how to solve the underlying problem with political philosophy

so my last blog entry proposed a solution for analytics to tackle political philosophy and reclaim the territory that has been seized by continentals and disseminated throughout american social science departments in the past half-century or so. ultimately, i proposed a holistic approach through which normative claims about the future could be determined, and then upon establishing that range, a variety of possible solutions could be volunteered. now, earlier i discussed elitism as a problem that philosophy must overcome in order to regain its relevance in a productive manner outside of sheer intellectual circles. however, my proposition assumed something that cannot be taught and that lies outside of the conventional approach of analytic philosophy: judgment. the problem is that since judgment cannot be validated rationally, empirically, or conceptually beforehand, analytics view judgment as an inherent "trivial truth" of their system (meaning something taken for granted that is subjective but not to a degree large enough to affect larger, objective entities -- "common sense" would be another notion viewed the same way as judgment) and nothing more; they essentially minimize the subjective aspect of it as much as possible. continentals, on the other hand, love espousing their opinions, often without properly substantiated support, and because they believe in creating their own reality and truths, this often leads to them believing their opinions to be inherently correct without caring about possible flaws that could be exposed through external criticism. in fact, some of them don't care if their ideas contradict each other as they change their opinions over time, for they view this as part of the process of philosophy and questioning things. this renders the notion of judgment as pointless. furthermore, they often frame their opinions in ways that cannot be proven or disproven, as they are "intellectual blank checks" of sorts, so even if they were to conform to a normal reality, the notion of judgment would not be pertinent to their ideas. in social science theory, the notion of employing a lens to conduct and evaluate research is consistent with the continental perspective of there not being an objective truth per se. social science does attempt to justify and support its positions with rigorous inquiry, however, instead of just ranting opinions based on interpretations of other philosophers.

so judgment is one major obstacle -- in order for analytics to cover political philosophy, they must embrace a broader, more subjective notion of judgment as being valid for dealing with that topic. this is a matter that can be dealt with internally by analytics and is simply a matter of them deciding to loosen their approach, for there is nothing else impeding their path from doing so. however, the second major obstacle is one that is a problem external to philosophy: economics. in viewing our society as existing around a core political economy, it is evident that one cannot address politics without addressing economics. it is here that the problem lies in the social sciences, not within analytic philosophy. from what i can tell, it appears that there is an antagonistic relationship between economics and "social sciences" -- mainly geography, anthropology, and sociology. economists appear to be very applied, concerned only with the short-term and number crunching (hence why you basically can't publish in any major economic journal without having a degree in math), and doing so by making a host of assumptions and ignoring contributions that other disciplines have to offer. "social sciences" do a better job in terms of employing a more holistic approach, but they deal mainly with theory and typically critique capitalism through a marxist lens. perhaps they do this because marx is an enemy of capitalism and they feel he offers a unique perspective, or it is possible that marx has a "theory of everything" encompassing not just economics but politics, philosophy, history, etc. -- if one were to use marx solely as an economic lens, while no one can deny marx's contributions to economics, why not use perspectives from other great economic minds like adam smith or keynes? now, it is true that social scientists do employ lenses from keynes and other economists, but i still feel that if one were to use economists based on the success of their past and present implementability, that marx is disproportionally represented as an economist as used by "social scientists" as someone like keynes would be used by the majority and marx would be used by a minority. that shouldn't come as a surprise though, given that "social scientists" do not put as much stock in normative claims as i do and actually place more value on theoretical ideas. also, there is always the position that "communism" of the 20th century was not true marxism. however, holding capitalism to the same theoretical standard, it can be argued quite easily that the current world political economy is not true capitalism (just ask your neighborhood libertarian if he/she believes that america is truly capitalist and 90% of them would say, "no!"), so employing a marxist critique of it is to be using theory to evaluate an implemented system, i.e., something done in practice. so to me, it is only fair for marxists to critique capitalism philosophically unless they can