social science (anthro and psych in particular) debunked!

i continued my exchange with this friend, who is responsible for the quote in the next sentence (remember that i'm addressing the friend as "you", not *you* the reader):  addressing your idea that. "so i'm not entirely sure the social sciences ever try for "to be" but rather for a full "knowing" of "to be"." your statement defines knowing simply as a positive accumulation of sorts, not also defined by "not knowing", which is equally as important. if you consider both "knowing" and "not knowing" as including all forms of knowledge (think of knowing as going towards positive infinity, and not knowing as going towards negative infinity), then when social science aims for a "full knowing" of "to be", it means that it knows what is necessary both to know and not to know. however, in knowing what not to know, it follows that...

1) those who reach this point of "full knowing" "do not know" because they know what not to know. this means that their experience of "not knowing" amounts to being aware of universals whose particulars they should not investigate. so, even though these people "do not know", since they do know the universals of what not to know, they actually do know *something* in the category of "not knowing". which leads me to the second point...

2) those who reach this point of "full knowing" are obligated to censor what others should not know in order for those people simply "not to know" instead of "knowing what not to know". so, what it boils down to is that whereas people from point 1 have knowledge of universals under the category of "not knowing", the people who are censored are denied knowledge of universals under the category of "not knowing"; simply put, point 1 people "know what not to know", whereas people from point 2 just "do not know, period". now, you may ask why are point 1 people obligated to censor point 2 people? the answer lies in a fundamental paradox of the statement that, "so i'm not entirely sure the social sciences ever try for "to be" but rather for a full "knowing" of "to be"."; the paradox pits epistemology against metaphysics. the point 1 people are epistemologically superior to point 2 people due to point 1's people's "knowing what not to know" under their "not knowing" category, but point 2 people are metaphysically superior to point 1 people because they genuinely do not know at any level what social science will have determined people should not know in order to obtain a "*full knowing* of *to be*". point 1 people possess the greater wisdom (possessing a better *full knowing* of *to be*), while point 2 people possess the more ideal human experience (possessing a *full knowing* of a better *to be*). at first glance, one might say that in order for social science to rid itself of this paradox, it must choose whether to favor epistemology or metaphysics in determining whether point 1 people (progress through knowledge) or point 2 people (enlightenment through experience or lack thereof -- an "innocence" of sorts) fully understand the human condition (favors point 1 people) and/or have the optimal human experience (favors point 2 people); at some point, progress and enlightenment are inherently incompatible. however, when one realizes that simply that the two types of people relativize both the idea of *full knowing* and *to be* to each other, then that nullifies even the theoretical desired end goal of social science because it is impossible to have both the *better* "full knowing" and the *better* "to be".

3) to make matters worse for social science, it follows that its theoretical desired end goal is ill-defined. if the definition of "full knowing" is infinite and undetermined, then a) being infinite, it cannot be fully experienced by the individual in a finite lifetime, b) since full = complete, "full knowing" being undetermined means that it is incomplete, and thus not full, and c) "full knowing" being infinite and undetermined is fundamentally predicated on some number of particulars for each individual for which no number of universals can compensate for (unless one has an infinite number of universals, which then eliminates the possibility for the existence of particulars and indicates that we have found a perfect *theory of everything*). on the other hand, if the definition of "full knowing" is finite and determined, then it follows that this "full knowing" is inconsistent with the greater number (although not necessarily, but possibly infinite) of particulars presented to people in reality. by definition of being finite and determined, "full knowing" will always be overwhelmed with a number of particulars that are defined by the set with n being the finite number representing "full knowing" as finite and determined {particular subscript n+1, particular subscript n+2...particular subscript n+infinity}. thus, even in theory, the end goal of a "full knowing" of "to be" is proven fallacious. as such, social science must ultimately either favor the end goals of science ("full knowing") or the arts/humanities ("to be") as the optimal form of human experience; the middle ground has been proven null and void by the above argumentation. this is further supported by the inherent incompatibility between epistemology and metaphysics unless they exist under a perfect theory of everything, a state of which has been proven impossible by a previous argument of mine unless we live in a universe governed by the law of causal determination covering all time and space. and if causal determination reigns over the universe, then ultimately the study of anything is pointless because everything is interpreted as existing as "just is" (for a point *p* in time and space) or as "just because" (for any interval longer than point *p* in time and space).