the problem of free will...solved!

typically, the problem of free will is associated with determinism/indeterminism and not the mind-body problem. however, there are tremendous implications for free will if the mind-body problem is solved and it is confirmed that mental states are causally reducible to physical states -- this would mean that we do not possess free will unless the brain is a physically indeterminate system. there are two perspectives that argue that mental states are causally reducible to physical states: monism and a type of property dualism. the latter of these has the following: mental states have arrows going in one direction between the mental states, brain states have arrows going in one direction between brain states, and both mental and brain states and have arrows going both directions interacting in parallel with each other (see wikipedia "philosophy of mind" diagram for further visual clarification). with this in mind (no pun intended), let's move on to the problem of free will.

the mind-body problem is about how consciousness emerges from material things (whether or not there is error in the neural correlate of consciousness is irrelevant regarding this definition). free will is defined by whether consciousness can intentionally override material inputs (in order for this to be possible, there must be some error in the neural correlate of consciousness -- which entails property dualism -- unless one just so happens to always choose what materials inputs tell him/her to do, so it's possible in theory, just highly unlikely in practice); if there is no error in the neural correlate of consciousness, then barring some infinitesimally small chance being realized as just mentioned, monism is almost certainly the correct philosophy of mind and free will does not exist with the brain as a determinate system. however, if the brain is an indeterminate system, then monism can still be conducive to free will existing. so either experimental error in the neural correlate of consciousness or indeterminism of the brain as discovered by science allows for the possibility of free will but do not provide firm answer for whether or not the error is a "random" property of mental, an indeterminate property of the brain and/or mental (brain only for monism, brain and/or mental for property dualism), or whether it is due to free will.

now, allow me to establish some definitions regarding free will -- definitions that are perhaps somewhat unconventional -- in order for me to successfully communicate my argument.

1) free will = ability to make choice in brain + fulfill this choice through action

2) ability to make choice in brain = internal intentionality

to fulfill this choice through action = external intentionality

3) internal intentionality = ability to match a later mental state as desired by an initial mental state

4) external intentionality = matching internal intentionality with mental state conceiving the self interacting with the environment instead of remaining within the self; executing external intentionality is ultimately an exercise in reflexivity of the self with regard to the environment and the mind-self-environment interactions -- ultimately a relationship between individual and environment as perceived through the mind, whereas executing internal intentionality is ultimately an exercise in reflexivity of the self with regard to the mind (simulated/envisioned/imagined environment) and the mind-self-mind interactions -- ultimately a reflexivity of the self as perceived through the mind

knowing the above, i will now make the following argument.

a) free will is relevant only to the range of experimental error and/or indeterminism; the rest is covered by deterministic brain states

b) free will entails a mental state derived from earlier a mental state independent of brain states

c) mental states are not discrete, but continuous -- only the illusions of language and abstraction make us conceive mental states as discrete -- and without distinction between cause and effect, mental states are in a constant state of "becoming", not being, so if we have free will, then it overlaps with other "intervals" of free will. since overlap entails free will affecting other free will, this means that everything ultimately reduces to us not having free will because the ontology starts with beginning of mental states in consciousness instead of with the beginning of a situation. also, with no defined interval, there is no first cause for mental states in consciousness, and with no first cause, there is no impetus for the start of free will (free will starts with a mental state that later tries to be actualized through another mental state); at least with defined intervals, one could define a situation involving free will with the first interval of consciousness and view the entire ontology from start to end of consciousness as an cumulative effect of free will encompassing that entire span as a single situation involving a chain of cause and effect. this argument holds for both monism and property dualism because both assume mental states are causally reducible to physical states. thus, even if monism were proven true and science determined that the brain is inherently indeterminist, the ontological problem i have presented renders it impossible for the indeterminism to allow for the possibility of free will. so, regardless of whether the philosophy of mind is monist or property dualist, and whether the brain is determinist or indeterminist, there is no possibility for the existence of free will.