Tuesday, October 13, 2009

qualia and social science clarified: part 2

after some feedback, i've decided that it's necessary to further clarify a few things regarding qualia and social science. the fundamental question seems to be: why does social science have to improve people's lives in an experiment to be considered successful? here are the various possible responses to this question:

1) first of all, social science could ignore the possibility of improving people's lives by eliminating the obstacle of qualia. to do this, social science would have to revert to pure behaviorism and treat the mind/brain as a "black box". in this school of thought, success is no longer measured by improving people's lives, but by achieving goals set forth in the hypothesis of an experiment, tested through the behavior of the subjects. we already have a form of social science that pretty much follows this process: economics! (well, for almost all intents and purposes, although it does make a few inferences about people's psychological states so as to not be absolutely and completely behaviorist, although it still is essentially behaviorist as far as its approach to evaluating people's decisions.) so unless one would want anthropology, sociology, and psychology to be reduced to the level of economics, i don't see how this approach is a viable option.

2) consider the notion of progress in science: is the concept of progress essential to the concept of science? while progress can always be considered somewhat subjective, i think the general notion of progress in science is building on a body of knowledge so that, with the passage of time, we have a better understanding of how our environment works (in hard science, the environment being matter/energy). however, since social science is epistemically subjective according to my argument, then you can't build on an objective body of knowledge. however, you can attempt to improve people's epistemically subjective qualia, which equates to improving people's lives so to speak. if you don't try to attempt to improve people's epistemically subjective qualia, then you are no longer doing science -- even science in the form of social science. at this point, one is simply interacting with people under the methodology of the experiment, which is inherently a rule system. however, without a social scientific intentionality, the experiment is no longer a form of social science, and social scientifically isn't any different from casually interacting with people.

3) why does social science have to improve people's lives in an *experiment* to be considered successful? well, one could claim that while certain experiments might not be "successful" according to the definitions i have given, that over time a series of "unsuccessful" experiments might lead to knowledge that is considered "successful". so, you could raise the standard of "success" from experiment to theory to paradigm, with the standard encompassing a larger scope in both space and time as one jumps up from one level to the next. the problem with this idea is the following: at what point does one determine the appropriate level for the standard of "success" to be? the problem is that paradigms, even when paradigm shifts occur, are rarely ever completely replaced. so, at some level, a paradigm established now has an infinite life span, which coincides with the infinite life span of possible existence for humans (although the human species will likely not continue forever, but that is a debate for another time). by having the domains of paradigms and human life/existence completely overlap, the end result of social science becomes the end point of human life/existence, which poses two major problems. first of all, since humans will no longer be around, the results of the paradigm will have no relevance to the human species. secondly, even coming from the perspective of an objective observer, one cannot know whether the end result is due to the paradigm or due to overall life circumstances; in this sense, social science will have become equivalent to the humanities and art and vice-versa. one could argue that the standard of success could operate at the level of theory, but in order to be as scientific as possible, one should keep the standard of success at the level of the experiment, because any level higher is indicative of a less-social scientific intentionality.

Monday, October 12, 2009

why cog sci never lived up to its expected potential

cognitive science initially faced two fundamental issues: cognition and consciousness. the theory of consciousness is subsumed by philosophy of mind, which is an utter quagmire and in which few inroads, either via philosophy or science (neuroscience in particular), have been made to solve the mystery of consciousness. on the other hand, cognition, as a theoretical school, replaced psychoanalysis and behaviorism. the theory was that by reducing input-output to a certain level, the problem of the mind as being a "black box" in the behaviorist approach would be eliminated, and we could have a thorough conceptual and functional understanding of cognition. however, the problem was as follows: by reducing the timeframe and localizing and/or simplifying stimuli, the results would also be interpreted at approximately the same level both in cognition and behavior. the more you reduced, the more inapplicable the results and their implications seemed to be to "real-world" phenomena. in theory, if you reduced everything infinitely, then assuming a 100% mind-brain/body correlation -- in essence assuming the mind-body problem to not exist -- you would have an infinite amount of data and cognition would be solved. a further implication of this is that because you would have an infinite amount of data and fully understood cognition, consciousness would also be solved; if consciousness were not able to be solved, then you would still have a finite amount of data due to the lack of 100% mind-brain/body correlation and cognition would not be solved.

