now, compare this to social scientists who are interested in how people's behaviors can be studied using the scientific method, and then using this information, by reincorporating it back into a theory which makes inferences about people's metaphysics -- e.g. belief systems, etc. in this way, social scientists actually operate using principles that are inverted compared to those of cognitive scientists:
cognitive science: metaphysics --> physics --> physical ontology --> metaphysical ontology
social science: physics --> metaphysics --> metaphysical ontology --> physical ontology
the cognitive science method is sound: one starts at the highest level of theoretical knowledge (metaphysics), then siphons off a small portion that can be addressed successfully through physics (using the deductive method most often, i might add, so as to enhance its validity). physics is then used inductively to form a new physical ontology, an ontology which is wider in scope thanks to its physical discoveries, which is then reinterpreted under a new metaphysical ontology, an ontology which is smaller in scope due to the expansion of the physical ontology and which can be reformulated using the physical ontology's implications so as to create a revised version of metaphysics from which further inquiry can result in more physics being siphoned off and the cycle continuing. the social science method is fundamentally flawed: one starts with physical observations, but instead of using those inductively to form a new physical ontology, one circumvents this and immediately creates a new idea of metaphysics, i.e., new terminology, new systems, and the interactions between the two. from this, a new metaphysical ontology is derived (the "theory") and is translated into real world applications through a physical ontology (the "in practice"). one should also note where the different branches of philosophy appropriately fit in with each sequence. in the cognitive science sequence, metaphysics --> physics is done by both cognitive science-informed philosophers (analytic) and cognitive scientists, sometimes working together. physical ontology --> metaphysical ontology is done exclusively by cognitive science-informed philosophers, whereas physics --> physical ontology is primarily done by cognitive scientists alone through their research. on the other hand, the entire social science sequence is done by social science theorists and/or continental/postmodern philosophers, with social science research being done only at the beginning with the gathering of information -- physics -- and the "scientific" (usually statistical) interpretation of the physics into loose physical ontologies (theorists devote much more time to developing exact ontologies whereas the physical ontologies used by social science researchers is much more practical and applied).
the implications for this are critical. what we have is as follows:
analytic philosophy attempts to never vouch for more than it can substantiate, thus keeping its realm of metaphysics as limited and practical as possible, and maintaining a complementary relationship with science and reason; if possible, analytic philosophy would have science and reason explain all phenomena and eliminate the need for metaphysics at all, thus reducing philosophy's role to simply logic. as such, analytic philosophy relies on cognitive science to make in-roads into metaphysics and extract those out of philosophy's realm into the realm of physics. in the course of the sequence, analytic philosophy frames the problem (metaphysics --> physics), cognitive science attempts to solve the problem (physics --> physical ontology), and analytic philosophy attempts to interpret cognitive science's success or lack thereof solving the problem and its implications for the remaining metaphysical issues not yet solved (physical ontology --> metaphysical ontology). as such, this symbiotic relationship encompasses a kind of meta-science, where actual progress is made through science and reason in research, but whose research could not be possible without the metaphysical framework established by philosophy.
