Wednesday, December 30, 2009

the role of philosophy and science continued

so with the three paths we can see that social science basically is a combination of theory and "soft science" (i.e., induction and correlation instead of deduction and causality). here is my problem with this format. soft science in and of itself is fine, generally speaking. it includes not just social science, but most of psychology along with non-lab natural sciences such as environmental studies, nutrition, and meteorology. it helps us make more informed decisions about the world around us, giving us insight into the risks and benefits of our actions. soft science can operate on its own, as it does in non-lab natural science, with its own theoretical framework, theories, and hypotheses. it also has the capability to do the same in social science, but most of the time it instead is combined with metaphysical theory to encompass metaphysics in addition physics, and this is where i have a problem. of course it is possible that soft science, via physical theory, can influence metaphysical theory and demarcate its boundaries. however, within those boundaries, a theorist can propose virtually any theory he/she wishes without a proper system of checks and balances, only the notion of "rigor" that is supposed to regulate the validity of these theories. with analytic philosophy and cognitive science, metaphysical theory is held accountable because without it being properly constructed, parts of it can be extracted and tested in the realm of physics using the scientific method. in short, the relationship between philosophy and science here can exclude not only what is not, but affirmatively define what *is*. on the other hand, the relationship between philosophy and science in social science can only definitely define what is not; any claims as to what *is* are purely speculative, educated guesses on the parts of social science theorists. furthermore, not only does the relationship between analytic philosophy and cognitive science affirm what is epistemologically, but in some cases it does metaphysically as well, for when a universal truth is discovered through causality in physics, then it can holds implications for universals in the realm of metaphysics. on the other hand, social science does not embrace universal truths either way -- epistemologically it is incompatible because social science can only define what is not, not what is, and metaphysically there are no implications because true causality is never found in social science, only strong correlations at best.

it seems like there is so much perceived overlap in social science's theoretical areas -- social philosophy, social theory, political philosophy, political theory, sociological theory, anthropological theory, etc. -- that lost in the confusion is a critical assessment of the curriculum of each. with such an information overload, people just assume that the proper things are being taught for the proper reasons in each of the classes; these people could not be more wrong. if you look at the curriculum of a political philosophy class, you'll see that most of it consists of theory written hundreds of years ago, with only two philosophers from the past half-century being taught: john rawls and robert nozick. why only two and why these two specifically? well, first of all, both are considered to be from the analytic branch of philosophy. second, there just hasn't been much else written from that branch that is considered worthwhile. third, there is a question as to whether anything from that branch can be considered valid at all. wikipedia notes that, "After World War II political philosophy moved into a temporary eclipse in the Anglo-American academic world, as analytic philosophers expressed skepticism about the possibility that normative judgments had cognitive content, and political science turned toward statistical methods and behavioralism." in short, analytic philosophy expressed skepticism about metaphysics in political science and social science in general, and as a result, relied only on "soft science" as evidence (it maintained political theory covering metaphysics up through the 19th century to give students an historical background for political thought before the advent of the use of behaviorism and statistics in political science and social science). now, look at an area like social theory, filled with political theorists such as adorno, agamben, debord, habermas, etc. -- dozens of philosophers from the past 50 years. why are these theorists taught in social theory but not in political theory? because the agenda of these theorists is primarily metaphysical, which automatically bars them from being taught in political philosophy classes. it should also be noted that in addition to rawls and nozick, other contemporary philosophers are taught, but none are nearly as prominent as the previous two and additionally, these other philosophers primarily deal with issues of ethics. this is the other hidden barrier between political philosophy and social theory: political philosophy deals with political and legal systems and evaluates the ethical implications of all political interaction, ignoring culture, whereas social theory's first agenda is dealing with culture, a metaphysical entity, and its political ramifications. also, in general, analytic philosophers rarely are political in what they teach, whereas continental/postmodernist philosophers address politics head-on, and even when they don't what they discuss often tends to be steeped in political overtones. the reason ultimately boils down to this: outside of political systems and ethics, analytic philosophers view politics as being strictly opinions (even if they are educated ones at that), whereas continental/postmodernist philosophers view politics in a way marx would -- everything is ultimately political, not just politics per se!

what both can agree on is that what analytics avoid and what continental/postmodernists embrace is metaphysics, which brings us to one of the most fundamental questions in philosophy today: what is philosophy, what should it study, and how should philosophy study it? to my mind, both analytics and continental/postmodernists have valid points and glaring flaws regarding politics. for analytics, i agree that their approach is sound within the self-contained world of the discipline. however, philosophy is supposed to deal with the rest of the world outside the walls of academia, so just because philosophy doesn't have an answer at present for metaphysical aspects of politics doesn't mean philosophy should shun metaphysics in politics completely, because there exists a real world need for this area to be studied -- without academic guidance, this area becomes a void that can become filled quickly with uneducated opinions. how should analytic philosophy go about doing this? well, for one, it could use analytic social philosophy as a starting point and, combined with soft science, propose sensible representations of the changing political climate and offer possible solutions for ongoing problems. for continental/postmodernists, i believe that their metaphysical political preaching is out of line and, as rorty as pointed out, the far left has probably been counterproductive towards the overall progress of contemporary society. however, i do realize that one of the original goals of philosophy is to keep postulating about the presently unexplainable, and analytic philosophy has certainly distanced itself from this tradition. as such, i believe that continental/postmodernists can theorize about metaphysics within the realm of metaphysics itself without many any outstanding political claims to knowing the truth, instead having their metaphysical ideas have political implications that can be interpreted by political scientists to enhance the knowledge of their field and research.


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