to escape this probably impasse, cognitive science placed faith that artificial intelligence would reach a stage at which it could bridge the gap between having a finite amount of data and having a processing machine capable of intelligently forming connections among the finite amount of data, which in turn allowed for an infinite number of possibilities. by reaching infinity this way, researchers figured the problem of cognition could be solved, and consciousness, if it could not be understood to the point of being created, could at least be adequately explained so as to have eliminated the mind-body problem. however, ai still has yet to remotely approach this expected level, and as such, after decades of research we have simply been left with a mountain, albeit it a finite one, of data and virtually no way to integrate it successfully on a macro level. furthermore, we have all this data and no overarching theory to tie it all together in a meaningful way.

so, where do we go from here? well, to tie it together in a meaningful way means that we have to have an underlying theoretical framework for cog sci. first, we have to determine an even more fundamental question: is cog sci a natural science, a social science, or some other classification such as "brain science"? well, first of all, if you've read my previous post, you should be informed about what i consider hard science to be. in normal hard science, the objects of study are ontologically objective, but in cognitive science, the objects -- or "subjects", as we should refer to them -- are ontologically subjective. however, john searle has stated that epistemic objectivity does not preclude ontological subjectivity. so, "brain science", or cognitive science can be a hard science in theory. however, this only occurs in the first-person ontology, as all philosophy of mind is done starting with one's own intuitions to form premises and then analyzing things from there. so, for cognitive science -- with the emphasis on the *science* part -- it can only be hard science if an experimenter does an experiment on himself, even if that includes using computers and other devices to run the experiment on him as a subject. since most cognitive science research has not been done in this fashion, and has included more than one person in the process of conducting an experiment, then cognitive science has been mostly a social science in practice. so, to restate things, cognitive science in theory is hard science, but in practice is social science.

now, i have defined that cognitive science, as a process, is in theory a hard science, but in practice a social science. now that this matter has been resolved, we can attempt to adopt a theoretical framework for cog sci to operate in. in theory, by reducing all stimuli and timeframes infinitely, you would have an infinite amount of data and could ultimately solve the puzzle of cognition, and with the help of theoretical ai (as opposed to where ai stands currently), possibly explain consciousness and fill in any gaps in defining cognition if the amount of data was not quite infinite (but still extensive and incredibly reductionist). as a result, cog sci would become a meta-social science of sorts. however, in reality, you cannot reduce everything infinitely, the puzzle of cognition remains incomplete, and ai has not reached a point where it can even approach explaining the mystery of consciousness. the underlying goal of social science is to attempt to explain *why* people make decisions -- social science theory makes some inferences and leaps in its theoretical frameworks in order to cover up the fact that it actually does not know why people make decisions -- but cog sci basically attempts to explain *how* the decision making process occurs, and ultimately thought it would get to the *why* -- it only does in theory when it reaches the "meta-level" -- but never actually did. in trying to explain the *how* more than the *why*, cognitive science resembles an approach closer to that of hard science than social science. and, as mentioned in the previous paragraph, *in theory* cognitive science could be practiced as a hard science, thus eliminating the qualia obstacle that faces social science as i outlined in my previous post. so, how can we reconcile a discipline which as a process is hard science in theory but social science in practice with a theoretical framework that is social science in theory but hard science in practice? here is my solution. earlier in this paragraph i mentioned that "social science theory makes some inferences and leaps in its theoretical frameworks in order to cover up the fact that it actually does not know why people make decisions" -- fair enough. cog sci can, at present, and probably to a much better degree in the future, help fill in those gaps in social science's theoretical frameworks that are currently occupied only by inferences and leaps. i'm just starting to learn a bit about john searle's philosophy of society, and i think that there is a fundamental discord between cog sci and the social sciences because social science theory is mostly rooted in postmodernism, whereas cog sci is rooted in an analytic approach. as such, cog sci will probably fit more neatly into the gaps in social philosophy than social science theory, but i do believe that it can, with a few tweaks, still be compatible with social science theory. and just for clarification, my use of the term "cog sci" in the past few sentences refers only to the cognition aspect of cog sci, not consciousness; the issue of consciousness remains firmly rooted in the analytic area of philosophy of mind with no theoretical framework from the postmodernist perspective. i believe that once social scientists explore how to incorporate cog sci findings into their theoretical frameworks instead of dwelling on cog sci's failures, shortcomings, and quagmires that cog sci can make a notable contribution to improving the theoretical frameworks of social science, and in turn, improve the scientific aspect of inquiry in the social sciences.


