology is essentially a self-experienced metaphysics of an objective external metaphysics. i suppose a practical example of this might be how to define thinking -- do you view the mind from the perspective of the independent observer (metaphysical) or the mind of the person being observed (epistemological)? from a material perspective, the fact that our thinking processes are caused by and result in chemical and electrical changes in the body, which in turn impact the external metaphysics of the universe also presents a question as to whether it is an epistemological or metaphysical question. the fact that we need epistemology to understand metaphysics, but at the same time, epistemology would not exist without metaphysics makes for an interesting debate. and i think that's where i originally got stumped. 

ok, here we go. thinking causes a person to affect his surroundings, which are defined by metaphysics. in order to establish knowledge, one is unknowingly sacrificing his knowledge of the metaphysical universe on what would be considered a negligible level in order to obtain knowledge about "more important" entities or entities of a "greater value"; knowledge can thus be defined by the intentionality of favoring an endpoint of universals instead of particulars. for example, thinking about a concept might cause me to discover something new in the field of a science -- a universal formula such as e = mc^2 -- whereas watching tv might cause me to think of random correlations and have subtle reinforcements of factual understanding and latent concepts. while the prior would be considered more "successful" at figuring out the metaphysical universe, both acts emit their own "negligible" effects on the metaphysical universe through the chemical and electrical signaling among neurons. so, at present, a person is incapable of having complete control over his or her thoughts because of the negligible effects on the metaphysical universe caused by the act of the thinking in the brain. a true understanding of the universe would require a perfect compatibility between epistemology and metaphysics: the point at which humans could think, and using their intentionality, have their thoughts affect the universe exactly the way they had intended to. this perfect dance, of course, would require intentionality, at a point in time *p*, to be perfect on all levels of thinking, including conscious and unconscious processes -- making people 100% perfect from their side of their relationship with the surrounding metaphysical universe -- and for the surrounding metaphysical universe to be equally in sync with the thoughts of people -- making for a 100% "perfect universe" from its side of the relationship with people. this perfect dance of sorts would seem to bridge the schism between epistemology and metaphysics, with logic falling in place under the new combination of the two philosophical branches. at the same time, this would leave the mystery of consciousness unsolved -- not in the mind-body dichotomy but in the vein of other philosophical questions like the existence god, life, etc. -- but still subsumed under the combined epistemological/metaphysical paradigm. 

i previously stated that "epistemology is basically a self-experienced metaphysics of an objective external metaphysics". now that epistemology and metaphysics are combined into one field, one can claim that understanding one's self and thoughts also is understanding the world and vice-versa, thus eliminating the problem of reflexivity. the problem of ryle's regress (e.g. i think that i think that i think that...to infinity) is also solved, because without reflexivity, the definition of the self must be abandoned, causing one's thinking and doing to be one and the same, working perfectly in every possible way with the surrounding metaphysical universe, and thus eliminating the idea of "thinking" period. or, one could equate thinking with doing, but either way it is of only one order, not infinite, as it exists perfectly in sync with the surrounding metaphysical universe. by eliminating the idea of thinking or combining it with doing so as to make the idea of thinking void, any remaining philosophical problems with the mind-body dichotomy (mainly property dualism) become eliminated. as such, consciousness is no longer more mysterious than things in the so-called material world because it is accepted by definition as being part of "the everything"; an analogy would be with how mathematically pi is defined as circumference/diameter even though when it is computed, the digits after the decimal place go on forever. the same is true with consciousness; it is philosophically now defined by being included as a part of "the everything" ("the everything" = the perfect synchronization between epistemology and metaphysics). 

and then everything makes sense, except for the fact that "the everything" is only defined at any given instant in time *p*; the lack of the existence of "the everything" prior to its inception and the possibility of it ending -- the perfect dance between epistemology and metaphysics being disrupted for whatever reason -- seems to present a time-based problem for a paradigm that seems to have solved problems in space. in "the everything", causal determinism would be the prevailing theory by default -- this should be obvious if you understand what i have written up until now and therefore i am not going to spend another paragraph explaining why causal determinism is inherent to "the everything" -- and because of this, for "the everything" to occur over a period of time longer than point in time *p*, it would either have to exist continuously across all time and space, or could never occur at all. regarding why i reduced the time of point *p* to either all moments or none, it is because this is the only way my theory is compatible with causal determinism. causal determinism as stated on wikipedia is: "Determinism is the view that every event, including human cognition, behavior, decision, and action, is causally determined by an unbroken chain of prior occurrences." thus, this precludes any "theories of everything" from ever being successful and why we live in a so-called imperfect world, or to be more accurate, universe. but just because we live in an imperfect universe doesn't mean we can't imagine a perfect universe. or can we? according to my theory of "the everything" and the fact that it cannot exist, it seems inherent that perfection can only be imagined if it is in turn realized; in "the everything", there is no discrepancy between imagination and reality. so, it follows that problems of reflexivity and the epistemological-metaphysical divide prevent us from imagining a perfect world. so, in short, this theory i have just espoused allows us to only imagine an "imperfect perfect" universe, not a truly perfect universe. and if this is the case, then does it render the crux of my theory useless? well, philosophically-speaking, no. but according the standards of perfection set by the theory, it does render my theory useless. analogously, this is like math problems that have been proven to be unsolvable; my theory has proven that theories of everything can never be valid.

album of the year list

a friend challenged me a few months ago to come up with a greatest album of the year list starting with the year that rock n' roll was born (1955). it took a while, but i finally settled on the following. the albums are either the best, my favorite, or the quintessential album for each year. i hope the album list is final, but i reserve the right to make changes at a later time where i deem necessary. btw, the list ends in 2001 because i haven't felt enough worthwhile music has been made in recent years to warrant continuing the list on a yearly basis. feel free to send me your own list and we can discuss the differences.


1955: miles davis -- 'round about midnight
1956: elvis presley -- elvis presley
1957: john coltrane -- blue train
1958: buddy holly -- buddy holly
1959: miles davis -- kind of blue
1960: john coltrane -- giant steps
1961: miles davis -- steamin'
1962: ray charles -- modern sounds in country western music
1963: bob dylan -- the freewheelin' bob dylan
1964: john coltrane -- a love supreme
1965: bob dylan -- highway 61 revisited
1966: beatles -- revolver
1967: jimi hendrix -- are you experienced?
1968: jimi hendrix -- electric ladyland
1969: beatles -- abbey road
1970: john lennon -- plastic ono band
1971: led zeppelin -- IV (zoso)
1972: david bowie -- the rise and fall of ziggy stardust
1973: the who -- quadrophenia
1974: queen -- sheer heart attack
1975: brian eno -- another green world
1976: stevie wonder -- songs in the key of life
1977: kraftwerk -- trans-europe express
1978: van halen -- van halen I
1979: pink floyd -- the wall
1980: ac/dc -- back in black
1981: king crimson -- discipline
1982: michael jackson -- thriller
1983: stevie ray vaughan -- texas flood
1984: prince -- purple rain
1985: john fogerty -- centerfield
1986: metallica -- master of puppets
1987: guns n' roses -- appetite for destruction
1988: r.e.m. -- green
1989: joe satriani -- flying in a blue dream
1990: pantera -- cowboys from hell
1991: u2 -- achtung, baby
1992: rage against the machine -- rage against the machine
1993: smashing pumpkins -- siamese dream
1994: nine inch nails -- the downward spiral
1995: smashing pumpkins -- mellon collie and the infinite sadness
1996: 2pac -- all eyez on me
1997: u2 -- pop
1998: tori amos -- from the choirgirl hotel