provide an all-encompassing, overarching economic plan that is better than the current system (something which i have asked for repeatedly and has yet to be answered satisfactorily). one thing marxists do is to claim that marxism will prevail in practice after the downfall of current "capitalism", and that the downfall of "capitalism" is necessary for true marxism to emerge; until then, we can only take baby steps in assisting the downfall of "capitalism" and in attempting to curb its harmful effects (both by helping needy/oppressed people and by slowing its destruction of the environment, although some strict marxists might not agree with the latter as marx was for man conquering nature). however, the idea of marxism prevailing after capitalism has two problems. for one, it assumes that a kind of utopia will emerge for the first time in human history, which i think is a severe misjudgment of "human tendency" -- just because we finally reach a stage wherein every person in the world has his/her basic human rights fulfilled doesn't mean that people will suddenly become any less corrupt or exploitative in nature. the assumption of a utopia emerging is based on another assumption that we are currently in a capitalist stage, which inevitably will be followed by socialism and then a utopia, but as i've mentioned before, "capitalism" as our current political economy does not necessary equate to true capitalism as defined by some economists or as how marx envisioned it could evolve. thus, if we haven't ever entered a fully capitalist stage, then marx's historical inevitability is stuck at an impasse as it doesn't account for what will happen if we reach a stage of so called "quasi-capitalism". second, it doesn't have an explicit plan for what kind of political economy will emerge -- it could be socialism, communism, anarchism, or some other system. it inherently rules out capitalism though, because ultimately it is futile to be a marxist if you believe that capitalism will continue on forever. now, while capitalism "as we know it" might end, meaning the definition of capitalism altering space, the use of natural resources, the continuance of colonialism in new forms, etc., might finally come to an end, it does not mean that capitalism will be dead. marx himself stated that, "from each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs." thus, even marx recognized the inherent inequality in people's innate abilities. now, this might seem like a claim with fairly negligible implications, such as that a 240 lb. man is deserving of twice as much food as a 120 lb. woman (assuming that amount of food is directly correlated with a person's weight, and i don't think that's exactly the case, but assume it is simply for the general notion implied by the example). however, unless one can concretely define what a person's abilities and needs are, then there will always be contention regarding properly appropriating resources to different people, and it is precisely this grey area that capitalism thrives in. furthermore, if we can't properly define a person's abilities then we can't concretely define the value of labor invested in producing each commodity, which in turn creates another grey area that capitalism seeks to exploit for profit. and given my beliefs about "human tendency" tending to favor the self over altruism roughly 80/20, it seems much more likely that people will squabble over this grey area and a power structure will emerge in which the inequality that exists is greater than that which is inherent in people's abilities and needs (assuming that we could objectively measure those). also, the nature of competition among groups -- along the lines of nations -- will cause non-capitalist systems to collapse out of jealousy if this new version of capitalism is more effective and efficient at producing goods than non-capitalist systems are, and based on history, it seems highly unlikely that non-captialist systems will be more effective and efficient than capitalism. so marxism is in essence a closed loop regarding "human tendency" -- not only does it assume that people will not attempt to exploit each other in grey areas, but it also assumes that this will occur unilaterally, for all it takes is one group to turn capitalist and be more effective and efficient economically to cause the other groups to eventually follow capitalism. thus, in order for the exploitation in the grey areas to not be sustainable, marxism must work as a superior economic system such that capitalism will be unsuccessful once its historical stage has passed. however, imo, with the help of technology providing essentially limitless growth regarding production even as we run out of space to annihilate and resources to devour, capitalism will still be able to not only survive in a redefined form, but due to "human tendency", will continue to be a more effective and efficient economic system than marxism, thus preventing marxism from prevailing. as long as there is room for growth and a means for exploitation (i.e., "grey areas"), the economic system will be a type of capitalism instead of marxism even if this form of capitalism in other areas bears little to no resemblance to 20th/early-21st century capitalism and manages to fulfill the bare minimum of human needs and rights as demanded by so-called "progressives". thus, the end of poverty does not necessarily mean the end of inequality and exploitation.