qualia and social science clarified

i believe my previous post requires a bit of nuancing to be fully understood. the key quote was:

this presents an epistemological dilemma for social science: it can either have the experimenter, in trying to fulfill his intentionality for anticipating qualia for his subjects and himself and the rest of society, limit the scope of his research based on these expectations and increase the odds that the experiment's results will result in the qualia of his subjects, himself, and other people all being compatible with his initial intentionality, *or* the experimenter can ignore possible expectations for the effects of the experiment's results on his and other people's qualia and only focus on the possible qualia of his subjects.


ok, so you're probably asking yourself, "what does this mean?" first, i will try to parse the meaning of the above, followed by an example. based on what i have previously explained, the unintentional goals of social science aren't the establishment of universal truths, they are optimization of quaila, which is a subjective entity and cannot be objectively measured. this doesn't result in the epistemological scope of social science being narrower, but "compromised/less scientific" if universal truths -- if there are such things in social science, being most likely in the form of a behavior -- established are associated with quaila that is subjective, thus rendering the universal truth, being considered holistically in conjunction with qualia, epistemically subjective. however, the epistemological scope of social science is narrower because the experimenter has to consider the quaila of himself/herself, other people, and the subjects. the goal of hard science is not the optimization of quaila -- qualia simply must be compatible with the results of the experiment -- but even if it were, if only the experimenter and subjects were involved in the experiment and the experimenter's interest in science optimized his/her quaila, then hard science would not have an epistemologically narrower scope. if you want to expand this further to include people outside of the experiment, then if the overall intentions of science were to improve technology, which would in turn optimize the qualia of the outside people, one could still maintain the the epistemological scope of science is unaffected by qualia. of course, if the goal is simply to make qualia compatible with the results of the experiment, then hard science's epistemological scope remains fully entact.

let's review what i have just written using a quote from philosopher john searle. searle maintains that epistemic objectivity does not preclude ontological subjectivity. this is true for hard science, although usually ontology is objective, which does not affect its epistemological scope. on the other hand, in social science, epistemic objectivity does preclude ontological subjectivity because universal truths cannot be isolated independently of subjects' quaila, which are subjective, thus making associated universal truths subjective, which in turn rendering the universal truths invalid. so in order to run experiments in social science, there must be epistemic subjectivity. the debate is whether the experimenter wants to recognize the subjectivity before the experiment starts and therefore have the epistemological scope be more likely to be compatible with the results or if the experimenter wants to ignore the subjectivity before the experiment starts and therefore have the epistemological scope be less likely to be compatible with the results.

