social science is not equal to science

here's another email i wrote that i felt was appropriate for public view:

this quote is from our aim discussion: "and science doesn't care, because ultimately it sacrifices internal metaphysics in favor of epistemology."

let me rephrase what i said: science cares in that it ultimately cares about the internal metaphysics of every person except the person doing the experiment, who sacrifices his/her internal metaphysics in favor of epistemology.

social science cares about the internal metaphysics of every person, including the person doing the experiment. person x doing a social science experiment has an internal metaphysics, including nervous system and consciousness. social science, then, is inherently defined by person x's ability to match an external metaphysical state (outcome of experiment) with a desired internal metaphysical state, a state of one of an infinite number of possible states. as such, intentionality for social science has both projecting and reflexive consequences.

pre-ww2 science does not care about the internal metaphysics of person x. science is defined by person x's ability to obtain an external metaphysical state regardless of its effect on person x's internal metaphysics, which also consists of an infinite number of possible states. therefore, the intentionality for science initially has only projecting consequences. post-ww2 science initially cares about the internal metaphysics of person x, but only as an accepted one of many possible theoretical states of the external metaphysical state (as a person of a larger group of people), not as person x's desired, more specific internal metaphysical state compatible with the universals of the external metaphysical state (this is crucial to my argument). and obviously, the projecting consequences of an experiment are ethically considered before the science is applied to technology which in turn affects the larger group of people.

so, it follows that science only cares about person x's internal metaphysics as being part of external metaphysical states, states that are considered to be compatible with universals. person x's internal metaphysics are only of secondary importance (i will explain this a bit later).

social science also cares about person x's internal metaphysics as being part of external metaphysical states, states that are considered to be compatible with universals, but the intentionality is different because whereas science allows person x to have an internal metaphysical state compatible with the external metaphysical state of secondary importance, social science compels person x to have an internal metaphysical state compatible with the external metaphysical state, both of primary importance.

here is how i've defined the distinction. ultimately, except in a world where a theory of everything is possible, epistemology remains separate from metaphysics; *to know* and *to be* are two separate entities. in science, *to know* takes precedent over *to be* for two reasons. first of all, science is considered from the perspective of consciousness, not from the study of consciousness. this is important because science first and foremost values *to know* and considers the resulting *to be* caused by the *to know* to be of negligible importance. second, i can use social science "turning the lens" on science to support my case here. science indeed is a culture, and this culture ultimately determines and defines most aspects of the *to be* part of science; not only is the *to be* in science considered negligible, but the range of its acceptability has been culturally determined to be quite wide.

cognitive science actually straddles both worlds, and in doing so, has yet to espouse a sound theoretical framework, which is one of the discipline's current pitfalls as being a distinct discipline of its own instead of a collage of parts of a handful of other disciplines; this indicates that cognitive science is still in its beginning stages. unlike science, cognitive science gives equal weight to both *to know* and *to be*, and there still is great debate as to which side cognitive science should eventually choose; at present, the majority of evidence favors *to know*, but decades from now, with the appropriate technology, *to be* might become the preferred inquisitional method. this is why your comment that, "it was only the asshats in cog sci who pretended they were the saviors who didn't get that" cracked me up -- you only got part of the story (more on this later). cognitive science gives equal weight to both because it undertakes both the *to know* side -- the perspective of consciousness -- and the *to be* side -- the study of consciousness from a material perspective, e.g. neuroscience, etc. now, as far as culture is concerned, cognitive science follows science for both sides, but ultimately should abandon the end goals of science for the *to be* side in that cognitive science should be considered directly, not secondarily, concerned with the effects of its research on humans and what this means for society. however, in not considering concerned with the metaphysical aspects of its research, cognitive science follows science's direction for the *to know* side; at present, culture ultimately determines and defines most aspects of the *to know* part of cognitive science due to the lack of sufficient evidence to arrive at a different conclusion. however, unlike science, the *to be* in cognitive science, even with the current body of knowledge, cannot be considered negligible. accordingly, it is this side of cognitive science that, while currently following cultural standards, is really in conflict with its own interests, and as such, has chosen to delay addressing them. this is where cognitive science should eventually be compatible with social science; right now cognitive science is still too busy chasing its tail trying to be the true "hard" science of soft science instead of addressing how its current body of research might shed light on the discipline's ability to culturally govern itself regarding its *to be* aspect, and to a somewhat lesser extent, its *to know* aspect. this moderate dichotomy segues into my theory of social science.