now, returning to economics and "social sciences", between the two, it appears that they offer no coherent progressive solution: economists simply care about predicting what will happen (not necessarily caring about *why* things will happen as long as their answer/prediction holds true), making normative claims and suggesting that alternatives to these claims, which always contain some aspects that are not satisfactory for "progressives", would cause economic circumstances to be even worse for people; "social scientists", on the other hand, are interested in assessing capitalism in the following ways: 1) understanding capitalism from a holistic perspective, both in terms of what it entails beyond solely economics and in terms of its history (both its past and its future), 2) critiquing problems with capitalism, and 3) offering alternative solutions to capitalism's problems. so, not only do economists and "social scientists" often have totally different interests and priorities in studying economics, but they are at a crossroads when it comes to offering solutions to problems. economists predict that the economy will go a certain way and assume there will be a certain number of accompanying problems with it but that we can't do anything about them, while "social scientists" protest that we cannot accept those accompanying problems and that there must be a better way to solve those problems, yet they can only offer piecemeal solutions at best and do not present an immediate, overarching plan for how to rectify national and global economic problems by replacing the system approved by economists with their own new version of a political economy. analytics, while avoiding economics in general, if forced to choose a position, i imagine, would tend to favor economists because they seek objective truth using quantitative data instead of seeing things from perspectives using other forms of evidence and because they trust the status quo more than ideology given its history and given that you can't prove ideology satisfactorily at most levels, let alone down to the cognitive level. there is debate within economist circles as to what constitutes normative claims about the near future of the economy and what means need to be undertaken to reach that point, which is why you have conservative and liberal economists (although seldom radical ones). i should also point out that because economists don't necessarily care about understanding capitalism holistically from a long-term perspective, many of them place their own political and/or personal agenda in their economic research, so instead of looking to do what is best for the most people over the long haul, they instead attempt to keep the rich people as rich as possible without collapsing the economy in the short-term, thus skewing their normative claims. two things are evident from this: 1) there is indeed a range of possible future economic outcomes from which we can work towards achieving, not just one predetermined position that we have no control over, and 2) because economists view things in the short-term (especially the ones who care about using capitalism as an excuse to optimize wealth for the rich), their predictions have complete disregard for "minor" problems that can accrue and result in something catastrophic later on down the line, e.g., global warming.

so what is a philosopher to do when faced with this dilemma? well, for one, i think i can safely say that we can ignore conservative economists or at least view them at best as critiquing possible problems of liberal economists' plans without embracing the entire plans of conservative economists. so the goal is to determine a range in which our economy can function, and then choose the option that helps address the immediate problems of capitalism, e.g., in essence "redistributing" the wealth so as to ensure a basic, humane standard of living for as many impoverished people as possible and helping to reduce class disparity. now, we would like to address the long-term effects of capitalism as well, but if attempting to reach those goals causes an economic collapse in the short-term, then it is simply unfeasible to undertake such an effort, as not only will it cripple our economy in the short-term, but even in the long-term it probably will not pan out as hoped for. this is something that i don't think many "social scientists" "get" -- there is an inherently limited spectrum within which our economy can be flexible due to behaviors by people that are rooted in "human tendency", which as a genes-environment interaction can ultimately be reduced down to the cognitive level, and this exists as an objective truth; it is "out there" in reality independent of whatever lens a "social scientist" may employ. so the bottom line is this: if even the most liberally realizable plan for our economy in the coming decades does not result in the social change and long-term environmental effects that concern "social scientists", my answer is, "deal with it!" eventually, at some point, i think it is possible for every man, woman, and child in the world to be treated with human rights as outlined by the united nations, but until that day is possible, advocating that such takes place now without proposing an all-encompassing, implementable plan is simply fantasy, and an irresponsible one at that. what would be useful is if economists listened to the suggestions of "social scientists", both in refining their short-term predictions and in preparing for the long-term, and trying to make the long-term normative predictions compatible with some of the "utopian" goals (at least the reasonable ones) sanctioned by "social scientists" at present.