ok, finally an example to demonstrate my philosophy. imagine that you are a social scientist and want to prove, or at least gain further insight into whether human nature is good or bad. in this position, it is your responsibility to account for the expected qualia of yourself, your subjects, and outside people following the results of the experiment. let's assume that the optimization of qualia for everyone is predicated on the results indicating that human nature is good. remember the statement from the previous paragraph: the debate is whether the experimenter wants to recognize the subjectivity before the experiment starts and therefore have the epistemological scope be more likely to be compatible with the results. so, let's imagine that this experiment is about giving one subject a certain amount of money to spend freely, and when faced with a situation in which a customer in line is a dollar short of being able to purchase all necessary items (say, household items at a store), the customer can choose to either spend all of his/her money on his/her own items, or give a dollar to the customer in need. as the experimenter, you must decide which amount of money most optimizes the qualia of everyone. for example, at first you consider giving the subject $100, but then realize that most people wouldn't find a person giving one dollar to a person in need -- 1% of his/her spending allowance -- wouldn't go very far to establishing that human nature was good. upon much contemplating, you finally decide that giving the subject $20 is the best way to optimize qualia for everyone and you run the experiment this way. it turns out that in your experiment, the subject with the $20 is generous enough to give the needy customer a dollar to buy his/her necessary items. from this experiment, people infer that human nature is genuinely good, thus optimizing the qualia of the experimenter, the subjects, and outside people. now, consider the other option: the experimenter wants to ignore the subjectivity before the experiment starts and therefore have the epistemological scope be less likely to be compatible with the results. in this case, say the experimenter believes that the truest test of altruism is 80/20 selfish/selfless, thus meaning that the tipping point of determining whether human nature is good (altruistic/selfless) or bad (selfish). to represent this accurately in the experiment, the amount required for donation must be 20% of a person's free spending money -- $1 being 20% of $5. however, the experimenter disregards possible and expected qualia of everyone following the results of the experiment. let's assume that the experiment is run 10 times, and 8 out of 10 times, the subject with $5 spending money does not offer a dollar to the needy customer. this would seem to provide pretty firm support for the theory that human nature is more bad than good. now, upon learning of this result, everyone in academia and people learning about the experiment's results from the media are devastated by the ramifications of the experiment for human nature, thus not optimizing their qualia. in turn, by having sub-optimal qualia, most people go to work the next day feeling slightly depressed, and the gross gdp of the country declines in the following days and weeks because of this. this cannot be considered "progress"; in fact, in this case, social science would seem to have caused society to "regress". furthermore, returning to the original premises, by ignoring the subjectivity before starting the experiment, the epistemological scope, inherently subjective in social science, has proven to be incompatible with the results. compare this to hard science: the results of the experiments do not compromise the epistemological scope because the establishment of universal truths is not associated with anyone's qualia. it is only when you bring up science's effects on society through technology that the issue of subjectivity emerges (or the case of the experimenter's qualia), but this subjectivity is ontological, not epistemic.

(btw, if you are concerned with the issue of qualia, simply replace qualia with "qualitative aspects of consciousness" and my argument works just as well without getting stuck in the debate over whether or not qualia actually exists.)

so, what, if anything, does all of this mean? practically speaking, absolutely nothing. for example, consider the discovery of a universal truth, like e = mc^2. most certainly, this being one of the world's most famous equations, had a monumental impact not only on twentieth century physics, but on the world and people's schemas of the world in general (fwiw, time magazine named einstein the most important person of the twentieth century). so, it is obvious that universal truths can have a far-reaching effect on society, certainly as much as, if not more, than social science experiments, with an extreme example being the one i gave about have a country's gdp negatively affected due to widespread mild depression induced by learning about the experiment's results. however, the difference is that the change induced by a universal truth in people's mental states is ontological -- consciousness being ontologically subjective but epistemologically objective -- whereas the change induced by a social science experiment, resulting in changes in people's qualia, is epistemological -- consciousness being epistemologically *and* ontologically subjective. yes, i know this is really nitpicking, but what did you expect? after science has been so brutally attacked by some postmodernists, classifying science as an historical, social, and cultural phenomenon -- a definition that, while not completely untrue, is certainly lazy and can lead to dangerous inferences -- i figured i'd engage in the gamesmanship by throwing their nonsense right back in their faces using similar sneaky, but legal tactics. i rest my case.