now, onto social science. in attempting to follow science, social science has proclaimed to only care about *to know*, and it should follow that *to be* will fall into its right place as a result -- such is wishful thinking. by placing emphasis on *to know*, social science, like science, evaluates things from the perspective of consciousness. however, unlike science, the resulting *to be* caused by *to know* is not deemed negligible because doing so would ultimately conflict with the inherent goal of social science "knowing to be"; the conflict is caused by social science's concern with *to know*, which is inherently epistemological, being fully compatible with *to be*, which is inherently metaphysical. second, unlike science, which is primarily influenced by culture regarding its aspects of *to be* in its methodology and has a range of acceptability for its negligible *to be* that has been culturally determined to be quite wide, social science is in control of its own destiny; by studying culture, social science claims to be the ultimate authority on how to govern culture's role in its own experiments. instead of turning out to be social science's claim to victory, this actually is revealed to be social science's achilles heel. social science cannot ultimately accept any amount of negligibility for *to be* if the discipline is to remain true to striving for its end goals. so, if a theory of everything can never be attained, then social science is left with only one possible solution for reaching its goal of "knowing of to be". social science must believe that there are a certain number of universals (infinite if necessary) that can compatibly subsume the particulars of every person, and that all of these universals somehow positively reinforce what it means *to be*. revisiting "point 2", if simply one universal negatively affects what it means *to be*, then social science collapses under its own weight of an inherent paradox. regardless, let's assume that the goal of attaining a certain number of universals of *to be* are compatible with every person's particulars. how will it know when it has succeeding in reaching this magic number of universals? and if the universals are infinite in number, as is expected to match the infinity of knowledge (*to know*), the social sciences can never quite reach its goal of "knowing to be", but as long as none of its discovered universals negatives affects what it means *to be*, social science remains having an incomplete "knowing of to be" and perpetuates itself through faith that what it doesn't know yet will not debunk the entire discipline. contrast this to science, in which discovered "setbacks" simply force science to arrive at new truths, sometimes discarding entire paradigms in the process. how can social science follow science in being able to withstand discoveries deemed to negatively affect what it means *to be*? very simple: admit that they can never determine what it means *to be* without a theory of everything, thus allowing the "negative" discoveries to simply become "discoveries". but in doing so, social science must abandon its end goal of "knowing of to be" and replace it with "knowing of to know". thus, it follows that social science is a science only when it is solely concerned with epistemological considerations, not metaphysical ones.

i figured that postmodernists would misconstrue this distinction due to a lack of background in analytic philosophy. from what i gather, the problem with postmodernist philosophy is that it is based on terminological constructs that can be relativized to each other and accommodate an infinite number of possible situations -- a recipe for subjective interpretation. and it is this recipe that i have overturned using solid, consistent philosophical argumentation. i will stand by what i have written (barring possible mistakes that can be corrected by proof-reading and do not fundamentally invalidate my theory), and welcome anyone to take their best shot at objectively debunking my proof, particularly without twisting the rules so as to subject my piece to the rigors of their paradigms. furthermore, regarding these studies that "prove" social science is science, it should appear obvious by now that in ignoring the distinction between epistemology and metaphysics, one should be able to conduct just about any study that will be able to slip under the radar of any philosophy of science rooted in postmodernism. what's funny is that "knowing of to know" is simply a concept derivative of ryle's regress (i think that i think that i think that (to infinity)...*something*). so, since "knowing of to know" can be extended as a series ("knowing of knowing of knowing of (to infinity)...*to know*), social science is ultimately stuck in the same quagmire as cog sci regarding having a sound theoretical framework in philosophy of mind. of course, i doubt postmodernist philosophers considered this possibility when constructing their theories. in any case, philosophy of mind deals with the study of consciousness, which is what i have ultimately reduced social sciences too. when social science studies people, it either a) ignores the variable of consciousness, or b) it studies consciousness as it manifests itself through forms other than consciousness itself. true hard science (chemistry and physics) does not have to deal with the variable of consciousness or study consciousness in and of itself (biology only negligibly does so as to remain much closer to chemistry and physics than social science). therefore, the scientific method is applicable to chemistry and physics (and for the most part, biology), but is not *ultimately* applicable to social science; the method of social science is synonymous with philosophy of mind, which is anything but sound as a definitive, holistic framework and will likely remain in a quagmire forever despite future improvements in technology to study consciousness. this is demonstrative proof that social science is not equal to science.

re: the "asshats" at cog sci will ultimately save social science from its postmodernist paradigm, it's just that you'll probably be collecting social security by the time it happens. cog sci is the hardest of the "soft" sciences. it was the asshats in anthropology who initially failed to construct their own cognitive model(see cognitive anthropology). and while i can sympathize with you about some of the problems with economics and its dominance in the social sciences, don't forget that economic anthropology was an epic failure, so consider criticizing your own discipline for failing to offer better alternatives. and since when is cog sci falling off the map? maybe in anthro, because they finally realized that at this stage the two are really not compatible or complimentary as they had hoped. but cog sci on its own hasn't fallen off the maps; you can check college catalogs if you need verification. also, remember that even though i'm from the cog sci camp and i ultimately believe it will be integrated with social science, by undermining social science, i have also undermined cog sci as well. so, the philosopher in me has turned me against my own previous discipline.