refutation of nietzsche's perspectivism

the following website provides an article discussing nietzsche's perspectivism, epistemic relativism, and some other topics regarding the philosopher:

http://www.richmond-philosophy.net/rjp/rjp15_samuel.php

To appreciate Nietzsche's concept of perspectivism, it is important to distinguish between the epistemic (how reality is acknowledged) and the ontological (the reality that is acknowledged). Perspectivism affirms epistemic relativism (i.e., there is no unique reality to be known). For example, if there is a table in the room we might all see it differently. I might just see its surface due to sitting on top of it. You might see its four legs and its long edge due to sitting just before the table. And someone else might see its short edge and only two legs due to sitting on one side of the table. Now we are not able to claim that one way of seeing the table is correct - they are all different ways of properly seeing the table (epistemic relativism). Nevertheless, we would no doubt agree that there is a real table to be seen (ontological realism), and this rules out certain claims (e.g., the table is made of jelly) as wrong.

Nietzsche's "perspectivism" is not therefore simply rejecting truth (full relativism). It acknowledges ontological realism (i.e., there is a reality to be known), but at the same time affirms epistemic relativism (i.e., that any acknowledgement of reality is necessarily from a particular perspective or viewpoint, and this shapes how reality is acknowledged). Nietzsche's critique of the "prejudice" of philosophers is therefore the assumption that there is one way to acknowledge reality, not that there is a reality to be known.


does nietzsche deny the existence of an external reality? no, but for epistemic relativism he confuses ontologically subjective experience (mind) with epistemic objectivity, mistakenly believing the former is epistemic and thus why his epistemology is relative. he thinks that a multitude of views make for a reality relative to each view. what he doesn't get is that a plurality of views can all be within the domain of views that can equally affirm objective reality. if there are multiple correct corresponding viewpoints for each interaction with objective reality, then you have epistemic objectivity with claims to metaphysical/ontological objectivity. if there are multiple correct corresponding viewpoints for each interaction with a reality that is equivalent to itself (seeing different parts of a table and recognizing it is a table, but since they are from multiple perspectives, the table as defined in reality according to this idea is table (subscript 1) = table (subscript 2) = table (subscript n)) but is not itself per se (being itself would mean a tautology: table (subscript 1) *is* table (subscript 1)), and thus is not *the same* objective reality, then you have the possibility for multiple realities as they act as "mirrors", having identical content but being separate entities. however, since the mirrors are interchangeable due to their identical content, each viewpoint can correspond to any of the mirrors. so nietzsche has things "backwards" of sorts (not inverted or the inverse per se, just that the number that was previous associated with epistemology (number is more than one -- many) is now associated with metaphysics/ontology (number is more than one -- many)): with epistemic objectivity you have many viewpoints compatible with one objective reality, but with nietzsche's theory any of many viewpoints is compatible with many realities. having multiple realities (wherein not only is each reality equivalent to the others, but each reality is equivalent to the sum or totality of all the realities combined) is bizarre indeed, and it presents a problem for nietzsche's perspectivism because if there is only one objective reality, and all of nietzsche's mirrors, together, constitute that "the single objective reality", then each viewpoint must correspond to every mirror as well as the sum of the mirrors. in this case, epistemic relativism works at the expense of a "the single objective reality", because that reality is composed of many equivalent realities, so there is not just one "the single objective reality" -- there are two types of reality: a single objective reality (as the sum of the many equivalent realities) and the many equivalent realities. as such, since no "the single objective reality" exclusively can be determined, perspectivism fails. here is a mathematical analogy. i just previously stated that, "not only is each reality equivalent to the others, but the each reality is equivalent to the sum or totality of all the realities combined." what numbers are compatible with the aforementioned scenario? just one: zero (0 + 0 + 0 = 0). metaphysically, one could equate zero with meaning "nothing", so if reality exists as the absence of reality, then that is the only plausible scenario in which perspectivism holds as objective reality exists because there is no difference between the whole of reality and the parts -- the many equivalent realities -- that comprise it. however, this only holds up mathematically; if we take the concept of "mirrors" and have 0 (subscript 1), 0 (subscript 2), 0 (subscript n), etc., then the sum of the equivalent realities is not the same as any of the individual equivalent realities, and thus we have the problem of "the single objective reality" not being able to be determined. so now we must explore other avenues. in order for perspectivism to work -- for epistemic relativism to function with an objective reality -- then there can only be one correct corresponding viewpoint for each interaction with objective reality -- as such, reality is thus reduced to epistemology instead of a metaphysical ontology, making for an anti-realist view even if a person's epistemology correctly corresponds to an objective reality because the objective reality cannot be conceived as such. thus, nietzsche's claim for not rejecting ontological realism due to epistemic relativism is refuted: if epistemology is relative, then ontology is assumed to be as well even if in actuality it is not. however, since nietzsche has allowed for multiple realities, having each viewpoint correspond to only one reality would mean each viewpoint would correspond to a different reality, which is not only anti-realist as conceived, it is anti-realist in being actualized as exactly that since metaphysically there is no single unified ontological reality. in this case, epistemology is relative an ontology is not only assumed to be relative, it in fact is confirmed to be so. as such, nietzsche's perspectivism does not hold up.

now, some thoughts on the rest of the article (which you should probably read before reading the rest of this paragraph since it is essentially me taking notes as i read along). evolutionary theory of the will to power reduces knowledge to power, which i have already refuted on my blog in a previous entry (nietzsche attacks the sciences by saying they are all constructs resultant upon drives in the will to power). by devoting his energies to questioning what truth is, nietzsche evades the question of how he can reconcile epistemic relativism with ontological realism. then he realizes that his theory of power permits the absence of moral claims to truths, so he compensates by saying that morality can be measured by how it contributes to his drives to power. but this is just rubbish because 1) it claims morality approaching an ultimate truth is dependent on one's ability to attain power, so now morals = power = knowledge, and 2) he criticizes the weakness of people when they fail to make moral choices that contribute to the will to power, yet he doesn't explain the reason why this occurs (free will, etc.), he just criticizes it. my guess is he doesn't bring up free will because he already uses will in his will to power, and he can't explain having a will behind a will. instead, nietzsche naturalizes morality, making morality the domain of primordial demands of being human, whereas his drives in the will to power entail a more sophisticated metaphysical domain (nietzsche fails to explain how drives evolve out of or are connected to primordial demands). so in short, nietzsche is criticizing gene/environment states, which is ultimately a criticism that is worthless. this also brings christianity into the picture, since christianity is supposed to defend the weak, but nietzsche deems this as leading to a slave morality, instead of his master morality -- now he creates his own metaphysics to justify his other metaphysics (drives in the will to power). so even if one accepts his epistemic relativism as true, then it has to be reconciled with nietzsche's own attempts to reduce it to a realist ontology (his account of drives in the will to power and how those arise out of natural, primordial states); remember at the beginning i noticed that, "for epistemic relativism he confuses ontologically subjective experience (mind) with epistemic objectivity, mistakenly believing the former is epistemic", and now it appears that he is confusing epistemic relativism with his drives in the will to power (realist ontology). that alone is a difficult task to undertake, to somehow make sense of his seemingly incompatible positions and defend them as being cohesive. however, if one accepts my conclusion that epistemic relativism is false, then one has to reconcile nietzsche's relativist ontology with his realist ontology, and that simply cannot be done. thus, many of nietzsche's core ideas -- perspectivism/epistemic realism, the will to power, and master morality -- are disproven and/or nonsensical.