the following is taken from an exchange with a friend on the following topic. as such, in addressing "you", i am addressing the friend, not *you* the reader.
now, i see something i want to point out with the topic of "the inherently social construction of the nature of humanity". inherent is defined in the dictionary as "existing in someone or something as a permanent and inseparable element, quality, or attribute". so, if the social construction of human nature is a permanent and inseparable element of human nature, and we can't know why it exists in this manner, then we are essentially saying that social construction is natural to human nature, and arguing that something is natural as a valid reason for something is a logical fallacy. ok, so i assume that you didn't go that route and instead tried to argue that the social construction of human nature being a permanent and inseparable element of human nature exists for a reason or reasons. this can be addressed outside of the social sciences in the metaphysical branch of philosophy, in particular ontology. but going back to the argument, you are assuming that human nature and its social construction are somehow interrelated, and that you can prove some sort of causality between the two as evidenced through human behavior patterns in such categories as articles and identifiers central to identity formation, traditional precedents carried from one generation to the next, how survival is directly tied to cultural habits and organizational hierarchies, etc. ok, so that's legitimate. however, the idea of social construction as being a different, yet interconnected entity with human nature is ultimately at the crux of some issues i have with social science approaches.social science approaches tend to adopt terminology that gives what actually exists in metaphysical reality a life of its own so to speak, amounting to more than the sum of its parts. these terms, representing ideas on the macro-level, are then thrust through some sort of formula of sorts, which is then supposed to determine what the truth actually is regarding everything with life and people on the most infinitesimally micro-levels and holistic levels. my reservations aside, the idea of social construction as being interconnected with human nature is simply a translation of the true essence of human nature into semi-verifiable forms, such as cultural behavior patterns. and my question then is as follows: at what point does the essence of human nature morph into forms of social construction? it seems that social science, instead of addressing this fundamental question, instead assumes it to be inherent to the nature of studying the human condition, with the emphasis being on the rigor of analysis of what is translated from human nature into verifiable things that are classified under the theoretical category "social construction". if we can't define why or how human nature is connected to the idea of social construction ("how" might be sort of answered by cog sci approaches eventually), then we simply arrive at language games. one can attempt to address why human nature is connected to social constructions, but in doing so, one simply introduces more "constructions" (whether they can be classified as "social" constructions or not depends on the approach one is taking and the interpretations of those attempting to understand this person) via language in order to attempt to solve the initial question. so yes, it appears to me that social science is stuck in a quagmire either way -- if it assumes certain constructs to be necessary, then it is taking a leap of faith or committing a logical fallacy by believing the causality to be natural to the human condtion; if it attempts to explain why these constructs are necessary, then the result is a new set of constructs that further confuses and complicates the problem. of course, at a certain point in any discipline -- even hard science -- there are only so many "why's" you can ask before you end up at the answer of "just because." however, the fact that it takes only one "why" to undermine the metaphysical structure of the interconnectedness of social constructions and human nature seems to point to the conclusion that social science lacks the necessary reductionist premises for a sound methodology to sufficiently *prove* something. this doesn't mean that once one goes beyond the underlying assumption that one cannot employ the scientific method to prove things; it simply means that, at best, they can prove the translation of the human condition, not directly the human condition itself. seeing how that is the desirable endpoint of the social sciences, i don't see how the social sciences prove anything about the human condition any better than philosophy, art, or the humanities; instead, they simply offer more concrete, informed, and educated -- but not necessarily "better" -- metaphors using scientific approaches where they are deemed appropriate (and where they are deemed appropriate is another debate in and of itself) in a futile effort to explain the unexplainable and to some degree, claim to have knowledge about the human condition that is unknowable to those outside of the social sciences (this claim is both true and untrue and worthy of a paragraph in and of itself, but i'm not up for writing it tonight). and to me, despite my "training" in cog sci, i know that it eventually, even in an ideal world, could only explain the "how" of the human condition and not the "why", which i guess is why i turned to art for truth instead of any forms of science. and it is why i am ultimately a philosopher at heart and not a scientist.
No comments:
Post a Comment