now, compare this to social science theory/continental philosophy/postmodernist philosophy. first of all, the framework is inverted: the framework starts with "science" (physics), the "research" is done through philosophy/theory (metaphysics --> metaphysical ontology), and the conclusion ends again with "science" (physical ontology). there are two crucial points to be made here. first of all, notice that i did not use an arrow between physics and metaphysics ("physics --> metaphysics") and between metaphysical ontology and physical ontology ("metaphysical ontology --> physical ontology"). the reason for this is that unlike analytic philosophy/cognitive science's sequence, which can be grouped around each arrow as "philosophy, science, philosophy", "physics --> metaphysics" and "metaphysical ontology --> physical ontology" do not constitute either pure philosophy or science. i suppose they could be construed as one or the other or a combination of both, but it is this ambiguity that leaves their designation as an unknown. in short, the sequence of social science theory/continental philosophy/postmodernist philosophy is "unknown, philosophy, unknown". as such, not only can we not ever be sure that real science is ever taking place in a meaningful fashion (science exists as a category in physics here, but it needs to be bound to another category via an arrow to constitute science as a meaningful part of the sequence), and the "research" that is being conducted is purely philosophical, and metaphysical at that -- don't expect continental or postmodernist philosophy to rely on anything outside the most primitive logic in their arguments, as the construction of their arguments primarily relies on the subjectivity of their language. so if the "research" being conducted is purely metaphysical, then unless it is falsified via some extreme event in physics, there is no way of knowing which argument is correct. i know that there exists this notion of "rigor" as a standard for evaluating arguments, but if this rigor is not logical or scientific per se (obviously, illogical arguments are still detrimental, but rigor does not give extra credit to arguments that use more extensive logic than others do), then is it simply a matter of who can write the "best" arguments regardless of their degree of validity in comparison to other arguments? i think this can be supported by the fact that the second most prominent philosopher of the second half of the twentieth-century (the first being foucault) is derrida, a philosopher who has been criticized, even protested against by numerous academics, as being evasive and not meeting the standard criteria for rigor of philosophical argumentation. so given derrida's fame and influence, i find it hard to believe that the idea of rigor alone can provide an objective measuring stick for the validity of one's argument.
the second point is that unlike analytic philosophy and cognitive science's complementary relationship that is a complete, unified cycle, social science theory/continental philosophy/postmodernist philosophy's sequence can actually be short-circuited. because of the problems with the arrows i discussed in the previous paragraph, there are essentially three routes one can take:
1) an attempt at a holistic sequence: physics --> metaphysics --> metaphysical ontology --> physical ontology
2) a more pure philosopher's role: metaphysics --> metaphysical ontology
3) a more pure social scientist's role: physics --> physical ontology
these might be a bit abstract, so let me provide examples for each. the first person might be a geographer who both conducts field research and is well-informed about theory/philosophy. he/she might conduct his/her own research and compare this research with other geographers' research to establish a familiar "physics" with breadth and depth. from there, he/she would extract metaphysics from the physics, e.g. culture, belief systems, etc. then, he/she would establish a metaphysical ontology by explaining how current culture, belief systems, etc. will lead to changes in those areas. furthermore, he/she might offer an objective ontology of what he/she predicts will happen, and then offer an alternative ontology of what he/she wants to happen or what could happen if certain changes are made by introducing a new ontology or subtle changes to the old ontology -- basically, in everyday language, this amounts to a social scientist predicting what will happen culturally, etc. if we do nothing and sit back and observe world events versus being proactive and making efforts to convince people to change things, etc. finally, the transition from metaphysical ontology to physical ontology is simply translating how metaphysical notions of culture, etc. will be evinced through physical behaviors and their interactions with a physical environment. an example of the second person would be a postmodernist philosopher who is less familiar with "physics" and simply keeps informed about world events much like an armchair analyst, not incorporating statistical research, etc. into his/her knowledge base. so in this sense, "physics" here is implicit, and could be labeled as "(physics)". from there, the philosopher then uses his version of metaphysics, say neo-marxism, and then applies this to a situation, such as the culture of his home country in europe, constituting a metaphysical ontology. finally, this is implicitly translated into a physical ontology -- "(physical ontology)" -- loosely predicting future world events etc. without any sort of real knowledge of the interaction between people and their landscape, etc. so the sequence could be refined as:
2) (physics) --> metaphysics --> metaphysical ontology --> (physical ontology)
now, the inverse is true for a pure social scientist. he/she will devote most of his/her time to research, then form some implicit metaphysical beliefs by combining his/her knowledge of the field he/she does research in with his/her somewhat sub-standard background in theory/philosophy. as such, he/she will usually treat the metaphysical aspects of his/her discipline as secondary to the "hands on" approach of field research, statistics, etc. finally, arrives at a physical ontology using physics as his/her primary means of justification and metaphysics secondarily. so, the sequence can be refined as:
3) physics --> (metaphysics) --> (metaphysical ontology) --> physical ontology
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