so, now that economics and the notion of judgment have been addressed, we have a domain within which political philosophy can function. as such, any political claims that fall outside of the accepted range of economics can be dismissed as unfeasible ideology. within the range, there are certain to be many details to be worked out, and there is no doubt that a slew of ideas regarding ethics, justice, and so on will be debated, and in all likelihood no single set position will be deemed to be the only correct one. but one thing is certain: by limiting political philosophy to being based on a specific range for our political economy, a strong element of pragmatism will be the underlying theme, as "reality" will be play a major role in determining our destiny. of course, this goes against the very spirit of liberalism and radicalism, which views us and our surroundings as agents of change and which believes that ultimately the power for change resides inside of us, not in something "external". the problem with this perspective is that we are part of the "external" as living results of the totality of gene-environment interactions. so once again, my view of political philosophy differs from those of typical radicals in that ultimately we differ on some very fundamental philosophical beliefs: 1) i believe in an "objective, external reality", 2) i acknowledge the power that this reality exerts on us, 3) we have inherent limitations due to our "human tendency", and 4) i accept those limitations and attempt to work with them to optimize things as best as possible for the most people, i.e., the greatest good for the greatest number of people. opposition to #1 is still a prevailing belief in much philosophy and "social science" that i believe hinders those disciplines' ability to pursue the truth. #2 is typically viewed as a two-way street by continentals and "social scientists" whereas for the most part (getting into the details of this would be quite lengthy and i don't wish to do so here), i believe it to be a one-way street. #3 is the most anti-liberal of my beliefs because it makes essentialist claims that result in the belief, in practice, leaning more towards the status quo than to an extremist/radical position; it is based on judgment, although i believe i have arrived at the correct conclusion based on my personal experiences and my education, both formal and informal. thus, i believe there to be limitations on what humans are capable of regarding political/economic systems, and because i can't *prove* my belief per se but my belief nevertheless denotes some sort of inherent structure or system regarding people that exists despite the fact that we cannot access it to a degree that would constitute it as a form of proof, my belief about people -- "human tendency" -- is inherently conservative because the liberal belief would be to view people as limitless since there is no proof per se that people are inherently inflexible regarding political/economic systems. the problem i have with people who claim that we can't speculate on "human nature" (which i have revised to be "human tendency") because it is too complicated and there is not enough evidence to make an accurate determination of it, and therefore making a judgment on "human nature" is wrong and possibly even dangerous is that you are already inherently making judgments about "human tendency" through all of your behaviors and interactions with people (and your behaviors not involving others), and so in forming political beliefs, you are indirectly creating an essentialized, abstract system about the way humans do and should behave, which is an extension of "human tendency" and the ultimate intellectual decision in that, while political judgments are not more intellectual than judgments through other lenses, e.g. psychological, cultural, historical, etc., political judgments do entail the most power a person can exert over others exclusively through intellectualism. thus, political judgments, of all intellectual beliefs, require the utmost responsibility. so, #2 and #3 (and to some extent, #1), reflect my belief that there exists a reality that exerts power over people, and people passively interpret it. people are not complete robots -- particularly those who are intelligent and can gain positions of power to exert their beliefs over people, and in the process, change our surroundings and thus alter reality -- but i believe that this flexibility is rather limited, which is why i believe that reality exerts power over us as mainly a one-way street (although there is *some* power going back the opposite way) and that there are normative claims to be made about the future (with the range reflecting our ability to change things; if we were robots, then the normative claim would be a precise point in the future instead of being a range, but because the range is rather limited in comparison with all theoretically imaginable scenarios of human behavior, i still view the range as being much closer to a normative point than being reflective of a wide range of possible outcomes able to be realized by human agency). marx declared that, "philosophers have previously tried to explain the world, our task is to change it," but i have explained why his position is incorrect in a previous blog entry (see "in defense of realism" for my take on marx's epistemology) and, in defending realism, why i pretty much believe that philosophy's position is to explain the world (as philosophy did from the ancients through the moderns), although it also can and, imo, should be an agent for change within defined boundaries. while #4 is an extension of #3 and thus makes me a pragmatist when it comes to politics and economics instead of a radical, ideologue, idealist, etc.